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THE  INTEREST  OF  AMERICA 

IN    INTERNATIONAL 

CONDITIONS 


THE 

INTEREST   OF    AMERICA 

IN  INTERNATIONAL 

CONDITIONS 


BV 

A.  T.  MAHAN,  D.C.L.,  LL.D. 

Captain,  United  States  Navy 

Author  of  "  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History ,"  '    The 
Interest  of  America  in  Sea  Power, "  etc. 


BOSTON 

LITTLE,  BROWN,  AND   COMPANY 

1918 


<. 


Copyright,  iqio, 
By   A.    T.    Mahan. 


All  rights  reserved 


bioioa*« 


printers 
8.  J.  Paekhjll  <fc  Co.,  Boston,  U.S.A. 


CONTENTS 

Page 
I.   The  Origin   and  Character  of    Present 

International  Groupings  in  Europe      .         i 

II.  The  Present  Predominance  of  Germany  in 
Europe  —  Its  Foundations  and  Tend- 
encies   69 

III.  Relations  between  the  East  and  the  West     125 

IV.  The  Open  Door 185 


•12  i  I 


I 


THE   ORIGIN   AND    CHARACTER 

OF  PRESENT  INTERNATIONAL 

GROUPINGS  IN   EUROPE 


THE  INTEREST  OF  AMERICA 


IN 


INTERNATIONAL   CONDITIONS 


THE    ORIGIN    AND    CHARACTER    OF    PRESENT 
INTERNATIONAL   GROUPINGS   IN  EUROPE 

IN  all  countries,  the  tendency  of  the 
general  population  is  to  concentrate  at- 
tention upon  those  questions  which  are 
commonly  called  domestic.  The  individual 
man's  immediate  neighborhood,  the  state, 
territory,  or  province,  where  he  lives,  the 
particular  needs  of  the  region  in  which  his 
interests  lie,  have  with  him  a  prominence 
upon  which  it  is  needless  to  insist,  and 
which  is  both  natural  and  proper.  The  fa- 
miliar phrase,  "  local  self-government,"  rep- 
resented to  American  thought  by  the  rights 
of  the  States  and  by  the  tradition  of  the 
town  meeting,  conveys  to  our  minds,  and 


The  interest  of  America 


there  maintains,  the  necessary  recognition 
that  those  immediately  upon  the  spot,  and 
conversant  with  conditions  by  actual  daily 
contact,  are  best  fitted  to  control  and 
administer  the  affairs  of  the  local  commu- 
nity. The  State  governments,  the  various 
municipalities,  the  subdivisions  into  towns 
and  villages,  are  outward  visible  signs  of 
this  conviction;  which  with  most  of  us, 
however,  reflects  a  simple  tradition,  not 
our  own  reasoned  apprehension  and  knowl- 
edge. 

A  due  recognition  of  this  general  truth, 
which  intrusts  the  immediate  locality  with 
the  functions  of  local  administration,  lies 
at  the  foundation  of  successful  working 
institutions.  But  at  a  very  early  period 
of  our  national  history,  before  independence 
was  achieved,  in  measure  even  before  it  had 
been  declared,  —  that  is,  during  the  colonial 
period,  —  it  was  seen  that  much  more  than 
local   self-government   was   needed,   if   the 


In  International  Conditions 


results  at  which  such  government  aimed 
were  to  be  attained  effectually.  The  habit 
of  mind  bred  by  acquaintance  with  such  a 
system  only,  which  did  not  look  outward, 
upon  other  communities,  except  with  a 
jealous  prepossession  notoriously  common 
in  the  inter-relations  of  the  thirteen  colonies, 
militated  distinctly,  not  only  against  the 
advantage  of  all,  the  common  advantage, 
but  also  against  the  advantage  of  each. 
The  necessity  was  seen  of  formal  inter- 
colonial relations,  corresponding  in  char- 
acter to  inter-national  relations,  although 
pregnant  of  a  still  closer  tie. 

The  epithet  "  provincial,"  by  its  associa- 
tions more  applicable  to  Europe  than  to 
America,  nevertheless,  by  its  implication 
of  narrowness,  befits  the  prejudices  and 
conduct  which  notoriously  characterized 
our  early  history,  colonial,  state,  and  sec- 
tional, up  to  the  War  of  Secession.  The 
harm  of  provincialism,  of  provincial  habits 


The  Interest  of  America 


of  thought  and  act,  is  not  that  they  reflect 
the  conditions  of  the  province,  or  section; 
for  in  so  far  they  are  beneficial.  It  is  that 
they  excluded  proportioned  sense  of  the 
relations  of  other  communities  to  one's 
own.  In  this,  a  metropolis  may  be  as 
hopelessly  provincial  as  the  remotest  cor- 
ner of  the  country,  and  with  less  excuse. 
Wall  Street  is  perhaps  provincial,  despite 
its  numerous  outlying  interests. 

The  same  line  of  thought  applies  to  the 
inter-relations  of  the  greater  community, 
that  of  nations.  The  first  concern  of  each 
member  of  this  is  doubtless  its  own  internal 
affairs,  the  ordering  of  its  own  house.  There 
is  nothing  that  the  individual,  whether  man, 
or  community,  or  nation,  can  contribute 
to  the  general  welfare  of  greater  value  than 
the  soundness  of  his  or  its  own  principles 
and  life.  But  a  realization  of  this  truth 
which  stops  short  there,  neglecting  to  con- 
sider and  to  appreciate  the  conditions  and 


In  International  Conditions 


necessary  tendencies  of  other  men,  or  of 
other  members  of  the  international  com- 
munity, is  provincial  in  the  worst  sense. 

An  apt  illustration  of  the  usual  indiffer- 
ence of  our  American  public  to  international 
conditions,  except  for  brief  moments  when 
some  circumstance  out  of  the  usual  course 
threatens  to  involve  ourselves,  or  traverses 
some  of  our  accepted  notions,  is  to  be  found 
in  the  stationary  condition  of  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  Department  of  State  between 
the  close  of  the  War  of  Secession  and  the 
end  of  the  War  with  Spain.  The  impetus 
given  to  international  relations  by  the  later 
war,  alike  in  its  immediate  antecedents 
and  in  its  consequences,  is  obvious  even  to 
a  casual  consideration;  but  the  require- 
ment for  development  has  been  little  ap- 
preciated, outside  of  the  Government  circles 
directly  involved  in  the  additional  labor  en- 
tailed, or  by  the  very  few  and  for  the  most 
part  silent  persons  who  interest  themselves 


The  Interest  of  America 


in  such  matters.  The  public  attitude  still 
holds  good  which  a  shrewd  old  member  of 
Congress  is  said  to  have  expressed  in  his 
advice  to  one  newly  elected:  to  avoid  ser- 
vice upon  a  fancy  committee  like  that 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  if  he  wished  to  retain 
his  hold  upon  his  constituents,  because 
they  cared  nothing  about  international 
questions. 

It  is  curious  to  remember  that  this  at- 
titude of  international  indifference  was  less 
marked  among  Americans  in  the  colonial 
period,  when  the  several  colonies  were  in 
the  strictest  sense  provinces,  than  it  after- 
wards became;  perhaps  even  less  than  it 
now  is,  with  all  our  advantages  of  steam 
and  telegraph,  of  daily  information  from 
the  four  quarters  of  the  globe.  The  rea- 
son, of  course,  is  not  far  to  seek,  either  of 
the  earlier  interest,  or  of  the  later  indif- 
ference. The  American  of  the  ante-revolu- 
tionary period  was  directly  connected  with 


In  International  Conditions 


Europe,  economically  as  well  as  politically, 
to  a  greater  degree,  relatively  to  that  period 
of  development,  than  he  is  now.  He  was 
affected  not  only  by  the  relations  of  his 
community  to  European  states,  but  also, 
and  very  closely,  by  the  relations  of  those 
states  to  one  another;  precisely  as  the 
whole  European  family  of  to-day  under- 
goes a  tremor  when  a  shock  occurs  in  any 
one  of  its  more  unstable  commonwealths. 
Rumors  of  European  wars  disquieted  the 
American  colonist;  the  outbreak  of  war 
involved  him  as  a  participant.  To  use  a 
graphic  expression  of  Macaulay's,  concern- 
ing the  great  Frederick's  seizure  of  Silesia,  — 
"The  evils  produced  were  felt  in  lands 
where  the  name  of  Prussia  was  unknown. 
In  order  that  he  might  rob  a  neighbor 
whom  he  had  promised  to  defend,  black 
men  fought  on  the  coast  of  Coromandel, 
and  red  men  scalped  each  other  by  the 
Great  Lakes  of  North  America." 


io  The  Interest  of  America 

Rare  and  scanty  as  communications  then 
were,  they  were  characterized  by  the  de- 
liberateness  and  fullness  of  the  letter  writer, 
not  pressed  to  catch  a  mail;  while  the 
reader  had  time  more  closely  to  discern 
and  appreciate  the  determining  conditions 
of  affairs,  because  his  attention  was  less  dis- 
tracted by  a.  daily  succession  of  numerous 
insignificant  items.  The  contrast  between 
such  comprehension  and  the  foreign-news 
columns  of  most  American  newspapers  of 
to-day  is  that  between  a  telegram  and 
the  domestic  correspondence  of  near  rela- 
tions. Few  things  are  more  significant,  or 
suggestive,  than  the  space  and  character 
of  the  information  concerning  foreign  com- 
plications to  be  found  in  American  dailies, 
and  that  given  by  their  British  contempora- 
ries. This  reflects  the  difference  of  interest 
in  readers;  between  those  who,  like  our 
colonial  forefathers,  felt  themselves  directly 
interested,  and  those  who,  like  most  among 


In  International  Conditions  n 

ourselves,  believe  the  United  States  only 
remotely  concerned  in  events,  unless  they 
touch  us  immediately. 

There  was  much  to  originate  the  exist- 
ing attitude  of  mind,  and  there  is  still 
much  to  perpetuate  it;  though  it  may  be 
believed  that  it  has  now  become  an  anach- 
ronism. Speedily  after  our  War  of  In- 
dependence came  the  French  Revolution 
and  the  wars  ensuing  from  it.  The  new 
nation  found  itself  at  once  in  a  network  of 
successive  embarrassments,  arising  from 
engagements  with  France  contracted  in  the 
past.  Upon  this  followed  a  variety  of  vex- 
atious incidents  resulting  from  the  maritime 
war  between  that  country  and  Great  Brit- 
ain. Hence  sprang  Washington's  fervent 
warning  against  entangling  alliances,  and 
a  most  earnest  desire  on  the  part  of  his 
successors  in  the  Presidency  to  keep  free 
from  involvement  in  European  quarrels. 
Events  seconded  this  wish.     The  extension 


12  The  Interest  of  America 

of  our  territory  from  the  Atlantic  to  the 
Pacific,  and  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  by  the 
acquisition  of  Louisiana  and  the  Floridas, 
in  1803  and  1821,  gave  to  our  boundaries 
precision  of  definition  by  natural  features, 
thus  avoiding  contentions  inherent  in  arti- 
ficial demarcation;  while  the  revolt  of 
Spanish  America  eliminated  European  lo- 
calized contact  with  the  new  republic, 
except  on  the  side  of  Canada. 

Coincident  with  these  realized  conditions 
came  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  in  the  early 
twenties  of  the  last  century.  The  leading 
purpose  of  this  was  to  exclude  European 
intrusion  from  this  hemisphere,  and  thus 
to  accomplish  the  wish  to  avoid  entangle- 
ments, whether  of  alliance  or  dispute.  Ex- 
perience of  centuries  had  demonstrated 
that  disturbance  in  America  was  sure  to 
arise  from  European  conflicts,  and  to  be 
colored  by  them,  when  European  posses- 
sion existed.     To  prevent  the  extension  of 


In  International  Conditions  13 

such  a  cause,  by  new  acquisitions  or  by 
exchanges  between  European  Powers,  was 
the  essential  spirit  of  the  Doctrine;  and 
although  the  maintenance  of  it  has  been 
fruitful  of  contentions,  it  doubtless  has  con- 
tributed markedly  to  the  end  in  view.  It 
also  fixed  and  intensified  the  repulsion  to 
association  with  European  policies,  hard- 
ening into  a  prepossession  still  operative, 
and  which  perhaps  has  become  unreason- 
ing, and  obstructive,  as  prejudice  always 
is;  preventing  a  clear  vision  of  the  ten- 
dencies shown  by  the  present  evident 
unrest  in  the  state  of  the  world.  Conser- 
vatism is  a  fundamental  and  admirable  in- 
gredient in  national  policy;  but  like  the 
Constitution,  the  great  exponent  and  guar- 
dian of  the  conservative  forces,  there  must 
be  found  in  national  ideals  a  certain  elas- 
ticity, and  capacity  for  progress.  No  de- 
gree of  conservatism  will  prevent  changes 
external  to  one's  self;    and  if  the  man  or 


14  The  Interest  of  America 

nation  cannot  find  adaptation  to  the  times, 
even  that  which  seems  to  be  held  most 
firmly  may  be  lost. 

The  origin  of  American  aloofness  from 
questions  of  European  policy,  as  well  in 
interest  as  in  act,  is  thus  to  be  found 
in  incidents  of  our  early  history,  already 
briefly  noticed.  It  is  needless  to  com- 
ment, beyond  mere  mention,  upon  the  fact 
that  this  indifference  was  fostered  and 
perpetuated  by  the  internal  sectional  diffi- 
culties consequent  upon  the  disputes  about 
slavery.  From  the  promulgation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  end  of  the  War  of 
Secession  the  nation  was  occupied  almost 
exclusively  in  endeavoring  to  keep  its 
house  in  order,  and  to  settle  national  self- 
government  upon  solid  foundations.  This 
entire  period,  of  over  a  generation,  was 
spent  in  attempting  the  problem  of  main- 
taining unity  —  the  essence  of  national 
vigor  —  by    reconciling   the    irreconcilable. 


In  International  Conditions  15 

In  any  country,  particularly  in  one  as  ex- 
tensive as  ours,  divergence  of  interests  be- 
tween sections  must  give  rise  to  oppositions 
which  may  be  called  sectional;  but  in  our 
experience  no  such  divergence  has  been 
virulent  and  menacing,  as  was  that  which 
confronted  with  each  other  two  systems 
of  labor,  radically  hostile  in  spirit  as  in 
form,  and  modifying,  not  only  industrial 
and  economical  conditions,  but  the  mental 
and  moral  characteristics  of  the  communi- 
ties affected.  To  our  present  subject  this 
situation  is  of  interest  chiefly  as  contribut- 
ing to  explain  the  persistent  alienation  of 
national  thought  from  international  rela- 
tions. The  nation  did  not  possess  the 
conditions  of  external  effectiveness.  In- 
ternally sick,  only  partially  developed,  im- 
mature, it  had  not  the  strength;  while, 
preoccupied  with  the  symptoms  of  its 
malady,  it  had  no  attention  to  spare  for 
remote  external  events. 


1 6  The  Interest  of  America 

Yet,  inasmuch  as  this  portion  of  our 
national  progress  is  in  essential  character- 
istics only  a  repetition  of  other  history, 
though  differing  in  the  particular  causes, 
it  is  well  that  the  stage  thus  differentiated 
by  its  peculiar  features  from  that  which 
preceded  and  from  that  which  followed  — 
from  the  present  in  which  we  are  now 
living  —  be  viewed  in  its  analogies  to 
other  historical  periods.  States  are  made 
up  of  human  beings;  and  hence  there  is  in 
their  experience  a  certain  inevitableness 
of  tendency  which  needs  to  be  observed, 
if  only  to  avoid,  or  to  modify  in  action. 
Slavery  has  not  been  the  only  cause  that 
has  divided  nations  sectionally.  Sectional 
division  has  arisen  from  differences  of  re- 
ligion, and  from  differences  of  race.  In 
Germany  the  line  of  division  was  between 
north  and  south;  the  south  Roman  Catho- 
lic, the  north  Protestant.  The  issue  was 
a  political  disintegration  of  the  entire  ter- 


In  International  Conditions  17 

ritory  which  has  been  remedied  only  in  our 
own  day,  —  subsequent  to  the  War  of 
Secession.  In  France  the  general  line  of 
demarcation  was  again  East  and  West; 
the  strength  of  Protestantism  was  in  the 
south.  In  these  two  nations,  the  religious 
feature  was  not  the  sole  cause  of  internal 
dissensions;  but  it  alone  was  distinctly 
sectional,  and  in  virtue  of  this  local  con- 
centration it  was  the  most  powerful,  the 
most  persistent,  the  longest  to  survive. 

The  instructive  feature  for  us  to  note 
is  that  while  this  internal  dissension  lasted 
the  international  relation  of  the  nations 
concerned  was  that  of  being  acted  upon  by 
other  people;  in  short,  defensive.  Spain, 
unified  in  spirit  by  the  perpetual  religious 
wars  with  the  Moors,  and  consolidated  in 
territory  by  their  expulsion,  and  by  the 
marriage  of  Castile  with  Aragon,  was  then 
the  united  nation  which  found  itself  able 
to    impress    its    policy    upon    foreign    com- 


1 8  The  Interest  of  America 

munities.  Were  its  aims  good  or  bad,  it 
was  in  a  position  to  enforce  them;  to  carry- 
on  vigorous  external  action  wherever  its 
particular  interests,  or  its  more  general 
views,  disposed  it  to  interfere.  For  over 
a  century,  therefore,  Spain  was  the  domi- 
nant power  in  Europe;  because  united, 
while  Germany  and  France  were  rent 
asunder  by  internal  divisions,  and  Great 
Britain  was  still  politically  a  divided  island, 
England  against  Scotland.  In  general  out- 
line, whatever  the  particular  manifesta- 
tion from  time  to  time,  all  these  stood 
on  the  defensive,  internationally,  against 
Spain,  for  over  a  century 

France  was  the  first  to  extricate  herself 
from  her  internal  difficulties.  The  nations 
of  western  Europe  were  in  one  respect  hap- 
pier than  ourselves,  to  whom  slavery  has 
bequeathed  a  still  unsolved  racial  question, 
mainly  sectional  in  its  distribution,  but 
intensified     by     fundamental     distinctions. 


In  International  Conditions  19 

While  not  without  sectional  characteristics, 
they  possessed  elements  of  homogeneous- 
ness  which  lent  themselves  to  national 
consolidation.  To  recall  the  events  which 
led  to  the  concentration  of  national  power 
in  France  is  not  in  point  here.  The  fact 
alone  concerns  us,  that,  under  the  succes- 
sive administrations  of  Henry  IV,  Riche- 
lieu, Mazarin,  and  Louis  XIV,  consolida- 
tion and  concentration  were  effected;  while 
during  the  process,  and  consequent  upon 
its  completion,  there  developed  and  was 
sustained  a  powerful  external  policy  which, 
like  that  of  Spain,  whose  it  supplanted, 
made  itself  felt,  as  by  a  necessary  law  of 
being,  in  all  the  international  relations  of 
the  day.  To  France  there  belonged  the  at- 
tribute, which  we  now  see  so  often  named 
in  current  writing,  called  the  hegemony  of 
Europe;  one  accompaniment  of  which  was 
the  subversion  of  the  preponderance  pre- 
viously exerted  by  the  Empire  of  Spain. 


20  The  Interest  of  America 

The  propriety  of  the  policy  and  measures 
which  under  these  circumstances  marked 
the  conduct  of  France  is  less  to  our  modern 
purpose,  as  observers  of  contemporary 
events,  than  is  the  reaction  provoked.  An 
overweening  power,  which  by  its  varied 
influence  trammeled  and  affected  the  in- 
ternal and  international  relations  of  all 
other  states,  incited  a  general  alliance 
among  the  nations  of  Europe  to  withstand 
the  progress  of  a  predominance  which 
already  threatened  and,  if  unchecked,  might 
accomplish  the  dependence  of  the  whole  of 
Europe  upon  a  single  state.  This  was  the 
manifestation  of  a  tendency  analogous  to 
that  by  which  Nature  herself  restores  con- 
ditions after  a  disturbance;  a  movement 
towards  an  equilibrium  among  the  members 
of  the  European  family,  then  the  entire 
world  of  civilization,  as  we  understand 
that  term.  It  was  a  spontaneous  effort  of 
self-preservation,    among    numerous    scat- 


In  International  Conditions  21 

tered  communities,  directed  against  a  single 
concentrated  highly  organized  oppressor; 
and,  despite  the  inherent  feebleness  of 
alliances  and  coalitions,  it  effected  its  pur- 
pose. Louis  XIV  was  dragged  down  from 
the  height  of  his  power.  A  century  later, 
under  Napoleon,  a  similar  preponderance 
was  attained  by  France;  but  the  gigantic 
fabric  erected  by  him  was  overthrown  also 
by  the  same  process  of  combined  resistance. 
To  the  imagination  of  statesmen,  these 
beneficent  achievements  consecrated  the 
means  by  which  they  had  been  effected, 
viz.:  a  concert  of  action  among  states, 
framed  to  resist  such  oppression  as  had 
been  recently  experienced  on  the  part  suc- 
cessively of  Spain  and  of  France.  Upon 
observers  of  international  politics  had  been 
produced  an  impression,  closely  analogous 
to  that  made  upon  the  people  of  England, 
at  about  the  same  time,  by  the  burden  of 
Cromwell's   rule   by    means   of   a   standing 


22  The  Interest  of  America 

army.  The  concentration  of  military  force 
within  Great  Britain,  as  an  instrument  of 
government,  dominating  all  interests  and 
all  other  elements  of  popular  self-expres- 
sion, reflected  on  a  smaller  scale  the  con- 
dition of  international  relations  when  the 
physical  force  of  a  single  state,  by  its  con- 
centration of  energy,  predominated  over 
the  disseminated  and  often  conflicting  wills 
of  the  remainder  of  the  group.  The  means 
of  counteraction,  beginning  in  alliances, 
was  formulated  into  the  familiar  expres- 
sion, "Balance  of  Power,"  the  opposite  of 
preponderance;  a  conception  which,  while 
it  anteceded  the  birth  of  the  phrase  itself, 
continued  for  three  centuries  to  influence 
decisively  the  actions  of  statesmen.  The 
distinguished  English  historian,  Bishop 
Stubbs,  has  written:  "The  Balance  of 
Power,  however  defined,  that  is,  whatever 
the  Powers  between  which  it  is  necessary 
to  maintain  an  equilibrium,  such  that  the 


In  International  Conditions  23 

weaker  should  not  be  crushed  by  the 
stronger,  is  the  principle  which  gives  unity 
to  the  plot  of  modern  European  history. 
It  is  the  foremost  idea  of  the  three  centu- 
ries, 1 500-1 800.  Whatever  the  drama, 
this  is  the  key  to  the  plot."  In  the  course 
of  time  the  conception  received  an  elabora- 
tion which  it  was  thought  would  assure 
its  effectiveness  as  a  preserver  of  the  status 
quo,  of  equilibrium  and  of  peace.  This 
process  of  formulation  resembled  the  elab- 
oration which  of  late  years  has  been  deal- 
ing with  International  Arbitration  as  a 
means  to  an  end;  indeed  to  the  same  end, 
of  peace,  by  cooperation  on  an  established 
basis  of  international  equity. 

Artificial  arrangements  such  as  these 
are  effective  only  in  so  far  as  they  take  ac- 
count of,  and  correspond  to,  the  contem- 
porary qualities  of  human  nature;  to  its 
virtues,  defects,  passions,  interests.  The 
remark  applies  equally  to  Balance  of  Power 


24  The  Interest  of  America 

and  to  schemes  of  Arbitration.  Underly- 
ing them  all  is  a  raw  material,  which  can- 
not be  worked  into  a  finished  product 
possessing  characteristics  not  found  in  the 
material  itself.  In  the  great  settlement 
following  the  downfall  of  Napoleon,  it  was 
thought  that  by  territorial  distributions 
there  could  be  constituted  an  effective 
equilibrium,  or  balance,  among  the  five 
great  Powers;  while  the  integrity  of  the 
lesser  states,  as  then  determined,  would  be 
secured  by  a  basis  of  guarantees.  Attempts 
to  violate  such  conditions  would  be  the 
business  of  everybody,  as  had  been  con- 
sciously the  case  during  the  previous  cen- 
tury concerning  the  stipulations  of  Utrecht 
in  1 7 13;  the  last  universal  settlement  prior 
to  that  of  181 5.  Ascendencies,  such  as  the 
world  had  seen,  were  to  be  stopped  in  their 
beginnings;  not  allowed,  as  with  Philip  II 
of  Spain,  Louis  XIV,  and  Napoleon,  to 
grow   into   a   colossus,   overshadowing   the 


In  International  Conditions  25 

continent.  Thus  the  Balance  of  Power  en- 
dorsed international  Intervention  upon 
recognized  occasion. 

The  scheme  practically  assumed  that 
equilibrium  of  power  and  assurance  of 
quiet,  if  realized,  gave  also  equality  of  con- 
ditions and  opportunity;  otherwise,  how- 
ever adroit  the  momentary  adjustment, 
how  could  contentment  be  permanent? 
and  without  contentment  how  expect  men 
to  be  quiet?  The  assumption  is  much  like 
one  which  should  maintain  that,  give  all 
men  an  equal  degree  of  physical  strength, 
they  start  fair  on  the  race  of  life.  We  know 
from  experience  that  equalities  much  more 
extensive  in  scope  result  speedily  in  in- 
equalities, due  to  individual  capacities, 
mental,  moral,  or  artificial;  and  that  from 
these  inequalities  spring  social  and  eco- 
nomical dissatisfaction  and  dissension.  The 
status  quo  of  Europe  in  181 5  was  not  merely 
one  of  a  balance  of  regularized  power,  arti- 


26  The  Interest  of  America 

ficially  constituted.  There  were  among 
the  different  states,  upon  the  equilibrium 
of  which  the  scheme  depended,  varying 
stages  of  political,  social,  and  industrial 
development;  varying  conceptions  of  right; 
varying  degrees  of  wealth  and  opportunity. 
These  speedily,  and  progressively,  as  time 
advanced,  would  give  rise  to  national  dis- 
satisfactions, whence  in  due  order  follow 
national  ambitions  and  disputes.  The  sub- 
sequent history  of  Europe  to  to-day  is  the 
record  of  these  strivings;  of  their  workings 
and  results,  based  upon  and  conforming  to 
the  raw  material  of  human  nature  swayed 
by  interest  and  sentiment. 

With  the  overthrow  of  Louis  XIV  the 
predominance  in  Europe  had  passed  to 
Great  Britain.  This  was  almost  unnoted 
at  the  time,  but  increasingly  demonstrated 
by  the  events  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
and  clearly  recognizable  in  1815.  The  new 
condition,  however,   was  essentially  differ- 


In  International  Conditions  27 

ent  from  that  of  its  predecessors;  and  was 
so  understood,  though  perhaps  not  formally 
analyzed  by  contemporaries.  The  power  of 
Great  Britain  was  not  that  of  predominance, 
strictly  so  called.  She  never  had  the  mili- 
tary strength,  as  for  a  time  Philip  II,  Louis 
XIV,  and  Napoleon  had,  to  make  her 
successfully  aggressive  against  a  continent 
determined  on  resistance.  Her  predomi- 
nance was  that  of  a  determinative  factor, 
resembling  a  third  party  in  politics;  of  a 
make-weight,  which  casts  the  balance  from 
one  side  to  the  other.  Her  ability  to  do 
this  lay  in  the  defensive  strength  of  her 
insular  position,  which  had  enabled  her  to 
concentrate  attention  upon  industrial  en- 
terprises and  commerce;  secured  from  the 
disturbances  of  war,  which  are  most  griev- 
ous when  the  national  territory  is  open  to 
invasion.  This  immunity  began  with  the 
union  of  England  and  Scotland  under  one 
crown,  in  1603;    consummated  by  the  full 


28  The  Interest  of  America 

political  union,  with  a  single  parliament,  in 
1707,  six  years  before  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht. 
Again  an  internal  union,  of  provinces  polit- 
ically separate  but  racially  homogeneous, 
was  the  precursor  of  national  expansion 
and  self-assertion. 

The  expansion  and  aggression  of  Eng- 
land, again,  differed  from  those  of  her 
predecessors;  in  this,  that  she  turned  not 
towards  Europe,  but  towards  the  world 
outside.  This  may  be  considered  truly  as 
the  beginning  of  that  which  we  now  know 
as  "world  politics."  In  this  England  led 
the  way;  not  that  she  had  not  predecessors, 
and  competitors,  but  in  that  she  alone,  in 
addition  to  an  insatiate  thirst  for  colonies, 
saw  in  them  not  so  much  possessions  as 
extensions  of  England  herself.  The  British 
colony  in  this  resembled  the  Roman  Colonia; 
it  was  politically  as  well  as  industrially  an 
expansion  of  the  mother  state.  This  did 
not  save  Great  Britain  from  a  selfish  policy 


In  International  Conditions  29 

towards  her  colonies;  but  because  they, 
as  formally  constituted,  were  considered 
the  abode  of  Englishmen,  entitled  to  all 
the  traditional  and  constitutional  privi- 
leges of  English  citizens,  there  existed  from 
the  first  an  underlying  spirit  of  apprecia- 
tion, which,  after  the  severe  lesson  of  the 
War  of  American  Independence,  —  during 
which  the  English  rights  of  the  colonists 
were  admitted  by  a  very  large  minority  of 
the  English  at  home,  —  has  resulted  in 
the  formal  and  cordial  relations  that  are 
now  the  common  aim,  professed  by  all 
the  English-speaking  communities  of  the 
British  Empire. 

It  therefore  is  not  the  individual  part 
played  by  Great  Britain  in  the  struggle 
against  Napoleon  which  concerns  us  here. 
Decisive  as  that  was,  it  was  founded  upon 
the  advantages  before  named,  insular  and 
industrial,  which  had  enabled  her,  and 
induced  her,  to  the  acquisition  of  her  colo- 


3<d  The  Interest  of  America 

nial  markets,  and  upon  them  and  her  own 
defensive  security  had  developed  the  com- 
mercial and  industrial  resources  which  fi- 
nanced the  alliances  against  the  Emperor. 
That  struggle  over,  the  industrial  and 
commercial  preeminence  remained,  as  did 
the  colonies.  These  constituted  the  start 
over  all  the  other  Powers,  possessed  by- 
Great  Britain  in  the  European  race  then 
beginning,  which  characterized  the  whole 
of  the  wonderful  century  but  recently 
ended.  Disfigured  though  this  was  in  its 
course  by  not  infrequent  wars,  and  marked 
by  great  political  changes,  its  distinguish- 
ing feature  has  been  that  of  industrial 
development,  seconded  by  the  coincident 
advances  of  science.  The  start  which  Great 
Britain  had,  not  only  in  material  wealth, 
but  in  national  expertness  based  upon  un- 
interrupted industrial  and  commercial  hab- 
its, enabled  her  easily  to  take  the  lead  and 
long  to  keep  it  unchallenged. 


In  International  Conditions  31 

This  was  not  the  only  great  disparity 
under  which  the  European  states  labored 
in  181 5.  The  exhaustion  from  wars  almost 
incessant  for  twenty  years  had  grievously 
affected  the  populations  of  the  continental 
countries,  as  well  as  their  industries.  The 
victims  of  war  are  chiefly  men  in  the  prime 
of  life,  the  potential  fathers  of  a  new  genera- 
tion. Great  Britain  had  fought,  and  many 
of  her  citizens  had  fallen;  but  her  armies 
were  relatively  small,  and  naval  control, 
her  special  military  function,  called  for 
few  great  battles.  France  came  out  of  her 
Revolutionary  struggles,  of  which  the  wars 
of  Napoleon  are  an  integral  part,  not  only 
with  immense  losses,  but  with  the  incubus 
of  voluntary  non-increase  of  population 
which  has  qualified  her  position  in  the 
world.  She  was  embarrassed  also,  and  has 
remained  embarrassed,  by  a  dissemination 
of  national  power  into  an  extensive  admin- 
istrative system,  an  army  of  functionaries; 


32  The  Interest  of  America 

the  maintenance  of  which  not  only  is 
unduly  burdensome,  but  by  the  cumber- 
someness  of  its  constitution  defeats  its  own 
end  of  efficient  government.  Unlike  the 
Germany  of  to-day,  the  preponderant  ele- 
ment of  French  influence  is  not  in  the  govern- 
ment, but  in  the  thrift  of  the  individual 
Frenchman. 

Germany  remained  an  assembly  of  states, 
mostly  petty,  mutually  independent,  as 
before  the  Revolution.  The  existence  of 
two  great  powers,  Austria  and  Prussia, 
recognized  as  German,  rather  emphasized 
than  mitigated  the  absence  of  union  in  the 
German  race.  Their  mutual  opposition, 
traditional  and  otherwise,  constituted  an 
impediment  to  political  unity  until  the 
one  or  the  other  could  be  definitely  subordi- 
nated. The  coincidence,  that  at  this  very 
moment,  three  months  before  Waterloo, 
Bismarck  was  born,1  though  trivial,  is 
1  April  i,  1815. 


In  International  Conditions  33 

impressive.  While  the  rivalry  of  Austria 
and  Prussia  lasted,  Germany  by  inherited 
prepossessions  divided  into  two  groups; 
each  finding  its  center  of  attraction  in  one 
or  other  of  the  two  great  monarchies.  The 
primacy  by  ancient  custom  and  remaining 
prestige  rested  with  Austria,  the  older 
state.  The  political  constitution  of  both 
was  that  of  absolute  monarchy,  intensified 
momentarily  by  the  reaction  from  French 
revolutionary  excesses.  Of  Russia,  the 
fifth  great  Power,  there  is  less  need  to 
speak.  The  uncontrolled  sway  of  the  Czar, 
tempered  by  assassination  but  unchallenged 
by  popular  sentiment,  gave  an  appearance 
of  strength  which  was  by  no  means  wholly 
misleading.  The  strength  was  there;  but 
in  it,  as  in  its  German  contemporaries, 
despotism  was  a  political  weakness,  owing 
to  the  unavoidable  administrative  inter- 
position of  an  irresponsible  bureaucracy 
between  the  ruler  and  the  ruled.     The  last 


34  The  Interest  of  America 

decade  has  witnessed  the  result,  but  not 
yet  the  end,  of  conditions  which  have 
handicapped  Russia,  and  for  an  indefinite 
future  paralyze  her  great  inherent  strength 
through  defective  organization  and  imper- 
fect national  institutions.  The  tendency 
has  been  to  throw  her  out  of  the  European 
race,  back  upon  Asia,  to  which  her  political 
organization  associates  her. 

In  the  situation  thus  sketched,  as  con- 
stituted in  1815,  the  leading  features,  bear- 
ing upon  our  own  contemporary  conditions, 
were  the  material  prosperity  and  world 
system  of  Great  Britain,  and  the  disunion 
of  the  German  race,  which  kept  Germany 
in  political  and  industrial  backwardness; 
making  her,  to  quote  the  late  Chancellor 
of  the  Empire,  Prince  Blilow,  simply  a 
geographical  expression,  and  denying  her 
as  a  whole  the  name  of  a  great  Power. 
This  condition  had  been  fostered  deliber- 
ately by  France,  from  the  days  of  Richelieu 


In  International  Conditions  35 


to  those  of  Napoleon;  and  was  by  him 
continued,  though  modified.  In  these  two 
facts  lay  the  germs  from  which  have  sprung 
the  decisive  present  characteristics  of  Euro- 
pean international  relations,  wherein  are 
continuously  to  be  traced  an  effort  towards 
equilibrium.  It  would  be  perhaps  more 
accurate  to  define  this  effort  as  the  coin- 
cident struggle  towards  preponderance  on 
the  part  of  opposite  groupings  of  the  prin- 
cipal states,  the  result  of  which  is  to  con- 
stitute an  unstable  and  shifting  balance. 
How  unstable  and  how  shifting  this  equi- 
poise will  be  realized  by  those  who  have 
considered  attentively  the  series  of  events 
following  the  revolution  in  Turkey  in  the 
summer  of  1908;  not  in  themselves  alone, 
but  in  the  intricate  network  of  national 
necessities,  ambitions,  and  jealousies,  which 
the  occasion  brought  prominently  into  view. 
In  Germany,  thus  for  a  long  time  dis- 
tanced in  the  race  of  material  prosperity, 


36  The  Interest  of  America 

and  handicapped  by  traditions  of  disunion 
extending  over  centuries,  is  now  to  be 
found  the  beginnings  and  potentiality  of 
an  overshadowing  concentrated  power;  simi- 
lar in  that  respect,  however  different  in 
origin  and  in  characteristics,  to  those  suc- 
cessively known  to  modern  history  in  Spain, 
France,  and  Great  Britain.  It  differs  from 
the  two  former,  when  in  the  height  of  their 
power,  in  that  their  determining  ambitions 
were  confined  to  Europe,  which  then  con- 
stituted for  itself  the  total  of  European 
politics;  all  outside  enterprise  then  resting 
for  its  basis  upon  European  conditions.  It 
differs  again  from  that  of  Great  Britain 
in  that  her  power  rested  wholly  upon  the 
sea,  and  she  at  no  time  wielded  an  irresisti- 
ble army,  such  as  the  combination  of 
Austria  and  Germany  now  presents. 

There  is  found  now  in  Germany  great 
preponderance  of  power,  not  only  military 
but  in  organization  of  every  kind,  coinci- 


In  International  Conditions  37 

dent  with  a  well  ascertained  purpose  of 
playing  a  part  in  world  politics,  the  precise 
character  and  direction  of  which  can  as 
yet  be  only  surmised,  even  by  the  Germans 
themselves,  as  it  must  depend  upon  cir- 
cumstances not  yet  mature,  nor  to  be  cer- 
tainly foreseen.  After  writing  these  words, 
I  find  in  a  recent  instructive  article,1  "Why 
does  Germany  build  war-ships?"  by  Pro- 
fessor Delbriick,  professor  of  history  in  the 
University  of  Berlin,  the  following  just 
remarks:  "The  great  conquests  of  the 
world's  history  have  seldom  been  inspired 
by  mere  ambition.  The  empires  of  the 
world  have  not  been  built  up  from  the  mere 
desire  of  power.  Events  have  generally 
evolved  themselves  so  that  a  conflict  has 
arisen  out  of  comparatively  insignificant 
causes,  such  as  a  border  line  and  a  com- 
mercial right  of  way;  and  the  conqueror 
by  his  very  victory  has  been  obliged  to 
1  The  Contemporary  Review,  October,  1909. 


38  The  Interest  of  America 

enlarge  the  boundary  of  his  country.  Even 
the  Romans  were  not  intentionally  the 
conquerors  of  the  world."  In  Germany's 
European  progress,  the  struggle  with  Aus- 
tria, in  1866,  seems  to  have  been  foreseen 
and  deliberately  contrived;  whereas  with 
France,  although  foreseen  in  a  general  way, 
the  precipitation  of  hostilities  at  the  partic- 
ular moment  appears  to  have  been  simply 
a  sagacious,  if  somewhat  unscrupulous, 
seizing  of  opportunity,  for  doing  which  the 
previous  preparation  of  a  watchful  intellect 
gave  the  readiness  needed  to  take  the  tide 
upon  its  turn. 

The  prototype  of  modern  Germany  is  to 
be  found  rather  in  the  Roman  Empire,  to 
which  in  a  certain  sense  the  present  German 
Empire  may  be  said  to  be  —  if  not  heir  — 
at  least,  historically  affiliated.  The  Holy 
Roman  Empire  merged  into  that  somewhat 
extenuated  figment  attached  to  the  Austrian 
Habsburgs,    which  finally  deceased  at   the 


In  International  Conditions  39 

opening  of  the  nineteenth  century;  but  the 
idea  itself  survived,  and  was  influential 
in  determining  the  form  and  name  which 
the  existing  powerful  Germanic  unity  has 
assumed.  To  this  unity  the  national  Ger- 
man character  contributes  an  element  not 
unlike  that  of  antiquity,  in  the  subordina- 
tion of  the  individual  to  the  state.  As  a 
matter  of  national  characteristic,  this  differs 
radically  from  the  more  modern  conception 
of  the  freedom  and  rights  of  the  individual, 
exemplified  chiefly  in  England  and  the 
United  States.  It  is  possible  to  accept  the 
latter  as  the  superior  ideal,  as  a  higher 
stage  of  advance,  as  ultimately  more  fruit- 
ful of  political  progress,  yet  at  the  same 
time  to  recognize  the  great  immediate 
advantage  of  the  massed  action  which 
subordinates  the  interests  of  the  individual, 
sinks  the  unit  in  the  whole,  in  order  to  pro- 
mote the  interests  of  the  community.  It 
may  be  noted  incidentally,  without  further 


40  The  Interest  of  America 

insistence  just  here,  that  the  Japanese  Em- 
pire, which  in  a  different  field  from  the 
German  is  manifesting  the  same  restless 
need  for  self-assertion  and  expansion,  comes 
to  its  present  with  the  same  inheritance 
from  its  past,  of  the  submergence  of  the 
individual  in  the  mass.  It  was  equally  the 
characteristic  of  Sparta  among  the  city 
states  of  ancient  Greece,  and  gave  to  her 
among  them  the  preponderance  she  for  a 
time  possessed.  As  an  exhibition  of  social 
development,  it  is  generally  anterior  and 
inferior  to  that  in  which  the  rights  of  the 
individual  are  more  fully  recognized;  but 
as  an  element  of  mere  force,  whether  in 
economics  or  in  international  policies,  it  is 
superior. 

The  two  contrasted  conceptions,  the 
claims  of  the  individual  and  the  claims  of  the 
state,  are  familiar  to  all  students  of  history. 
The  two  undoubtedly  must  coexist  every- 
where, and  have  to  be  reconciled;   but  the 


In  International  Conditions  41 

nature  of  the  adjustment,  in  the  clear  pre- 
dominance of  the  one  or  the  other,  con- 
stitutes a  difference  which  in  effect  upon 
the  particular  community  is  fundamental. 
In  international  relations,  between  states 
representing  the  opposing  ideas,  it  repro- 
duces the  contrast  between  the  simple  dis- 
cipline of  an  army  and  the  complicated 
disseminated  activities  of  the  people,  in- 
dustrial, agricultural,  and  commercial.  It 
repeats  the  struggle  of  the  many  minor 
mercantile  firms  against  a  single  great  com- 
bination. In  either  field,  whatever  the  ulti- 
mate issue,  —  and  in  the  end  the  many 
will  prevail,  —  the  immediate  result  is  that 
preponderant  concentrated  force  has  its 
way  for  a  period  which  'may  thus  be  one  of 
great  and  needless  distress;  and  it  not 
only  has  its  way,  but  it  takes  its  way, 
because,  whatever  progress  the  world  has 
made,  the  stage  has  not  been  reached  when 
men   or   states   willingly   subordinate   their 


42  The  Interest  of  America 

own  interests  to  even  a  reasonable  regard 
for  that  of  others.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
indulge  in  pessimistic  apprehension,  or  to 
deny  that  there  is  a  real  progress  of  the 
moral  forces  lumped  under  the  name  of 
"public  opinion."  This  unquestionably 
tells  for  much  more  than  it  once  did;  but 
still  the  old  predatory  instinct,  that  he 
should  take  who  has  the  power,  survives,  in 
industry  and  commerce,  as  well  as  in  war, 
and  moral  force  is  not  sufficient  to  deter- 
mine issues  unless  supported  by  physical. 
Governments  are  corporations,  and  corpora- 
tions have  not  souls.  Governments  more- 
over are  trustees,  not  principals;  and  as 
such  must  put  first  the  lawful  interests  of 
their  wards,   their  own  people. 

It  matters  little  what  may  be  the  particu- 
lar intentions  now  cherished  by  the  German 
government.  The  fact  upon  which  the 
contemporary  world  needs  to  fasten  its 
attention  is  that  it  is  confronted  by  the 


In  International  Conditions  43 

simple  existence  of  a  power  such  as  is  that 
of  the  German  Empire;  reinforced  neces- 
sarily by  that  of  Austria-Hungary,  because, 
whatever  her  internal  troubles  and  external 
ambitions,  Austria  is  bound  to  Germany  by 
nearness,  by  inferior  power,  and  by  interests, 
partly  common  to  the  two  states,  as  surely 
as  the  moon  is  bound  to  the  earth  and  with 
it  constitutes  a  single  group  in  the  planetary 
system.  Over  against  this  stands  for  the 
moment  a  number  of  states,  Russia,  Italy, 
France,  Great  Britain.  The  recent  action 
of  Russia  has  demonstrated  her  interna- 
tional weakness,  the  internal  causes  of 
which  are  evident  even  to  the  most  careless 
observer.  Italy  still  belongs  to  the  Triple 
Alliance,  of  which  Germany  and  Austria 
are  the  other  members;  but  the  inclination 
of  Italy  towards  England,  springing  from 
past  sympathies,  and  as  a  state  necessarily 
naval,  because  partly  insular,  partly  penin- 
sular, is  known,  as  is  also  her  recent  draw- 


44  The  Interest  of  America 

ing  towards  France  as  compared  with 
former  estrangement.  Also,  in  the  Balkan 
regions  and  in  the  Adriatic  Sea  there  is  more 
than  divergence  between  the  interest  of 
Italy  and  the  ambitions  of  Austria,  — 
supported  by  Germany,  —  as  shown  in 
the  late  annexations  and  their  antecedents. 
An  Austrian  journal,  which  foreshadowed 
the  annexations  with  singular  acumen,  has 
written  recently,1  "We  most  urgently  need 
a  fleet  so  strong  that  it  can  rule  the 
Northern  Adriatic  basin," — in  which  lies 
the  Italian  Venice,  as  well  as  the  Aus- 
trian Trieste,  —  "support  the  operations 
of  our  land  army,  protect  our  chief  com- 
mercial ports  against  hostile  maritime  un- 
dertakings, and  prevent  us  from  being 
throttled  at  the  Strait  of  Otranto.  To  do 
this,  the  fleet  must  at  least  attain  the  ap- 
proximate strength  of  our  probable  enemy. 
If  we  lag  behind  in  developing  our  naval 
1  The  Mail,  April  20,  19 10. 


In  International  Conditions  45 

programme,  Italy  will  so  outrun  us  that  we 
can  never  overtake  her.  Here  more  than 
elsewhere  to  stand  still  is  to  recede;  but  to 
recede  would  be  to  renounce  the  historical 
mission  of  Austria."  The  Austrian  Dread- 
noughts are  proceeding,  and  the  above 
throws  an  interesting  side  light  upon  the 
equipoise  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  In  the 
Algeciras  Conference,  concerning  the  affairs 
of  Morocco,  Italy  did  not  sustain  Ger- 
many; Austria  only  did  so. 

Analyzing  thus  the  present  international 
relations  of  Europe,  we  find  on  the  one 
side  the  recently  constituted  Triple  En- 
tente, France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia; 
on  the  other  the  Triple  Alliance,  Austria- 
Hungary,  Germany,  and  Italy,  of  thirty 
years'  standing.  The  sympathies  of  Italy, 
as  distinguished  from  the  pressure  of  con- 
ditions upon  her,  and  from  her  formal 
association,  are  doubtful;  and  the  essentials 
of   the    situation  seem    to    be    summed    up 


46  The  Interest  of  America 

in  the  Triple  Entente  opposed  by  the 
two  mid-Europe  military  monarchies.  In  a 
comparison  of  force,  except  naval  force, 
everything  favors  the  latter.  They  stand 
locally  shoulder  to  shoulder;  bound,  if 
by  nothing  else,  by  that  facility  for  needed 
mutual  support  which  their  contact  gives. 
This  support,  however,  cannot  be  defensive 
only;  no  purely  defensive  attitude  can  be 
successfully  maintained.  There  must  be 
preparation  at  least  for  offense,  the  power 
to  compel  respect  by  ability  to  strike  as 
well  as  to  shield,  an  ability  markedly 
shown  in  the  enforcement  of  the  Balkan 
annexations  of  1908;  while  in  the  economi- 
cal conditions  of  the  two  states,  in  the  rela- 
tions of  population  to  the  means  of  exist- 
ence, is  to  be  seen  the  evidence  that  such 
striking,  whatever  the  immediate  nature 
or  scene  of  the  blow,  must  be  directed  to- 
wards at  least  a  reasonable  control  of  access 
to  the  markets  necessary  to  their  industries 


In  International  Conditions  47 

over  the  world  at  large.  The  Austrian 
movement  towards  the  Balkans  and  the 
iEgean  is  of  this  character.  More  and  more, 
for  over  thirty  years  past,  Germany  has 
been  changing  from  an  agricultural  to  an 
industrial  community.  More  and  more 
for  this  reason  she  needs  the  assured  im- 
portation of  raw  materials  and,  where  pos- 
sible, control  of  regions  productive  of  such 
materials.  More  and  more  she  requires 
assured  markets,  and  security  as  to  the 
importation  of  food,  because  less  and  less 
comparatively  is  produced  within  her  bor- 
ders for  her  rapidly  increasing  population. 
This  all  means  security  at  sea. 

Under  this  combination  of  necessities, 
and  with  this  accession  of  power  conse- 
quent upon  national  unity  and  national 
organization  of  strength,  Germany  at  the 
opening  of  her  course  has  found  the  markets 
and  the  productive  districts  of  the  world 
outside  her  own  borders  substantially  pre- 


48  The  Interest  of  America 

empted  by  possession  or  control,  alien  to 
herself.  Upon  the  splendid  achievement 
of  national  unity,  she  has  constituted  for 
herself  a  huge  industrial  system,  and  has 
built  a  great  merchant  fleet  now  in  inces- 
sant active  employment,  carrying  the  prod- 
ucts of  her  industry,  and  maintaining  the 
processes  of  intercourse.  She  has  ships, 
and  she  has  commerce;  but  for  the  third 
link  in  the  chain  of  exchange,  for  markets, 
outside  the  inadequate  body  of  consumers 
constituted  by  her  own  population,  she 
has  to  depend  upon  the  strenuous  compe- 
tition of  trade,  in  countries  almost  wholly 
foreign  to  her  control,  made  more  arduous 
by  the  arbitrary  provisions  of  other  govern- 
ments at  a  period  when  Protection  is  in- 
creasingly the  note  of  the  internal  economy 
of  states.  The  only  valuable  market  which 
she  can  effectually  command  is  that  within 
her  own  borders;  the  few  colonies  she  has 
been  able  to  lay  hold  of,  at  the  late  period 


In  International  Conditions  49 

of  her  entry  into  the  race  for  territory, 
offer  no  adequate  prospect  of  relief  in  this 
respect. 

Thus  handicapped  at  the  outset,  Germany 
has  found  impediment  to  her  career  con- 
centrated in  a  rival  so  near  at  hand  as  to  be 
constantly  in  sight;  thus  by  propinquity 
keeping  alive  the  sense  of  obstruction.  Ill 
feeling  need  not  arise  from  such  a  circum- 
stance. Unfortunately,  however,  it  does 
more  often  than  not;  and  it  may  very  well 
be  that  the  national  characteristics  which 
have  found  expression  in  very  different 
governmental  conceptions  as  to  the  rela- 
tions between  the  state  and  the  individual, 
tend  to  promote  misunderstanding  and 
dislike.  In  the  article  before  quoted,  Pro- 
fessor Delbriick  says:  "The  system  of 
English  government  is  popular  in  other 
countries,  whereas  the  German  regime  is 
not    favored.      In     Germany    we    hold    a 

strong  independent  [executive]  government, 

4 


5<d  The  Interest  of  America 

assisted  by  a  democratic  Parliament,  to  be 
a  better  scheme  than  the  continual  change 
of  party  rule  that  is  customary  in  England. 
We  believe  that  the  flourishing  condition 
of  Germany  to-day,  with  her  conscription, 
her  educational  system,  and  her  social  laws, 
which  have  practically  succeeded  in  abolish- 
ing distress,  are  due  to  this  form  of  govern- 
ment, which  combines  strict  order  with 
liberty.  But  the  other  nations  prefer  the 
English  system,  which  is  less  severe  and 
affords  greater  freedom.  A  greater  exten- 
sion of  English  rule  and  influence  would 
therefore  be  more  favorably  regarded  than 
an  increase  of  German  power."  An  offi- 
cial of  long  experience  on  board  German 
steamers  has  commented  to  me  upon  the 
gentleness  of  manner  in  the  average 
American  or  Englishman,  as  contrasted 
with  Germans,  in  addressing  attendants; 
a  difference  not  remotely  traceable  to  the 
peremptoriness  inherent  in  immediate  con- 


In  International  Conditions  51 


trol  of  personal  action  by  governmental 
interference,  military  in  cast.  Be  this  as  it 
may,  bitter  rivalry  does  exist;  and  the 
generally  conceded  superiority  of  German 
methods  in  industry  and  commerce,  the 
careful  studious  adaptation  of  means  to 
ends,  attention  at  once  minute  and  com- 
prehensive to  the  details  of  business,  un- 
tiring energy,  and  intelligent  governmental 
support,  have  had  to  encounter  and  to 
overcome  original  advantages  of  position 
on  the  part  of  Great  Britain. 

These  advantages  were  —  and  in  measure 
still  are  —  those  proverbially  inherent  in  pos- 
session; actual  occupancy  of  the  industrial 
and  commercial  field,  of  the  world's  carry- 
ing trade  and  productive  districts,  the  pres- 
tige thus  deriving,  and  yet  more  unfair  — 
in  the  estimation  of  a  sufferer  —  the  po- 
litical tenure  of  huge  tracts  of  territory, 
available  for  settlement  and  exploitation, 
only  partially   occupied,   and  yet,   because 


52  The  Interest  of  America 

owned  politically,  closed  to  utilization  by 
Germany  as  a  nation.  Germans  can  go  to 
them  indeed,  and  welcome.  They  make 
good  citizens,  the  more  so  that,  while 
loving  the  motherland  still,  they  love 
better  the  more  liberal  conditions  of  Ameri- 
can and  British  life,  or,  for  the  matter  of 
that,  any  scheme  of  society  less  intrusively 
ordered  than  that  they  left;  but  they  are 
lost  to  Germany.  However  advantageous 
to  their  own  prosperity  the  change  may  be, 
there  is  in  it  nothing  to  reconcile  the  home 
country,  or  those  who  remain  there,  to  the 
want  of  a  greater  Germany;  wherein  might 
be  established  and  fostered  those  reciprocal 
relations,  based  on  mutual  dependence, 
which  are  open  to  Great  Britain  and  her 
colonies,  and  by  them  actually  are  being 
realized  and  valued  in  increasing  measure. 
Nothing  could  be  more  congenial  to  the 
German  temperament  than  the  elabora- 
tion of  such  a  system;    whether  it  would 


In  International  Conditions  53 

work  as  well  as  British  laxity  —  be  over- 
done —  is  another  matter.  The  want  of 
the  opportunity,  in  the  apparent  natural 
developments  of  the  future,  cannot  but 
rankle  with  a  state  whose  appetite  for 
colonies   stands   sufficiently   revealed. 

Besides  these  initial  economical  and  polit- 
ical disparities,  the  situation  of  the  British 
Islands  is  a  military  factor  of  profound 
significance  to  Germany.  The  only  shore 
line  of  the  Empire  is  that  of  the  North  Sea 
and  the  Baltic.  All  the  river  ways  of  Ger- 
many, so  extensively  developed  and  utilized, 
interconnected  by  canals  already  existing 
or  planned,  constituting  a  huge  internal 
system  of  water  communications,  find  their 
outlet  in  one  or  other  of  those  two  seas, 
through  which  all  sea  borne  trade  enters  or 
departs.  The  whole  external  commerce  of 
Germany,  going  or  coming,  focusses  there. 
The  North  Sea  coast-line,  if  to  be  covered 
by  hostile  cruisers,  is  little  over  sixty  miles 


54  The  Interest  of  America 

long,  from  the  Ems  to  the  Elbe.  The 
Baltic  seaboard  is  much  more  extensive; 
but  all  access  to  it  from  the  Atlantic  is 
through  the  Skager-Rack,  the  external 
approach  to  which  is  less  than  a  hundred 
miles  wide.  It  is  true  that  merchant 
steamers  may  protect  themselves  in  some 
measure  by  skirting  the  Norwegian  and 
Danish  coasts  within  neutral  limits,  when 
once  attained;  but  a  large  margin  of  risk 
will  still  remain,  for  directly  across  all 
lines  of  communication  thence  to  the  At- 
lantic, and  so  to  every  ocean,  lie  the  British 
Islands.  Most  of  us  carry  in  our  mind's 
eye  the  width  of  the  English  Channel  and 
of  the  Straits  of  Dover,  along  the  full 
length  of  which,  moreover,  is  English,  land 
containing  two  principal  naval  stations; 
but  the  other  way  round,  by  the  north  of 
Scotland,  the  North  Sea  itself  is  nowhere 
four  hundred  miles  wide,  and  in  places  only 
three  hundred.    In  case  of  war  between  the 


In  International  Conditions  55 

two  countries,  no  German  ship,  as  inter- 
national law  now  stands,  can  use  this 
stretch  of  water  without  liability  to  capture; 
while  a  successful  blockade  of  the  German 
harbors  on  the  two  seas  puts  a  stop  to  all 
commerce,  as  well  by  neutrals  as  by  Ger- 
mans. Such  a  blockade  by  Great  Britain 
of  the  North  Sea,  including  the  two  chief 
commercial  cities,  Hamburg  and  Bremen, 
would  rest  on  ports  not  four  hundred  miles 
distant.  A  Baltic  blockade  would  be  a 
much  more  serious  undertaking. 

We  see  here  the  military  explanation  of 
the  Kiel  Canal,  connecting  the  Baltic  with 
the  North  Sea  at  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe. 
Ships  of  war  and  commerce  can  thus  pass 
from  one  sea  to  the  other,  without  exposure. 
This  permits  naval  concentration  against 
an  enemy  venturing  to  divide  his  fleet 
between  the  two.  Also,  while  it  does  not 
help  the  case  of  German  merchant  ships 
in  the  North  Sea,  it  does  permit  neutrals, 


56  The  Interest  of  America 

if  debarred  from  Hamburg  and  Bremen  by 
blockade,  to  go  to  Baltic  ports,  if  not 
blockaded,  whence  their  cargoes  can  be 
conveyed  by  the  canal  system  to  many 
destinations,  by  continuous  water  ways, 
obviating  in  great  part  the  necessity  of 
rehandling  en  route  —  of  transshipment. 
This  is  a  great  defensive  provision;  for, 
conceding  a  hostile  navy  not  fully  twice  the 
force  of  the  German,  it  cannot  undertake 
to  blockade  both  seas.  If  it  does,  one 
fraction  or  the  other  is  inferior  to  the 
German  whole,  upon  the  coming  out  of 
which,  assured  by  the  canal,  it  must  retire; 
and  by  accepted  international  law  such 
retirement  destroys  the  blockade  for  the 
time  being.  Until  it  is  reconstituted,  in 
such  force  as  to  hold  its  ground,  no  capture 
of  a  neutral  can  be  made;  and,  moreover, 
an  additional  margin  of  time  is  required, 
for  neutrals  to  receive  a  notification  of  the 
changed  conditions  which  make  a  voyage 


In  International  Conditions  57 

unlawful.  It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that 
the  substantial  advantage  arising  from 
securing  the  ports  of  the  one  sea  or  the 
other  for  neutral  vessels,  by  lessening  the 
facility  for  blockade,  is  much  qualified  by 
the  fact  that  so  large  a  percentage  of  the 
mercantile  tonnage  of  the  world  to-day  is 
either  British  or  German.  In  case  of  war 
between  the  two  countries,  the  remaining 
vessels,  constituting  the  neutral  tonnage, 
would  be  quite  inadequate  to  the  necessary 
transportation  to  German  ports,  over  and 
above  its  previous  employment  in  other 
trades. 

It  may  be  noted  also,  as  a  qualifying 
factor,  that  the  great  German  naval  base 
on  the  North  Sea,  Wilhelmshaven,  the  con- 
tinuous development  of  which,  parallel  with 
the  building  of  the  fleet  itself,  is  so  char- 
acteristic an  illustration  of  the  systematic 
prevision  and  preparation  which  constitutes 
much  of  the  greatness  and  menace  of  Ger- 


58  The  Interest  of  America 

many,  is  separated  from  the  Elbe  by  some 
twenty  miles  of  dangerous  coast  with  off- 
lying  shoals.  In  some  degree  this  modifies, 
though  it  by  no  means  destroys,  the  advan- 
tage of  the  Kiel  Canal  as  an  assured  inter- 
mediate link  between  the  two  seas.  Over 
this  strip  of  coast,  strategically  important 
to  a  watching  fleet,  stands  guard  the  island 
of  Heligoland,  now  a  heavily  fortified  base 
for  torpedo  vessels,  which  in  1890  was  ceded 
to  Germany  by  Great  Britain  in  exchange 
for  the  relinquishment  of  Germany's  claim 
to  the  island  of  Zanzibar,  off  East  Africa. 
Being  thirty  miles  from  the  coast,  Heligoland 
projects  by  so  much  more  the  torpedo  de- 
fence requisite  to  such  conditions. 

Defensive  provision,  such  as  that  of  the 
Kiel  Canal,  is  essential  and  admirable,  but 
the  security  obtained  falls  far  short  of  that 
demanded  by  national  pride  as  well  as 
national  interest.  Americans  who  recall 
what  Cuba  once  meant  to  our  international 


In  International  Conditions  59 

policy  may  appreciate  what  the  British 
Islands  by  situation  mean  to  German  com- 
merce. The  whole  Gulf  Coast  trade,  in- 
cluding that  of  the  Mississippi  valley,  had 
—  and  has  —  to  pass  within  a  hundred 
miles  of  Cuba,  on  one  side  or  the  other; 
a  circumstance  which  made  it  intolerable 
to  the  United  States  that  the  island  should 
go  into  the  hands  of  any  powerful  naval 
state.  The  change  of  political  tenure  and 
the  developed  power  of  the  Union  have 
put  that  anxiety  into  the  background. 
Cuba's  position  remains;  but  the  probabil- 
ity of  its  being  otherwise  of  use  as  a  base 
for  naval  operations  has  disappeared,  at 
least  for  the  time.  The  position  and  political 
tenure  of  the  British  Islands  are  permanent, 
as  things  go  in  this  world;  their  naval 
strength  is  now  supreme;  and  it  is  the 
pronounced  intention  of  both  the  principal 
political  parties  so  to  maintain  it. 

The    reason    for    this    pronouncement    is 


60  The  Interest  of  America 

sound  and  imperative.  Equally  with  Ger- 
many in  kind,  and  to  a  much  greater  de- 
gree, Great  Britain  depends  upon  external 
sources  for  raw  materials,  for  food,  and  for 
access  to  markets.  Her  population,  only 
two  thirds  that  of  Germany,  is  in  so  far 
inferior  as  a  source  of  military  power; 
while,  being  also  larger  in  proportion  to  the 
territory,  it  is  less  able  to  live  off  the  land. 
The  population  to  the  square  mile  is  over 
four  hundred;  that  of  Germany  only  three 
hundred.  Moreover,  the  dependence  of 
Great  Britain  upon  the  sea  is  absolute;  she 
has  not,  like  Germany,  any  continental  fron- 
tiers by  which  to  receive  supplies.  The  river 
Rhine  by  itself,  emptying  through  a  friendly 
Holland,  is  a  copious  highroad  to  the  interior 
of  Germany  which  in  no  way  can  be  closed 
by  Great  Britain.  On  another  frontier  is 
Russia,  one  of  the  granaries  of  the  world. 
In  1909  Russia  produced  more  wheat  than 
any  other  country  in  the  world,   213,425,- 


In  International  Conditions  61 

336  quintals.  The  United  States  came 
second,  but  at  a  large  margin,  193,544,97$ 
quintals.1 

As  regards  the  causes  for  maintaining  a 
navy,  the  greater  necessity  of  self-preserva- 
tion lies  upon  Great  Britain.  For  reasons 
absolutely  vital  she  cannot  afford  to  sur- 
render supremacy  at  sea.  Moreover,  the 
relations  between  herself  and  her  colonies 
impose  the  obligation  of  defense  for  them; 
not  indeed  by  local  superiorities  in  their 
several  waters,  an  object  at  once  unattain- 
able and  needless,  but  by  a  concentrated 
superiority  of  naval  force  in  Europe,  which 
as  yet  remains  the  base,  at  once  of  defense 
and  of  attack,  as  far  as  other  quarters  of 
the  world  are  concerned.  Yet,  at  the  same 
time,  this  supremacy  of  Great  Britain  in 
European  seas  means  a  perpetual  latent  con- 
trol of  German  commerce,  owing  to  the 
position  of  the  British  Islands.     This  has 

1  The  Mail,  February  21,  1910.  A  quintal  (metric 
system)  contains  220  )&  lbs. 


62  The  Interest  of  America 

been  emphasized  in  the  last  few  years  by  a 
concentration  in  home  waters  of  the  British 
navy,  previously  more  or  less  dispersed; 
a  very  large  fraction  having  been  in  the 
Mediterranean,  the  comparative  abandon- 
ment of  which  has  an  imperial  significance. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  this  con- 
centration has  been  caused  by  the  double 
consideration  of  the  growth  of  the  German 
navy  and  the  recognized  supremacy  of  the 
German  army.  The  possibility  of  a  sudden 
invasion,  during  an  enticed  absence  of  the 
British  fleet,  was  for  years  the  dream  of 
Napoleon,  and  the  terror  of  his  British 
contemporaries.  He  was  foiled,  and  by 
no  narrow  margin.  Nevertheless,  even 
before  the  days  of  steam,  the  conception 
was  not  wholly  fantastic;  it  had  been  en- 
tertained before  Napoleon,  by  Choiseul  in 
the  time  of  Louis  XV.  At  present,  the 
physical  difficulties  are  greatly  reduced  by 
steam,  which  makes  the  necessary  ferriage 


In  International  Conditions  63 


of  troops  wholly  independent  of  wind  and 
weather,  and  extremely  rapid.  This  does 
not  indeed  entirely  remove  the  obstacles 
and  delays  inherent  in  assembling  the  ves- 
sels and  embarking  the  troops,  an  operation 
embracing  a  multiplicity  of  nice  details, 
scarcely  to  be  effected  without  timely 
observation;  but  the  mobilizations  against 
Austria  and  France  are  remembered,  as 
well  as  the  astute  policy  which  preceded 
and  precipitated  them.  There  has  been  a 
real  fear,  among  men  whose  opinions  de- 
mand consideration,  that  by  surprise  a 
body  of  troops  might  be  landed  sufficient 
to    overpower    organized    opposition;     an 

army  in  face  of  a  mob. 

Hence  the  concentration  of  the  British 
navy;  and  correlative  to  it  a  German 
naval  programme,  involving  not  merely 
the  numbers  of  ships,  but  the  evolution  of 
a  complete  factory  and  docking  system, 
for  the  rapid  preparation  and  maintenance 


64  The  Interest  of  America 

of  naval  material  of  all  kinds,  in  large 
quantities.  This  scheme,  as  revealed  in 
its  entirety,  is  an  interesting  illustration  of 
the  peculiar  German  capacity  for  quiet  and 
masterly  elaboration.  The  object  is  not 
officially  stated,  but  a  particular  utterance 
may  be  believed  not  far  from  the  truth: 
that  it  is  to  provide  a  navy  of  such  force 
that  the  largest  in  the  world  will  hesitate 
to  incur  hostilities.  "  German  policy," 
writes  Delbrtick,  "can  never  aim  at  the 
subjection  of  England;  but  it  should  and 
must  endeavor  to  restrict  her  movements." 
This  may  mean  no  more  than  to  check  the 
control  over  German  trade  inherent  in 
British  position;  but  as  the  programme 
calls  for  a  navy  larger  than  that  which 
Great  Britain  now  has,  she  is  compelled 
to  a  ship-building  competition,  to  main- 
tain her  lead. 

It   is   clear,   therefore,   that   the   British 
navy  stands  opposed  in  the  balance  to  the 


In  International  Conditions  65 

German  army;  for  could  control  of  the 
sea  be  wrested,  Great  Britain  neither  has 
nor  contemplates  an  army  able  to  resist 
that  of  her  rival.  Germany,  on  the  contrary, 
does  contemplate  such  a  navy  in  addition 
to  her  army.  Though  vastly  the  richer 
state,  Great  Britain  cannot  obtain  from 
her  people  that  which  Germany  can  from 
the  very  different  antecedents  of  hers. 
Individual  liberty,  possibly  intensifying  nat- 
ural characteristics,  has  made  it  impossible 
to  organize  the  community  in  Great  Britain 
as  it  is  in  Germany.  Such  an  aptitude  is 
the  work  of  generations,  and  a  generation 
of  time  is  not  to  be  expected  here.  The 
successes  of  Great  Britain,  as  a  maritime 
and  colonizing  community,  have  been  the 
work  of  individuals,  singly  or  in  free  co- 
operation; the  state  remaining  in  the  back- 
ground, and,  as  it  were,  only  seeing  fair 
play.  Initiation  has  been  private;  in  Ger- 
many essentially  corporate. 


66  The  Interest  of  America 

The  result  is  illustrated  in  the  recent 
British  old  age  pension  scheme.  Although 
with  that  of  Germany  in  view,  as  a  model 
to  imitate  or  to  modify,  this  attempt 
at  corporate  —  state  —  action,  betrays  the 
state's  lack  of  experience  and  of  firmness 
of  grasp.  Neither  the  individual  employer 
nor  the  individual  employed  is  called  upon, 
as  such,  to  bear  part  of  the  burden  which 
properly  concerns  both.  The  community 
bears  the  burden,  undoubtedly,  as  in  Ger- 
many; but  in  Great  Britain  it  is  borne, 
not  by  a  careful  interadjustment  among 
the  members,  but  by  a  simple  dumping  of 
the  whole,  in  a  concentrated  load,  to  be  met 
by  a  taxation  which  directly  discourages 
both  enterprise  and  thrift;  the  one,  by 
overcharging  its  results,  the  other  by  plac- 
ing a  premium  on  its  absence.  Not  by  such 
crude  parody  of  state  action  can  Great 
Britain  meet  the  calculated  progress  of 
Germany. 


In  International  Conditions  67 

All  this  enforces  still  more  the  serious 
character  of  German  preponderance.  Upon 
the  Continent  no  single  state  can  make 
head  against  her  in  aggregate  of  power; 
while  cooperation  between  any  two,  or  all, 
of  them  encounters  the  difficulty  of  com- 
bining their  action,  and  the  certainty  that 
from  the  nature  of  things,  in  any  grouping 
of  the  Powers,  Austria-Hungary  will  stand 
by  the  side  of  Germany.  Thus  the  British 
navy  is  left  the  sole  military  force  in  the 
world  superior  to  anything  that  Germany 
can  as  yet  bring  into  action;  while  with 
this  military  circumstance  combines  an 
industrial  and  commercial  rivalry,  increas- 
ing yearly  in  intensity,  and  affecting  the 
welfare  of  the  two  peoples,  as  expressed  in 
the  needs  and  incomes  of  the  populations. 
The  various  diplomatic  visits  which  the 
press  brings  recurrently  to  our  knowledge 
are  the  reflection  of  this  condition  of  things. 
In  them   Germany  sees  an  attempt  to  iso- 


68  The  Interest  of  America 


late  and  restrict  her  action;  the  other  states 
an  understanding  by  which  to  check  the 
supposed  excess  and  intrusiveness  of  her 
ambitions.  Whichever  view  be  adopted,  the 
salient  organized  factors  are  in  Great  Britain 
and  in  Germany;  in  the  wealth,  the  commer- 
cial and  industrial  systems  of  the  two,  in 
the  British  navy  and  in  the  German  army. 
The  other  states  make  important  contribu- 
tions on  either  hand  to  this  balance;  but 
as    contributory,  not  as  principal. 


II 

THE   PRESENT   PREDOMINANCE   OF 

GERMANY   IN   EUROPE  — ITS 

FOUNDATIONS   AND 

TENDENCIES 


II 

THE   PRESENT  PREDOMINANCE  OF    GERMANY 

IN   EUROPE  — ITS    FOUNDATIONS 

AND   TENDENCIES 

"PRECOGNITION  of  the  protagonism  of 
Germany  and  Great  Britain  and  of 
the  causes  upon  which  it  depends,  does 
not  ignore  the  existence  of  other  circum- 
stances, —  such  as  the  Austrian  annexa- 
tions of  the  past  year,  or  the  Morocco  con- 
tention of  1905,  —  which  in  their  perma- 
nence, or  in  their  transient  appearance,  have 
from  time  to  time  affected,  or  still  do 
affect,  the  course  of  nations.  The  fact  re- 
mains that  such  minor  occurrences  are 
rather  of  the  nature  of  occasions,  which 
elicit  action  corresponding  to  their  impor- 
tance, as  estimated  by  the  several  govern- 
ments, but  controlled  ultimately  by  their 


72  The  Interest  of  America 

bearing  upon  relations,  of  which  the  cen- 
tral factor  is  the  contemporary  condition 
and  antagonism  of  Germany  and  Great 
Britain,  springing  from  the  historical  ante- 
cedents stated.  "It  is  my  opinion,"  writes 
Delbriick,  "that  the  rivalry  between  the 
two  great  nations  —  England  and  Ger- 
many —  is  the  natural  outcome  of  the 
state  of  affairs,  and  can  never  be  abolished. 
This  rivalry,  however,  does  not  involve  the 
necessity  of  war;  it  suffices  that  by  means 
of  strenuous  armaments  both  Powers  should 
maintain  an  equal  balance  of  power,  and 
keep  each  other  within  bounds."  To  this 
balance  the  other  European  states  con- 
tribute, on  the  one  side  or  the  other. 

Delbriick's  line  of  reasoning  applies  to 
every  other  nation,  as  well  as  to  Great 
Britain;  and  to  every  other  cause  of  con- 
tention, as  well  as  to  those  which  consti- 
tute the  rivalry  between  her  and  Germany. 
The  scene  of  a  war  depends  largely  upon 


In  International  Conditions  73 

the  geographical  situations  of  the  parties 
to  it;  but  its  origin  may  be  remote  in 
place,  and  especially  now,  when,  as  he 
argues,  and  we  all  know,  the  nations  of 
European  type,  including  the  United  States, 
are  compelled  more  and  more  to  seek  both 
raw  materials  and  outlets  for  their  indus- 
tries and  their  capital  in  the  less  highly 
developed  parts  of  the  world,  and  are  there 
in  mutual  competition.  That  is,  in  Asia, 
Africa,  and  South  America.  At  the  end  of 
May,  1909,  the  British  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  speaking  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
said  that  there  remained  then  no  European 
question  likely  to  give  rise  to  acute  differ- 
ences between  the  states  of  Europe;  but 
he  added  that  the  Congo  question,  an 
African  question,  if  not  rationally  handled, 
might  cause  European  difficulties  with 
which  those  of  the  last  few  months  —  that 
is,  the  Austrian  annexations,  definitely 
recognized  by  all  the  Powers  only  in  April, 


74  The  Interest  of  America 

1909,  —  would  be  child's  play.  "The  de- 
finitive aim,  which  Germany  sets  herself, 
is  not  to  acquire  vast  colonies,  but  to  en- 
force such  a  position  that  German  influ- 
ence, German  capital,  German  commerce, 
German  engineering,  and  German  intel- 
ligence can  compete  on  equal  terms  with 
other  nations,  in  those  countries,  and 
among  those  populations,  which  are  out- 
side the  pale  of  European  civilization."  ! 

No  one  can  complain  of  such  an  aim; 
but  none  the  less,  when  confronted  with 
the  avowal,  men  have  to  recognize  that 
they  are  being  confronted  with  force,  and 
to  remember  the  pregnant  remark  of  the 
speaker  that  wars  do  not  usually  arise 
from  definite  aims  but  from  incidental 
causes,  in  which  the  stronger  party  will 
usually  prevail.  Is  "equality  in  terms" 
immediately  recognized  by  both  parties  to 
such  collisions?  Has  the  world  generally 
1  Delbriick.     My  italics. 


In  International  Conditions  75 

been  as  satisfied  with  Germany's  ideas  of 
the  equality  of  her  rights,  in  Bismarck's  day 
or  in  recent  events,  as  it  has  been  con- 
vinced of  her  superiority  of  force,  and  of 
her  attempt  to  control  in  virtue  of  that 
superiority?  The  nations  of  the  world 
have  to  regard  the  two  facts:  1,  a  gen- 
eral rivalry  in  the  regions  named,  compli- 
cated in  South  America  by  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  and,  2,  a  German  navy  soon  to  be 
superior  to  every  other,  except  the  British. 
Should  the  latter  retain  its  full  present  pre- 
dominance, this,  coupled  with  the  situation 
of  the  British  Islands,  constitutes  a  check 
upon  Germany;  but  that  check  removed, 
none  approaching  it  remains.  It  follows 
that  the  condition  and  strength  of  Great 
Britain  is  a  matter  of  national  interest  to 
every  other  community.  With  her  far  more 
liberal  institutions  and  consequent  weaker 
organization  of  force,  replete  to  satiety  with 
colonial  possessions,   she   has   no   adequate 


76  The  Interest  of  America 

stimulus  to  aggression,  least  of  all  against 
the  United  States;  nor  has  she  in  these  days 
of  organization  the  national  efficiency,  of 
which  Germany  is  at  present  the  consum- 
mate and  unrivalled  example. 

Granting  what  has  been  said,  it  is  clear 
that  Great  Britain  occupies  the  key  of  the 
international  position  at  a  moment  when 
international  tension  is  increasing  because 
all  the  nations  eminent  in  industry  and  in 
the  possession  of  capital  are  seeking  out- 
lets in  the  same  quarters  of  the  world;  a 
moment  of  emphasized  competition.  In- 
dustry, production,  capital,  are  not  merely 
abstract  terms;  they  represent  the  resources, 
upon  the  utilization  of  which  depend  the 
food,  clothing,  housing,  and  reasonable 
comforts  of  populations.  The  principals, 
therefore,  to  the  present  struggle,  are  not 
the  governments  but  the  peoples,  of  whom 
the  several  governments  are  the  agents. 
If  by  the  superior  efficiency  of  one  gov- 


In  International  Conditions  77 

ernmental  system  there  is  brought  into 
play  military  organized  force,  over  and 
above  the  industrial  and  commercial  force 
possessed,  other  nations  have  to  look  to 
combination  among  themselves  to  main- 
tain the  balance  of  opportunity.  Owing 
to  her  situation  and  her  navy,  Great  Brit- 
ain occupies  the  key  of  the  general  situa- 
tion, a  condition  supported  by  her  exten- 
sive colonial  system,  especially  the  self- 
governing  colonies;  but  in  a  competition 
of  force  she  is  inferior  to  Germany  in 
efficient  organization,  and  in  concentrated 
numbers.  Hence  springs  a  necessity  for 
all  states,  or  rather  for  all  peoples,  who 
recognize  the  importance  to  themselves 
of  equality  or  opportunity  in  the  world 
markets,  to  consider  with  what  attitude  of 
mind,  what  comprehension  of  conditions, 
and  what  measure  of  force,  they  will  ap- 
proach the  inevitable  developments  of  the 
future.     If  one  state  be  decisively  stronger 


78  The  Interest  of  America 

than  every  other,  the  balance,  as  in  former 
times,  can  be  maintained  only  by  under- 
standings and  combinations  among  the 
weaker. 

Incident  to  this  must  be  noted  that  the 
sea  is  the  decisive  factor,  as  in  most  indus- 
trial competitions.  Under  present  condi- 
tions in  Europe,  notably  in  the  prostra- 
tion of  Russia,  coupled  with  the  diversion 
of  her  energies  eastward,  Germany  is  en- 
tirely safe  from  invasion.  Her  navy  is,  or 
very  soon  will  be,  free  to  act  in  any  part 
of  the  world,  —  except  for  the  British  navy. 
This  removed,  neutral,  or  fallen  in  power, 
Germany  under  present  anticipations, 
which  accord  with  reasonable  probabilities, 
becomes  the  dominant  naval  state  of  the 
world,  as  well  as  the  predominant  country 
of  Europe.  Is  it  to  be  expected,  moreover, 
that  Great  Britain  will  exert  her  power  of 
constraint  upon  the  movements  of  the 
German  navy,  in  cases  not  involving  her 


In  International  Conditions  79 

own  immediate  interests,  narrowly  con- 
strued, when  she  has  no  guarantee  of  re- 
ciprocal support  were  conditions  reversed? 
In  the  immaturity  of  American  national 
power,  at  the  time  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  enounced,  the  British  fleet  was  a 
greater  power,  relatively,  than  it  is  now. 
Yet  the  American  pronouncement,  trivial 
as  was  then  our  naval  force,  was  welcomed 
as  a  substantial  support;  and  the  two 
states,  by  their  action,  prevented  the  pro- 
posed transference  across  the  sea  of  armies 
from  combined  Europe  to  interfere  in  an 
American  quarrel.  This  reciprocal  support 
was  induced  by  the  coincidence  of  interests. 
Again,  at  the  time  of  the  War  with  Spain, 
in  1898,  the  writer  has  been  assured,  by 
an  authority  which  he  believes  competent, 
that  to  a  proposition  made  to  Great  Brit- 
ain to  enter  into  a  combination  to  con- 
strain the  use  of  the  United  States  power, 
—  as  Japan,  also  an  extra-European  nation, 


80  The  Interest  of  America 

in  1895  was  constrained  to  give  up  her  hold 
of  Port  Arthur  and  the  surrounding  terri- 
tory by  the  joint  action  of  France,  Ger- 
many, and  Russia,  —  the  reply  was  not 
only  a  refusal  to  enter  into  such  combina- 
tion, but  an  assurance  of  active  resistance 
to  it,  if  attempted.  I  do  not  wish  to  attri- 
bute such  an  attitude  to  other  than  mo- 
tives of  interest,  sagaciously  interpreted. 
Nor  would  I  appeal  for  acknowledgment 
of  such  a  service  to  any  sentiment;  for 
sentiment,  though  powerful  in  nations, 
is  excessively  undependable,  —  liable  to 
change.  The  question  to  be  posed  is, 
where,  under  existing  conditions,  broadly 
considered,  is  mutual  support  most  likely 
to  be  found,  because  of  common  interest? 
and  because  of  common  political  traditions, 
—  no  slight  factor  in  international  sympa- 
thies. It  is  as  true  now  as  when  Washing- 
ton penned  the  words,  and  will  always  be 
true,  that  it  is  vain  to  expect   nations  to 


In  International  Conditions  81 

act  consistently  from  any  motive  other 
than  that  of  interest.  This,  under  the 
name  of  "  realism,"  is  the  frankly  avowed 
motive  of  German  statecraft.  It  follows 
from  this,  directly,  that  the  study  of  in- 
terests, international  interests,  is  the  one 
basis  of  sound  and  provident  policy  for 
statesmen.  This  involves  a  wide  knowl- 
edge of  contemporary  facts  as  well  as  power 
to  appreciate  them;  but  for  a  nation  to 
exert  its  full  weight  in  the  world  such 
knowledge  and  appreciation  must  be  wide- 
spread among  its  plain  people  also.  So 
only  can  the  short  vision  common  to  most 
men  expand  to  the  prevision  of  national 
needs,  and  the  timely  provision  of  the 
necessary  means  for  national  self-assertion. 
The  United  States  now  is  compelled  to 
see,  not  for  the  first  time,  that  European 
politics  affect  American  interests,  directly 
and  inevitably.  In  the  determination  of 
Germany    to    assert   for    herself    a   leading 


82  The  Interest  of  America 

position  in  world  politics,  and  in  her 
avowed  plan  to  build  a  navy  which,  when 
completed,  will  exceed  in  strength  that 
which  Great  Britain  now  possesses,  and 
be  superior  to  any  as  yet  contemplated  by 
any  other  nation,  including  the  United 
States,  she  is  exercising  her  indisputable 
right  as  an  independent  state,  answerable 
to  no  other  for  her  actions;  but  in  so  do- 
ing she  places  herself  in  a  position  of  pre- 
ponderant force  over  every  other  state 
singly,  and  that  not  only  with  reference  to 
local  defense,  but  in  respect  to  her  con- 
tentions wherever  they  may  arise  through- 
out the  whole  world.  There  is  thus  form- 
ing, not  slowly  but  rapidly,  a  condition 
parallel  in  main  features  to  one  which  .con- 
fronted the  United  States  throughout  the 
first  half  of  the  last  century,  especially  be- 
tween the  enunciation  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine and  the  end  of  the  War  of  Secession. 
When  fully  developed,  the  situation  will 


In  International  Conditions  83 

not  be  unprecedented,  but  it  may  be  dis- 
tinctly more  ominous,  because  the  com- 
petition among  nations  is  vastly  sharper 
than  before  i860;  a  condition  which  itself 
arises  largely  from  the  change  of  Germany 
from  an  agricultural  to  an  industrial  com- 
munity since  1870.  Now,  as  before,  antag- 
onism will  arise  from  the  sea,  the  frontier 
common  to  ourselves  and  other  maritime 
states.  The  world  has  long  been  accus- 
tomed to  the  idea  of  a  preponderant  naval 
power,  coupling  it  accurately  with  the  name 
of  Great  Britain;  and  it  has  been  noted 
that  such  power,  when  achieved,  is  com- 
monly found  associated  with  commercial 
and  industrial  preeminence,  the  struggle  for 
which  is  now  in  progress  between  Great 
Britain  and  Germany.  Such  preeminence 
forces  a  nation  to  seek  markets,  and, 
where  possible,  to  control  them  to  its  own 
advantage  by  preponderant  force,  the  ulti- 
mate   expression    of    which    is    possession. 


84  The  Interest  of  America 

The   Protective   System,  now   almost  uni- 
versal, is  an  instance  of  force,  of  national 
power,  used  to  constitute  artificial  advan- 
tages for  national  industry  and  commerce; 
and  the  vaunted  free  trade  policy  of  Great 
Britain  has  rested  upon  a  simple  calcula- 
tion   of    advantage,    which    being    brought 
now    into    dispute,    the    fabric    is    shaken. 
Both  are  instances  of   national  possession 
of  territory,  utilized  or  recommended  as  a 
means   to   obtain  or  to   retain  advantages 
otherwise  than  by  free  and  open  competi- 
tion.    Great  Britain  in  1878  acceded  to  the 
occupation  by  Austria  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, though  they  continued  in  form  prov- 
inces of  Turkey;    upon  this  followed  tariff 
regulations    which    excluded    British    trade 
from  a  market  before  possessed.    The  now 
familiar  phrase,  "The  open  door,"  simply 
voices  a  protest  against  further  trade  exclu- 
sions in  particular  regions  by  territorial  ac- 
quisitions; or  by  territorial  control,  however 
exerted  or  disguised. 


In  International  Conditions  85 

Doubtless  there  is  such  a  thing  as  purely 
commercial  rivalry,  resting  solely  upon  in- 
dustrial and  economical  efficiency;  but, 
however  effective  in  these  respects  a  peo- 
ple may  be,  they  are  content  with  this  only 
when  they  have  not  the  power  otherwise 
to  control  matters.  When  they  have  the 
power  they  will  use  it;  and  no  ability  to 
use  compares  with  that  of  possessing  the 
land.  From  this  flow  two  results:  the 
attempt  to  possess,  and  the  organization 
of  force  by  which  to  maintain  possession 
already  acquired.  Very  lately,  when  these 
lines  had  scarcely  left  the  writer's  pen,  a 
German  voice  of  no  small  authority  has 
proclaimed  the  acquiescence  of  Germany 
in  her  exclusion,  by  preemption,  from  fur- 
ther colonial  acquisitions.  No  one  is  at 
liberty  to  doubt  the  perfect  sincerity  of 
such  utterance;  yet  it  remains  that  nations 
are  constrained  by  opportunity  when  it 
arises,  or  willingly  use  it.    Who  in  the  open- 


86  The  Interest  of  America 


ing  months  of  1898  expected  the  United 
States  to  occupy  the  Philippines?  Those 
islands  certainly  were  not  the  cause,  nor 
the  object,  of  the  war;  and  the  present 
writer  was  personal  witness  of  the  extreme 
repugnance  to  the  step  on  the  part  of 
the  then  Government.  No  one  can  fore- 
tell what  a  nation  will  do,  or  feel  com- 
pelled to  do.  One  thing  only  is  certain: 
that  where  both  parties  think  themselves 
right,  force  will  prevail;  moreover,  it  will 
be  exercised  when  occasion  offers.  Not 
the  present  purpose  of  Germany,  but  the 
fact  of  the  proposed  preponderant  Ger- 
man navy,  coinciding  with  the  condition 
that  access  to  necessary  markets  is  de- 
pendent upon  alien  legislation,  will  dictate 
Germany's  future,  as  unforeseeable  circum- 
stances may  determine. 

In  transmarine  application  of  force,  one 
element  is  indispensable;  that  is,  a  navy. 
Without  naval  strength,  the  exertion  over- 


In  International  Conditions  87 

sea  of  every  other  form  of  force  is  paralyzed. 
Further,  a  navy  needs  the  ability  to  re- 
main at  will  in  any  part  of  the  globe  where 
its  services  are  required.  This  means  naval 
bases,  which  themselves  furnish  an  addi- 
tional instance  of  the  advantage  of  terri- 
torial possession.  The  cession  of  Kiao 
Chau  by  China  to  Germany  was  the  re- 
sult of  a  German  armed  demonstration, 
consequent  upon  injuries  done  to  German 
citizens;  but  the  Chancellor  of  the  Empire 
told  the  legislature  that  the  step  was  not 
sudden,  unforeseen,  nor  disconnected.  It 
was  "the  result  of  ripe  reflection.  We  had 
long  been  convinced  that  we  needed  a  ter- 
ritorial base  in  the  extreme  East."  This 
statement  is  simply  a  specific  formulation 
of  the  general  necessity  stated;  itself  an 
inevitable  link  in  a  chain  of  logical  sequence: 
Industry,  markets,  control,  navy,  bases. 

This  series  sums  up  the  progress  of  the 
sea  power  of  Great  Britain,  and  because  of 


88  The  Interest  of  America 


the  impetus  and  traditions  of  that  progress 
the  United  States  was  in  continued  diplo- 
matic conflict  with  her,  concerning  disputed 
territorial  possessions,  from  the  time  of 
Monroe's  pronouncement  until  the  end  of 
the  sectional  war.  This,  too,  despite  the 
fact  that  Great  Britain  was  already  begin- 
ning to  feel  the  load  of  territorial  responsi- 
bility phrased  in  the  words  "the  weary 
Titan."  She  had  enough;  some  of  her 
statesmen  of  that  day  thought  far  too 
much;  but  she  had  not  yet  got  over  the 
habit  of  wanting  more,  her  industries  were 
importunate,  her  navy  supreme,  her  power 
on  the  sea  uncontested.  Fortunately  for 
the  American  diplomatic  contentions,  the 
recollection  of  the  harassment  and '  un- 
profitableness of  the  War  of  1812  was  still 
vivid,  the  markets  of  the  United  States 
were  valuable,  the  points,  the  occupation  of 
which  were  successively  at  issue,  not  very 
consequential.     Peace  was  not  broken,  and 


In  International  Conditions  89 

the  American  claims  for  the  most  part  were 
conceded. 

Throughout  all  the  agitations  and  govern- 
mental movements  accompanying  the  con- 
ditions so  far  summarized,  there  is  to  be 
discerned  ultimately  a  simple  contest  of 
forces,  determined  by  considerations  of 
conflicting  national  interests.  Whether  reg- 
ulated by  diplomacy,  or  brought  to  the 
arbitrament  of  war,  whether  between  two 
communities,  or  between  groups  of  states, 
it  is  power  arrayed  against  power;  power 
not  in  the  sense  of  physical  force  only,  but 
in  a  wide  estimate  of  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  attendant  upon  the  course 
of  action.  In  place  of  such  balance  of 
power,  which  suggests  necessarily  two  op- 
posite scales,  that  is,  an  equilibrium  de- 
pendent on  essential  antagonism,  and  there- 
fore liable  to  frequent  fluctuations,  the  last 
century  witnessed  the  growth  of  the  idea 
of  concert,  whereby  all  or  some  of  the  great 


90  The  Interest  of  America 

states,  with  other  communities  immedi- 
ately affected,  act  together,  in  accord,  for 
the  solution  of  questions  upon  a  basis  of 
right,  or  of  compromise,  which  when  reached 
has  the  binding  force  of  a  contract.  All 
general  treaties,  in  a  congress  of  nations, 
partake  of  this  character;  but  the  present 
conception  of  "concert"  applies  the  method 
of  general  consultation  and  arrangement, 
whether  by  correspondence  or  by  congress, 
to  particular  settlements,  of  matters  minor 
but  important.  Thus  a  partial  concert  of 
the  great  Powers,  to  which  Germany  re- 
fused her  participation,  apparently  because 
of  particular  relations  with  the  now  deposed 
Sultan,  Abdul  Hamid,  resulted  in  a  joint 
garrisoning  of  Crete  by  France,  Great 
Britain,  Italy,  and  Russia,  as  a  measure 
tending  to  maintain  quiet  between  Chris- 
tian and  Mahomedan  inhabitants,  who 
looked  for  political  union  and  for  support  to 
Greece  and  Turkey  respectively;    a  circum- 


In  International  Conditions  91 

stance  which  embittered  the  relations  be- 
tween these  two  countries  and  threatened 
an  outbreak  dangerous  to  the  peace  of 
Europe.  Again,  the  Conference  at  Alge- 
ciras,  five  years  ago,  was  a  concert  of  the 
Powers,  which  produced  a  mandate  to 
France  and  Spain,  as  the  states  most 
directly  interested,  to  take  certain  measures 
in  Morocco.  In  such  cases  the  result 
reached  represents,  in  form  at  least,  agree- 
ment, not  a  balance  of  antagonisms. 

In  endeavoring  to  put  aside  force,  sub- 
stituting for  it  reason  and  mutual  conces- 
sion, this  resort  is  in  idea  cognate  to 
arbitration,  as  balance  of  power  is  to  forcible 
settlement.  Unhappily,  such  agreements 
in  form  represent  also,  too  often,  a  mere 
resultant  of  forces,  and  are  liable  to  disturb- 
ance as  the  forces  vary.  A  very  recent 
instance  is  the  disregard  of  the  Berlin 
Treaty  of  1878,  by  Austria,  in  changing  the 
occupation    of    Bosnia    and    Herzegovina, 


92  The  Interest  of  America 

authorized  by  the  treaty,  into  political  in- 
corporation. The  concert  of  the  treaty 
thus  disappears  into  an  antagonism  of 
Powers.  Germany  backs  Austria;  while 
Russia,  under  German  pressure,  the  precise 
character  of  which  it  is  not  necessary  to 
know,  throws  over  her  understanding  with 
Great  Britain  and  France,  whereby  the 
three  stood  together,  opposed  to  a  step 
which,  without  the  concert  of  Europe,  de- 
prived Turkey  of  her  formal  suzerainty  over 
the  two  provinces,  and  which  was  regarded 
by  the  minor  kingdom  of  Servia  as  distinctly 
injurious  to  her  reasonable  ambitions.  The 
sullen  resentment  of  Russia  under  this 
thinly  veiled  coercion  was  manifested  dip- 
lomatically by  the  Czar's  labored  avoid- 
ance of  Austrian  territory  in  his  diplomatic 
journey  from  Russia  to  Italy,  in  October, 
1909.  Not  till  the  following  February  was 
a  formal  end  put  to  a  condition  of  estrange- 
ment which  menaced  the  peace  of  Europe, 


In  International  Conditions  03 

in  case  of  any  difficult  question  arising  in 
the  Balkans.  In  the  outcome,  the  action 
of  Austria  stands  an  accomplished  fact; 
accomplished,  not  with,  but  despite,  the 
concert  of  Europe,  and  modified  only  by 
certain  pecuniary  compensations  acceptable 
to  the  financial  needs  of  Turkey,  pressed  by 
an  internal  revolution  which  had  afforded 
the  occasion  for  the  Austrian  aggression. 
When  such  an  outcome  is  reached,  the  last 
state  is  worse  than  the  first.  The  antago- 
nism of  forces  revives,  intensified  by  the  evi- 
dence that  a  formal  concert  is  liable  to  be 
cast  aside,  at  the  arbitrary  decision  of  one 
of  the  parties,  whenever  convenience  or 
imagined  necessity  occurs.  Mutual  con- 
fidence has  been  shaken,  if  not  destroyed. 
Whether  inevitable  or  not,  such  a  result 
illustrates  that  the  states  of  the  world  are 
not  yet  in  a  condition  to  dispense  with  the 
institution  of  organized  force.  There  are 
contentions  which  a  state  will  not  submit 


94  The  Interest  of  America 

to  either  the  deliberation  of  a  concert  or 
the  adjudication  of  a  tribunal;  in  which 
its  action  is  maintained,  or  is  checked,  as 
the  case  may  be,  only  by  force.  It  may  be 
interesting  to  note  in  this  connection  that 
the  Balance  of  Power  is  analogous  to  com- 
petition in  industrial  and  commercial  life, 
while  the  Concert  of  Europe  has  much  in 
common  with  the  operation  of  a  Trust. 
Although  it  has  not  attained  the  feature 
of  absorption  of  all  into  one  which  is  the 
characteristic  of  the  Trust,  it  does  concen- 
trate the  political  adjudication  of  Europe 
in  the  hands  of  a  combination  before  which 
the  weaker  companies  —  I  mean  Powers  — 
have  to  bend. 

Without  undertaking  to  measure  circum- 
stances which  may  extenuate  such  an  ac- 
tion as  the  annexation  of  the  two  Balkan 
provinces  or  increase  condemnation  of  it, 
it  is  evident  that,  in  a  clear  instance  of 
contract    disregarded,    there    is    a    moral 


In  International  Conditions  95 

element  that  affects  the  whole  world.  At 
the  bottom  of  all  satisfactory  relations, 
social,  financial,  or  international,  lies  con- 
fidence. Without  confidence  there  is  no 
security;  the  extreme  of  confidence  shaken 
is  panic.  No  business  man  needs  a  more 
vivid  illustration  of  what  a  breach  of 
treaty,  sustained  by  force,  means  to  that 
business  of  nations  which  we  call  interna- 
tional politics.  This  has  been  more  or  less 
the  condition  of  Europe  since  the  Franco- 
Prussian  War;  for  that  not  only  revealed 
a  supreme  military  power,  but  also  finally 
constituted,  as  an  organic  whole,  a  state  in 
which  the  faculty  of  organization  in  all 
departments  of  life  transcends  that  of 
every  other  member  of  the  European  family; 
including  therein  the  United  States,  as  at 
least  very  near  of  kin  to  that  family. 

The  military  organization,  the  army,  is 
only  a  particular  instance  of  German  organi- 
zation of  energy;    of  which  the  distinguish- 


96  The  Interest  of  America 

ing  characteristic  is  that  the  entire  social 
order,  formally  concentrated  in  the  national 
government,  originates,  supervises,  fosters, 
and  develops  the  directive  agencies  of 
national  activity,  to  an  extent  and  with  a 
success  not  approached  elsewhere.  Thus 
is  accomplished  a  massing  of  forces,  which 
tells  in  industrial  and  commercial  life  just 
as  it  does  in  military  combinations.  A 
Trust  is  an  organized  massing  of  forces; 
and  the  power  of  trusts  we  know.  In 
Germany  such  massing  by  the  government 
is  peculiarly  easy  and  effectual;  for  the 
German  man  of  to-day  is  the  product  of 
centuries  of  political  and  social  conditions, 
in  which  government,  good  or  bad,  has  over- 
shadowed the  individual.  This  has  been 
partly  from  the  traditions  of  absolute  gov- 
ernment; still  more  because  the  smallness 
of  most  of  the  German  states  permitted 
such  government  to  seek  out,  reach,  and 
come   home    to    the  personal   life    of    each 


In  International  Conditions  97 

subject,  to  a  degree  not  elsewhere  attained. 
Thus  the  individual  German  of  to-day  is 
particularly  adapted  by  past  environment, 
and  very  possibly  by  hereditary  character- 
istics, to  fall  in  with  the  scheme  of  govern- 
mental control,  which  seems  to  be  the 
tendency  now  in  all  civilized  communities. 
The  liberty  of  the  individual,  undirected 
and  unrestrained  by  the  community,  except 
where  trespassing  on  the  common  right, 
or  on  the  rights  of  others,  has  been  the  ideal 
of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
It  is  yielding  now  everywhere  to  the  need 
of  restraint,  just  because  it  is  being  discov- 
ered that  otherwise  the  combinations  of 
individuals  do  threaten  common  rights. 
In  sheer  self-defense,  communities  are  forced 
to  measures  which,  while  socialistic  in  form, 
are  not  so  in  spirit,  when  their  aim  is  not 
to  substitute  governmental  action  for  that 
of  the  individual,  but  only  to  regulate  the 
latter;    just  as  in  every  age,  this,  that,  or 


98  The  Interest  of  America 

the  other  element  of  a  political  society 
has  required  control,  because  developing 
overweening  strength.  It  may  be  noted 
that  governmental  regulation  introduces  a 
competitive  factor  into  the  social  order,  by 
setting  up  the  interest  of  the  community  at 
large  against  that  of  individuals  or  corpora- 
tions when  the  power  of  these  becomes 
excessive;  whereas  the  Socialist  ideal,  that 
the  state  should  assume  directive  control 
and  possession  of  all  social  activities,  con- 
stitutes a  monopoly  to  which  no  natural 
efficient  corrective  exists,  —  a  gigantic  mo- 
nopoly and  Trust. 

In  this  contemporary  tendency  to  a 
higher  exhibition  of  organization,  Germany 
is  found  with  a  lead  which  in  so  far:,  in 
methods  and  in  aptitudes,  gives  her  a  start 
over  all  other  states,  and  constitutes  for 
her  an  opportunity  to  retrieve  those  dis- 
advantages under  which  a  century  ago  she 
began  her  course;   divided  then  politically, 


In  International  Conditions  99 

and,  as  far  as  regarded  the  mass  of  the  com- 
munity, backward,  —  socially,  economi- 
cally, and  commercially.  The  customs 
union,  which  freed  commerce  and  industry 
from  being  trammeled  by  tariffs  every  few 
miles,  dates  only  from  1835.  The  forward- 
ness of  Prussia  in  promoting  this  change 
was  a  decisive  step  towards  the  primacy 
over  Austria  which  was  afterwards  achieved; 
but  a  quarter  of  a  century  later,  from  1862 
to  1866,  the  stage  of  political  development 
in  Prussia  received  curious  illustration. 
The  lower  house  of  the  legislature  was 
defied  by  Bismarck,  in  support  of  whose 
measures  the  upper  house  laid  taxes  con- 
tinuously refused  by  the  other  chamber. 

The  notable  political  feature  in  this  was 
that  the  people  continued  to  pay,  appar- 
ently without  serious  demur;  a  marked 
contrast  to  the  English  people  under  the 
levy  of  ship  money,  and  to  the  American 
under  the  Stamp  Act.     True,  the  Prussian 


ioo  The  Interest  of  America 

tax  was  for  the  reorganization  and  develop- 
ment of  the  army  which  placed  her  at  the 
head  of  Germany,  and  in  the  victories  of 
which  the  modern  German  Empire  found 
birth;  but  equally  the  ship  money  was  for 
the  development  of  a  navy  to  which  Great 
Britain  has  owed  her  ascendency,  and  the 
need  of  which  was  recognized,  while  the 
Stamp  Act  alleged,  not  without  reason,  the 
requirements  of  defense  for  the  community 
upon  which  it  bore.  The  submission  of 
the  Prussians  under  similar  conditions  is 
significant  as  indicative  of  a  popular  char- 
acteristic which  lends  itself  plastically  to 
the  moulding  force  of  a  strong  government, 
without  at  the  same  time  losing  the  initia- 
tive of  the  individual  within  his  own  sphere 
of  activity.  There  seems  in  this  a  sympathy 
between  the  nature  of  the  government  and 
of  the  governed  which  carries  an  assurance 
of  strength  not  always  to  be  found.  Be 
this  as  it  may,  it  appears  certain  that  in 


In  International  Conditions  igi 

an  age  of  organization  of  force  Germany 
stands  at  the  head  of  all  nations,  in  the 
acquired  power  of  framing  and  accepting 
systematic  organization. 

With  the  strength  conferred  by  this 
inherent  and  developed  talent  for  syste- 
matically organizing  civil  activities,  —  the 
economical  element  of  power,  —  through 
the  concerted  force  of  the  community, 
cooperates  the  military  element,  in  an  army 
of  unrivalled  efficiency,  drawing  upon  a 
population  now  greater  than  that  of  any 
one  European  state  west  of  Russia,  and  with 
a  rate  of  increase  superior  to  that  of  any 
other.  Since  the  war  with  France,  in  1870, 
the  growth  of  population  in  Germany  has 
been  fifty  per  cent,  from  forty  millions 
to  sixty;  and  it  advances  at  the  rate  of 
eight  hundred  thousand  annually.  As  re- 
gards numbers  and  quality,  therefore,  the 
army  can  hold  the  lead  it  has,  while  as 
against    a    possible    combination    of    other 


102  The  Interest  of  America 

states  it  has  the  recognized  military  advan- 
tage of  central  position.  Disregarding  for 
the  moment  other  elements  of  military 
strength,  the  other  great  Powers  of  Europe, 
—  Russia,  Italy,  France,  Great  Britain,  — 
are  distributed  around  the  massed  ter- 
ritory of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 
Imagining  a  coalition,  such  as  those  against 
Louis  XIV  and  Napoleon,  this  entails  of 
course  liability  to  attack  upon  more  sides 
than  one;  but  military  experience  affirms 
that,  other  factors  remaining  the  same,  the 
central  position  gains  much  more  from  the 
ability  to  strike  successive  blows  at  several 
foes  than  it  loses  from  the  risk  of  simul- 
taneous offensive  action  by  them.  Con- 
centration of  impact,  whereby  superior 
force  is  brought  against  inferior,  is  greatly 
facilitated  by  an  original  concentration  of 
position,  enabling  movement  to  be  by  lines 
which  in  military  terms  are  called  interior; 
that  is,  briefly,  shorter  lines.    These  in  turn 


In  International  Conditions  103 

are  equivalent  to  more  rapid  action,  and  so 
to  time  saved;  the  famous  five  minutes 
which  the  proverb  affirms  may  make  the 
difference  between  victory   and   defeat. 

Combined  action  is  for  these  reasons  more 
easy  to  him  who  occupies  the  central  parts 
of  a  circle  than  for  those  whose  territory 
distributes  them  disconnectedly  around 
the  circumference.  This  factor  of  military 
strength  rests  with  the  alliance  between 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary;  and  the 
natural  advantage  of  position  is  confirmed 
and  developed  by  a  railroad  system,  most 
of  it  under  the  immediate  control  of  the 
government,  and  constituted  with  a  view 
to  strategic  as  well  as  commercial  trans- 
portation, thus  utilizing  to  the  utmost  the 
military  opportunities  conferred  by  interior 
lines.  These  considerations  cannot  but 
weld  the  two  governments  in  mutual  sup- 
port, now  that  their  reciprocal  position  in 
the  modern  Europe  is  accepted  by  them- 


104  The  Interest  of  America 

selves;  nor  does  there  appear  in  the  par- 
ticular ambitions  of  either,  or  in  general 
international  relations,  any  inducement  to 
division  between  them  commensurate  to  the 
advantages  obtained  by  combination.  The 
united  mass  of  their  territories  stretches 
across  Europe  from  water  to  water,  from 
the  North  Sea  and  Baltic  to  the  Adriatic, 
with  well  denned  commercial  and  military 
interests,  which,  in  the  problematical 
future  of  Turkey,  make  striking  the  Medi- 
terranean in  the  ^Egean  also,  at  Salonica, 
a  natural  ambition. 

Of  such  views  the  annexations  of  a  year 
ago  are  symptoms;  as  is  the  proposition 
to  build  four  Austrian  Dreadnoughts,  —  the 
military  correlative  of  the  commercial,  ad- 
vance. Granting  the  position  on  the  ^Egean 
achieved,  or  command  of  the  Adriatic 
by  naval  supremacy  there,  adequate  naval 
strength  will  assure  the  control  of  the  region 
intervening    between   the  ^Egean   and   the 


In  International  Conditions  105 

Adriatic,  west  of  a  north  and  south  line 
drawn  through  Widdin.  Here  the  interest 
of  Austria  clashes  with  that  of  Italy,  as 
well  as  with  the  general  sensitiveness  of 
Europe  concerning  conditions  in  the  nearer 
East.  It  must  be  remembered  that  only 
a  half-century  has  elapsed  since  Austria 
held  large  parts  of  Italian  territory,  includ- 
ing Venice  and  Milan,  with  a  tradition  also 
of  expansion  along  the  Italian  peninsula. 
For  a  brief  moment,  1718-1733,  she  held 
also  Naples  and  Sicily.  Forced  from  this 
line  of  advance,  the  same  tradition  and 
expectation  of  commercial  advantage  have 
been  transferred  to  the  other  side  of  the 
Adriatic,  in  the  Balkan  peninsula.  The 
former  opposition  of  Italy  naturally  follows 
this  movement  also,  regarding  command 
of  the  Adriatic  as  essential  to  Italian  secur- 
ity; for  this  sea  is  nowhere  more  than 
one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  wide,  narrow- 
ing at  its  outlet  to  less  than  forty.     Italy 


106  The  Interest  of  America 

cannot  view  with  quietude  such  an  in- 
land water,  coterminous  with  her  whole 
eastern  frontier,  controlled  by  a  superior 
foreign  navy  based  along  one  coast.  With 
this  strong  inherited  and  present  preposses- 
sion can  scarcely  fail  to  cooperate  sym- 
pathy with  the  romantic  country  of  the 
present  queen  of  Italy,  who  is  Montenegrin. 
There  lingers,  moreover,  in  Italy  resent- 
ment that  Italian  populations,  notably  at 
Trieste  and  Trent,  remain  "unredeemed" 
subjects  of  Austria.  Amid  these  conflict- 
ing desires  it  is  by  no  means  necessary  to 
strike  a  balance  of  probabilities  as  to  the 
issue.  It  is  only  requisite  to  recognize  the 
unstable  conditions,  and  their  proximity  to 
the  meeting  place  of  the  East  and  West, 
the  great  center  of  old  world  politics, 
ancient  and  modern.  Of  this  the  exponents 
are  Constantinople  and  Alexandria,  which 
get  their  names  from  two  of  the  world's 
greatest  statesmen  and  conquerors. 


In  International  Conditions  107 

In  this  powerful  alliance  of  the  two 
mid-Europe  states,  the  several  ambitions 
of  which  have  been  illustrated  by  recent 
events,  —  by  the  German  naval  programme 
and  by  the  Balkan  annexations  of  Austria, 
—  the  predominant  partner  is  Germany. 
Her  assistance  has  been  decisive  in  the 
recent  action,  in  which  Austria,  besides 
motives  of  immediate  expediency,  has  been 
actuated  also  avowedly  by  an  intention  to 
make  herself  felt  in  the  world.  In  the 
particular  instance,  said  the  prime  minister, 
it  was  necessary  to  take  matters  in  hand, 
because  otherwise  they  might  have  de- 
veloped against  Austria.  That  is,  the 
young  Turks,  who  had  just  achieved  their 
revolution  at  Constantinople,  might  have 
objected,  as  they  gained  strength,  to  an  in- 
corporation of  the  provinces  with  Austria; 
just  as  they  have  refused,  under  threat  of 
war,  to  allow  Greece  to  acquire  Crete. 
The  intention  was  avowed  also  to  continue 


108  The  Interest  of  America 

an  active  foreign  policy,  based  upon  the 
idea  that  Austria-Hungary  should  occupy 
to  the  full  her  place  in  the  world;  accessory 
to  which  is  extension  for  trade  towards 
the  iEgean  and  Mediterranean.  Should 
the  nation  as  a  whole  support  this  purpose, 
Austria  would  stand  no  longer  in  a  doubt- 
ful background,  a  spectacle  of  dissension 
and  disunion,  because  of  the  intestine 
struggles  of  the  diverse  races  which  com- 
pose her  empire,  but  by  a  determined  ex- 
ternal policy  would  create  a  center  of 
national  interest  which  should  compact  a 
national  unity.  Hampered  though  she  is 
financially,  this  object,  and  the  commercial 
advantage  which  access  to  the  sea  gives, 
must  continue  to  impel  her  in  the  same 
direction,  despite  oppositions  which  have 
shown  latterly  their  impotence,  when  con- 
fronted with  the  dangers  of  a  European  war 
under  existing  conditions.  These  condi- 
tions are  the  present  disability  of  Russia, 


In  International  Conditions  109 

and  the  military  power  of  the  two  central 
European  Empires.  With  this  demon- 
stration of  the  influence  inherent  in  their 
united  action,  a  certain  solidarity  between 
the  two  may  safely  be  assumed,  as  one  of 
the  most  settled  factors  in  present  inter- 
national relations. 

In  acknowledgment  of  her  timely  ex- 
ertion in  behalf  of  her  ally,  Germany  will 
certainly  expect,  and,  in  lively  expecta- 
tion of  a  similar  attitude  in  future  contin- 
gencies, will  doubtless  receive,  throughout 
a  future  to  which  no  limit  is  apparent,  the 
support  of  Austria-Hungary  in  the  various 
measures  of  her  policy,  whenever  these 
bring  her  into  conflict  with  other  govern- 
ments. This  means  that  in  so  far  as  world 
politics  depend  upon  European  conditions, 

—  still  one  of  its  most  important  elements, 

—  a  state  that  has  a  controversy  with  Ger- 
many, concerning  any  part  of  the  world, 
has  to  reckon  with  Austria  also.     This  was 


no  The  Interest  of  America 


conspicuously  the  case  in  Morocco;  'and 
the  two  stood  together,  apart  from  the 
European  concert,  in  the  Cretan  business, 
and  still  continue  so  to  stand.  In  the 
present  entente  between  France,  Great  Brit- 
ain, and  Russia,  should  serious  difficulty 
arise  between  any  one  of  the  three  and 
Germany  —  a  circumstance  by  no  means 
unprecedented  —  the  other  two,  if  contem- 
plating intervention,  would  have  to  take 
account  of  Austria  as  well.  Should  France 
in  such  case  decide  to  bring  her  navy  to 
reinforce  the  British,  she  must  look  to  see 
her  land  frontier  threatened  not  by  Ger- 
many only  but  by  Austria,  in  the  con- 
flagration which  might  ensue.  Evidently 
also,  should  the  United  States  in  any  part 
of  the  world  come  into  collision  with  Ger- 
man purposes  or  policy,  any  effect  that 
momentary  European  conditions  might 
exert  upon  Germany's  action  would  be 
modified  by  the  certainty  of  Austria's  at- 


In  International  Conditions  in 

titude.  These  are  concrete  instances  of 
the  balance  of  powers;  the  distinguishing 
feature  at  present  being  that  in  the  one 
scale  is  power  concentrated  in  mass,  by 
situation,  and  by  necessary  mutual  de- 
pendence; in  the  other,  power  dissemi- 
nated, and  with  no  necessary  element  of 
cohesion  except  that  of  counter-balancing 
a  preponderance  otherwise  irresistible. 
Experience  does  not  warrant  dependence 
upon  this  motive  to  overcome  the  influence 
of  momentary  advantages  and  dangers, 
and  to  weld  action  into  sustained  coopera- 
tion against  more  remote  contingencies, 
however  probable.  The  recent  scattering 
of  the  Triple  Entente  before  the  Triple 
Alliance  is  simply  a  demonstration  of 
where  the  power  lay. 

In  these  unstable  conditions  there  is 
only  one  force  capable  of  exerting  an 
effectual  check.  That  is  the  British  navy. 
If   maintained   in   due   preponderance,   this 


ii2  The  Interest  of  America 

is  capable  of  perpetuating  the  role  played 
by  Great  Britain  for  two  centuries:  that 
of  a  determinative  factor.  It  possesses 
this  power  for  two  reasons:  that  it  is  not 
the  creation  of  an  alliance,  but  of  a  single 
state,  power  concentrated  in  one  hand; 
and  that  that  state,  in  addition  to  insular 
security,  still  possesses  a  wealth  adequate 
to  the  maintenance  of  what  has  come  in 
our  day  to  be  called  the  "Two  Power 
Standard."  This  Two  Power  Standard  is 
simply  a  new  definition  of  an  old  idea. 
Throughout  the  eighteenth  century,  es- 
pecially about  the  time  of  the  American 
War  of  Independence,  it  was  an  accepted 
maxim  of  British  statesmen  that  the  navy 
must  be  greater  than  that  of  the  combined 
fleets  of  the  two  Bourbon  monarchies, 
France  and  Spain.  The  alliance  between 
these  two  —  the  Family  Compact  —  was 
in  form  perpetual,  and  in  substance  as- 
sured, under  the  conditions  of  those  times; 


In  International  Conditions  113 

in  this  resembling  the  present  conjunction 
of  Austria  and  Germany.  That  is,  France 
and  Spain  then  were  bound  together,  not 
merely  by  dynastic  sympathies,  but  by 
clear,  evident,  pressing  need  of  mutual 
support. 

To-day  the  Two  Power  Standard  is 
less  specific  in  application,  a  circumstance 
which  testifies  to  the  ill  defined  state  of 
international  relations  which  followed  the 
Franco-German  War,  and  continued  to 
within  a  very  few  years.  The  phrase 
affirms,  in  general  terms,  that  national 
security  requires  that  the  British  navy 
should  exceed  in  force  the  united  fleets  of 
any  two  other  Powers;  because  the  nation 
is  dependent,  not  only  for  military  defense 
but  for  mere  existence,  for  food,  for  com- 
merce, and  for  raw  materials  of  industry, 
upon  control  of  the  sea.  There  is  a  division 
of  opinion  as  to  whether  the  United  States 
should  be  accounted  a  possible  factor  in  a 


H4  The  Interest  of  America 

hostile  combination;  the  argument  of  those 
who  would  thus  include  her  resting  ap- 
parently upon  the  expediency  of  taking 
account  of  all  possibilities,  rather  than 
upon  the  belief  that  there  now  exist  any 
probable  causes  of  difference,  particularly 
of  such  a  nature  as  to  induce  the  United 
States  into  an  alliance  for  war,  contrary 
to  its  traditions.  Against  this  it  can  be 
urged  that,  in  the  closeness  of  commercial 
relations,  in  community  of  speech  and  of 
political  traditions,  and  in  the  interests  of 
Canada,  necessarily  involved  in  a  war  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  the  United  States, 
there  exist  deterrent  motives  of  a  force  far 
exceeding  those  of  any  probable  dispute. 

It  has  been  said  that  a  dominating  prin- 
ciple with  the  late  Lord  Salisbury  was  that 
no  controversy  with  the  United  States 
should  be  permitted  to  approach  a  rup- 
ture. Whether  truly  attributed  or  not, 
this  illustrates  the  general  fact  that  in  the 


In  International  Conditions  115 


horoscope  of  every  nation  there  usually 
is  one  other  Power,  accordant  relations 
with  which  are  of  primary  importance. 
To  Prussia,  in  the  days  of  Russia's  un- 
shaken power,  it  was  Russia;  to  the  Ger- 
man Empire  now,  it  is  Austria-Hungary. 
The  change  was  formulated  by  Bismarck 
in  1879,  against  the  strong  prepossessions  of 
the  old  Emperor.  Having  in  view,  not  the 
British  Islands  only,  but  the  other  con- 
stituent parts  of  the  Empire,  Australia, 
Canada,  New  Zealand,  —  all  with  Pacific 
frontiers  and  cherishing  political  incentives 
common  with  our  Pacific  states,  —  and 
especially  in  view  of  the  British  navy, 
there  is  strong  reason  to  believe  that  in- 
ternational considerations  should  assign  to 
the  British  Empire  this  prominent  place  in 
the  understanding  of  Americans. 

This  is  not  a  matter  of  sympathies,  ex- 
cept so  far  as  such  may  be  inferred  from 
the  spirit  of  a  common  political  tradition; 


n6  The  Interest  of  America 

which,  however  differing  in  manifestation, 
in  local  external  institutions,  has  had  its 
own  particular  and  isolated  development, 
through  England  and  her  colonies,  during 
the  fifteen  centuries  since  its  first  fathers 
brought  its  seeds  with  them  from  the  Ger- 
man shores  of  the  North  Sea.  The  con- 
clusion depends  upon  a  cool  calculation  of 
possibilities,  an  estimate  of  balances,  a 
recognition  that  the  United  States  can  no 
longer  stand  apart,  nor  proceed  safely  with- 
out a  somewhat  formulated  conception  of 
particular,  as  well  as  of  general,  relations 
among  states.  It  is  a  matter  of  public 
knowledge,  that  in  certain  lines  of  American 
policy  great  care  has  been  taken  to  act, 
if  not  in  concert,  at  least  in  consultation 
and  agreement  with  the  European  com- 
munity of  states;  and  this  in  matters  not 
between  us  and  them,  but  in  which  they 
and  we  have  interests,  like,  yet  indepen- 
dent.     This   is    an   implicit    admission    of 


In  International  Conditions  117 

entanglement  in  that  net  known  as  "  world 
politics;"  a  confession  that  the  United 
States  can  no  longer  accept  America  and 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  the  final  limita- 
tion of  her  relations  to  the  community  of 
States. 

We  always  have  had,  of  course,  par- 
ticular relations  with  particular  states; 
the  change  is,  that,  whereas  formerly  these 
stood  apart  one  from  the  other,  in  water- 
tight compartments  as  far  as  concerned 
American  negotiations,  now  the  unrest  of 
the  East,  its  need  of  development,  and 
the  opportunity  for  Western  industry  and 
capital  to  find  remuneration  in  filling 
that  need,  have  constituted  a  common 
object,  in  which  European  and  American 
interests  meet.  This  remark  is  no  less  true 
of  Central  and  South  America,  and  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  involved  in  them.  In 
these  contacts  there  arise  occasions  in 
which  the  interests  are  the  same;    others 


n8  The  Interest  of  America 

in  which  they  collide.  Both  compel  group- 
ings of  the  Powers  concerned.  At  times 
solidarity  of  diplomatic  action  is  found 
incumbent;  at  others  there  is  divergence; 
in  all  is  an  interplay  of  forces,  which  makes 
isolated  national  action  injudicious  and 
self-frustrative.  The  question  follows:  Are 
such  various  incidents  to  be  treated  merely 
independently,  as  they  arise,  on  the  plan 
of  opportunism?  or  can  there  be  recog- 
nized underlying  communities  of  political 
ideals,  or  considerations  of  forces,  by  steady 
regard  to  which  national  policy  can  be 
equally  consistent  and  yet  probably  de- 
cisively stronger? 

It  must  not  be  thought  that  such  a  point 
of  view  looks  to  formal  alliances.  It  is 
one  thing  to  act  habitually  in  cooperation 
with  a  man  because  of  reliance  upon  him, 
based  on  knowledge  and  experience;  quite 
another  to  bind  yourself  so  to  act  for 
a    prolonged    future,    whether    denned    or 


In  International  Conditions  119 

undefined.     Even  if  the  United  States  did 
not  have  a  traditional  policy,  wisely  based 
upon  an  avoidance  of  lasting  alliances  con- 
tracted   at    the    dictation    of    a    transient 
opportunism,    it    would   still   be   useless   to 
persuade  its  people  to  such  engagements; 
and    quite    ineffective    to    contract    them, 
unless   supported  by  a  strongly  accordant 
and  instructed  popular  sentiment.      But,  if 
there   be   such    popular   sentiment,   resting 
upon    a    comprehensive    understanding    of 
international  conditions  and  relations,  the 
advantages  of  alliance  are  secured  without 
its    drawbacks,    and   would   appear   in   the 
general  policy  of  the  country.     The  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  itself  is  an  illustration  of  the 
power    of    popular    sentiment.      It    derives 
from    statesmen    its    formulation,    its    de- 
velopments,  and   such   precision   as   it   has 
attained;     but    its    strength    as    a   national 
motive  depends  upon  the  continuous  pre- 
possession of  the  people,   not  always  per- 


120  The  Interest  of  America 

fectly  clear  in  apprehension,  but  sufficiently 
so  to  sustain  action.  It  has  no  other  bind- 
ing force,  no  artificial  force  of  compact. 

At  an  early  stage  of  this  discussion  I 
took  occasion  to  quote  the  comment  of 
Bishop  Stubbs,  that  the  Balance  of  Power 
is  the  key  to  the  History  of  Modern  Europe; 
of  the  period  from  1500  to  1800.  This  pro- 
found historical  student,  whose  methods 
affected  above  all  others  his  contempora- 
ries of  his  own  nation,  remarks  also  that  in 
the  preceding  era,  which  we  call  mediaeval 
history,  the  several  peoples  had  developed 
interiorly,  without  organized  external 
action,  one  upon  another,  as  states.  Na- 
tions then  had  not  attained  that  indi- 
viduality of  life  which  is  the  necessary 
antecedent  to  strictly  national  action.  They 
were  in  a  formative  period;  and  because  of 
the  large  number  of  independent  subdi- 
visions within  a  territory,  the  multitude  of 
the   actors   prevented   any   approach   to   a 


In  International  Conditions  121 

definiteness  of  action  that  can  be  realized 
or  formulated.  As  he  expresses  it,  there 
was  no  drama;  only  confused  agitation. 

For  instance,  there  is  a  great  advance  to 
simplicity,  and  so  to  comprehensibleness, 
when  England,  Ireland,  and  Scotland  form 
a  single  state;  when  France  is  no  longer 
an  assemblage  of  feudal  tenures,  but  a  con- 
solidated kingdom;  and,  in  our  own  day, 
when  the  German  Diet  of  independent 
sovereignties  has  become  a  united  Empire, 
with  its  central  executive  and  common  leg- 
islature. So,  too,  the  United  States,  as 
a  unified  group,  presents  a  tangible  object 
for  observation  and  consideration,  as  com- 
pared with  the  formless  mass  of  thirteen, 
which  issued  in  chaotic  intestine  struggle 
from  their  common  War  of  Independence. 

The  Balance  of  Power  is  the  expression 
of  the  stage  in  European  history  which 
followed  the  successful  efforts,  by  which 
many    members    thus    constituted    them- 


122  The  Interest  of  America 

selves  into  several  organic  bodies,  called 
states.  This  also  evidently  is  still  the 
stage  in  which  Western  civilization  is.  The 
consequence  has  been  to  constitute  the 
separate  states  into  a  community,  by  im- 
parting to  each  and  all  a  common  idea,  — 
that  of  balance  of  power  as  essential  to 
national  independence.  However  discord- 
ant the  interests  of  the  several  members, 
however  diverse  the  national  characters 
which  have  resulted  from  the  original 
differences  of  raw  material  —  heredity  — 
and  from  the  centuries  of  varying  political 
environment,  the  common  instinct  of  self- 
preservation  has  drawn  out  and  sustained 
this  common  conception  of  statehood,  in 
the  holding  of  which  they  find  relationship. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  itself  is  an  enun- 
ciation of  a  balance  of  powers,  by  the 
formulation  of  which  the  United  States  has 
established  relationship  and  inclusion  in 
the    European    community  —  not    the    Eu- 


In  International  Conditions  123 

ropean  system  —  so  far  as  membership  is 
concerned.  The  objection  to  Oriental  im- 
migration on  a  large  scale  is  another  un- 
noted admission  of  the  same  condition  of 
relationship,  to  nations  other  than  our 
own. 

Thus,  as  in  the  Middle  Ages  many  prov- 
inces, many  lords,  at  divers  times  and  by 
divers  roads,  found  their  way  to  unity,  in 
one  country,  or  under  one  sovereign,  thus 
forming  a  state;  so  the  community  of 
states,  of  this  tradition,  is  feeling  its  way 
towards  a  unity  of  its  own.  This,  so  far 
as  attained,  shall  be  the  expression  of  its 
common  antecedents,  when  the  West  was 
growing  up,  apart  from  the  East,  prepar- 
ing for  that  stage  in  the  course  of  history 
when  the  personages  of  the  drama  will  be 
the  two  groups,  of  the  West  and  the  East, 
which  hitherto  have  grown  up  apart,  as 
once  did  the  countries  of  Europe.  The 
whole    development    of    international    law, 


124  The  Interest  of  America 

which  is  the  standard  code  of  international 
relations,  is  an  outcome  of  the  struggles 
of  the  community  of  European  states,  in- 
cluding the  United  States,  dominated  by 
the  idea  of  independence;  of  the  sovereignty 
of  the  state,  no  matter  where  the  attribute 
of  sovereignty  was  lodged  in  any  particular 
form  of  government.  As  has  been  well 
said  by  a  German  writer,  "In  the  sover- 
eignty of  states  the  individuality  and  in- 
dependence of  nations  come  to  expression. 
Only  because  states  are  sovereign  can  the 
individuality  and  unity  of  the  peoples  they 
comprise  develop  and  flourish."  This  con- 
ception of  independence,  underlying  the 
development  of  the  European  community, 
has  been  common  to  all;  and  to  the  re- 
sults all  have  contributed  a  share,  as  they 
also  have  in  them  a  common  inheritance. 


Ill 

RELATIONS   BETWEEN   THE 
EAST   AND   THE   WEST 


Ill 

RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  EAST  AND  THE 
WEST 

TT  is  scarcely  surprising,  at  this  par- 
ticular stage  of  progress,  which  repre- 
sents the  development  of  the  European 
family  after  four  hundred  years,  to  find 
growing  up  a  fresh  conception  of  Balance 
of  Power;  that  between  the  East  and  the 
West.  The  late  war  between  Russia  and 
Japan  has  signalized  the  inception  of  this 
idea,  for  the  evident  reason  that  in  it  one 
of  the  European  family  has  been  over- 
thrown by  an  Eastern  nation.  Such  a 
conspicuous  fact  necessarily  arouses  pop- 
ular attention,  which  is  incapable  of  look- 
ing underneath  the  surface  to  qualifying 
circumstances,  or  even  of  seeing  modify- 
ing   facts.      Besides,    whatever    deductions 


128  The  Interest  of  America 

be   made,   the   excellence   of   the   Japanese 
performance  remains  confessed. 

The  issue  has  been  hailed  throughout  the 
East  with  a  sympathy  which  is  less  that  of 
brotherhood  among  themselves  than  that 
of  a  community  of  opposition  to  Western 
preponderance.  Since  the  West  and  the 
East  —  neglecting  the  Turkish  Empire  — 
first  came  into  close  and  effective  contact, 
some  two  hundred  years  ago,  the  relative 
conditions,  broadly  speaking,  have  been 
those  of  highly  developed  concentrated 
force,  political  and  military,  on  the  part  of 
the  West,  confronting  and  dominating  com- 
munities individually  inferior  in  organized 
power,  and  wholly  incapable  of  coalescing 
in  mutual  support.  The  hundreds  of  mil- 
lions of  East  Indians  have  been  for  the 
most  part  more  loosely  knit  than  were  the 
fiefs  of  a  country  in  the  height  of  feudalism. 
The  yet  vaster  numbers  of  China  have 
been  in  no  sense  a  nation;   and,  besides,  the 


In  International  Conditions  129 


profession  of  arms  has  been  held  in  a  dis- 
repute which  leaves  any  people  at  the  mercy 
of   one   more   warlike.      Japan   up   to   fifty 
years    ago    had    secluded    herself    from    all 
possibility  of  sharing  the  benefits  of  Euro- 
pean  advance,   which  since   that   time  she 
has  so  ably  appropriated.     The  backward 
political   organization  and  development   of 
other  Eastern  countries  needs  no  insistence. 
Under  these  circumstances,  the  Western 
nations,  while  all  the  time  quarreling  among 
themselves,  observed  towards  those  of  the 
Farther    East   substantially  the   same   line 
of  conduct;    the  result  being    that   in  this 
respect  the  West  has  been  towards  the  East 
a  homogeneous  preponderating  power,  such 
as  in  Europe  was  successively  Spain,  France, 
Great  Britain,  and  now,  on  the  Continent, 
Germany.      The    Turkish    Empire,    which 
once  itself  played  the  part  of  a  great  con- 
centrated   nationality    towards    a    divided 
Christendom,    and    the    Mahomedan    peo- 


130  The  Interest  of  America 

pies  in  general,  while  retaining  their  na- 
tional form  and  recognized  independence, 
have  been  continually  compelled  to  loss  of 
territory,  or  to  concessions  inconsistent  with 
independence;  because  unable  to  compete 
with  the  West  in  either  political  or  military 
efficiency,  or  among  themselves  to  combine 
resistance. 

Such  conditions,  the  outcome  of  centuries, 
are  not  to  be  overturned  in  a  day.  Japan, 
indeed,  has  shown  what  may  be  effected  in 
a  generation;  but  Japan,  relatively  to 
other  eastern  populations,  is  a  small  com- 
pact mass,  welded  into  unity  by  the  nar- 
rowness of  its  territory  and  by  the  long  ex- 
clusion of  alien  influences.  Besides  the 
particular  moral  characteristics  bred  in  this 
seclusion,  and  exhibited  magnificently  in 
the  recent  war,  the  transmission  of  energy 
throughout  the  body  of  the  nation  has  been 
made  comparatively  easy  by  the  relative 
fewness  and  the  concentration  of  the  people, 


In  International  Conditions  131 

together  with  the  military  tradition,  and 
the  local  effectiveness  of  command,  inherited 
from  the  daimio  system.  Japan  was  also 
most  fortunate  in  that  the  hour  brought 
forth  the  men.  The  conjunction  is  neces- 
sary: the  man  and  the  hour.  History 
abounds  in  opportunities  lost  for  want  of 
the  leader.    Japan  found  more  than  one. 

Nevertheless,  although  time,  probably 
much  time,  will  be  needed,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  we  are  now  in  presence  of  an 
idea  which  with  growing  force  is  moving 
that  bigger  half  of  mankind  that  we  call 
the  East.  Its  manifestations  are  often 
crude,  and  it  is  easy  to  exaggerate  their 
significance  as  well  as  to  undervalue  it.  It 
appears  as  yet  to  find  its  impulse  —  out- 
side of  Japan  —  in  impatience  of  Western 
control,  or  interposition,  rather  than  in  the 
sober  spirit  of  internal  regeneration  which 
makes  a  community  fit  for  self-government. 
The  example  of  Japan  in  this  does  not  seem 


132  The  Interest  of  America 

to  impress.  Mere  discontent  is  not  a 
constructive  force;  nor  does  there  seem  to 
appear  the  man,  or  class,  in  India  or  China, 
conspicuously  fitted  for  the  difficult  task 
of  leadership.  They  have  been  affected 
greatly  by  the  achievements  of  Japan;  but 
it  may  be  doubted  whether  they  would  be 
willing  to  submit  to  her  guidance,  or,  if 
they  did,  find  it  more  to  their  liking  than 
that  of  the  Westerner.  The  Koreans  ap- 
parently think  the  Japanese  fully  as  hard  to 
endure  as  the  East  Indian  does  the  Briton; 
or,  as  our  anti-imperialist  friends  tell  us, 
the  Filipino  does  the  American  rule. 

In  India,  as  in  the  Philippines,  change, 
the  transmutation  of  idea  into  accomplish- 
ment, can  scarcely  fail  to  be  slow,  because 
of  the  presence  in  both  of  the  superior  West- 
ern organizing  power,  political  and  social, 
in  effective  operation;  dealing  with  com- 
munities which  are  not  homogeneous  in 
race  or  faith.    Internal  oppositions  sap  the 


In  International  Conditions  133 

strength  of  such  discontent  as  may  exist. 
There  is  also  among  the  inhabitants  suf- 
ficient appreciation  of  the  substantial 
material  advantages  of  the  foreign  rule, 
and  of  the  probable  consequences  of  its 
withdrawal,  to  make  the  mass  of  the  peo- 
ple acquiescent;  tolerant  of  that  which 
they  may  dislike,  of  the  lesser  evil.  The 
propaganda  of  discontent,  and  of  independ- 
ence, is  chiefly  among  those  sufficiently 
instructed  to  know  about  Western  methods, 
but  not  so  historically  enlightened  as  to 
appreciate  the  toil  of  the  centuries  which 
have  fitted  Western  people  to  develop  and 
use  them.  It  is  improbable  that  the  political 
institutions  of  either  India  or  the  Philip- 
pines will  undergo  great  alteration  in  the 
near  future,  except  as  conceded  by  the  con- 
trolling country.  Both  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  are  making  such  con- 
cessions. 

With    China    the    outlook    is    different. 


134  The  Interest  of  America 

Like  other  Eastern  people  she  has  been 
stirred  by  the  Japanese  victories  over  a 
Western  state;  and  she  has  long  known, 
often  through  severe  experience,  the  ma- 
terial superiority  of  Western  development. 
For  a  short  time  after  the  Peace  of  Ports- 
mouth it  seemed  as  though  the  eyes  of  the 
more  progressive  element  in  the  country 
had  turned  towards  Japan,  as  to  an  inter- 
mediary, a  cognate  people;  through  whose 
demonstrated  aptness  to  learn,  and  to 
appropriate,  the  Chinese  might  more  easily 
and  sympathetically  acquire  that  which 
the  West  had  to  give.  The  mere  matter  of 
nearness,  of  shorter,  less  expensive  journey, 
was  also  of  account.  Chinese  students 
swarmed  to  Japan;  but  the  tide  soon  slack- 
ened and  turned.  However  drawn  together 
by  repugnance  to  Western  influence,  the 
two  countries  are  too  close,  and  the  charac- 
teristics of  the  people  too  different,  for 
political    approximation;     much    less    alii- 


In  International  Conditions  135 

ance.  Geographical  proximity  is  a  recog- 
nized source  of  international  difficulty; 
and  with  the  three  countries,  China,  Japan, 
and  Russia,  finding  in  Manchuria  not  only 
a  common  point  of  contact,  but  intersecting 
and  clashing  interests,  there  is  a  reasonable 
assurance  that,  even  if  peace  be  maintained, 
there  will  be  continual  political  antagonism 
and  watchfulness.  For  some  time  to  come 
Manchuria  will  be  to  the  Farther  East 
what  Belgium  in  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries  was  to  Western  Europe. 
Despite  various  buffets  of  the  past,  and 
the  unmilitary  disposition  of  the  people, 
China  retains,  partly  in  virtue  of  her  im- 
mense mass,  alike  of  territory  and  of  inhabit- 
ants, the  undisturbed  essentials  of  national 
solidarity.  To  constitute  her  a  potent 
world  force,  there  remains  only  to  bring 
these  attributes  into  effective  operation; 
an  attainment  which  will  doubtless  be  pro- 
tracted by  her  very  bigness,  the  inertia  of 


136  The  Interest  of  America 

which  has  constituted  for  her  a  defense. 
Although  her  territory  has  undergone  fre- 
quent encroachment,  the  native  govern- 
ment retains  its  control.  Contemplated 
division,  the  institution  or  recognition  of 
divers  spheres  of  influence,  has  been  in  most 
part  averted.  Her  population  is  racially 
homogeneous,  though  marked  by  provincial 
distinctions,  and  by  dialects  mutually 
unintelligible;  circumstances  inseparable 
from  great  expanse  of  territory  with  poor 
intercommunications.  Those  who  know 
them  best  find  in  the  individual]  Chinese  a 
solidity  of  character  which  gives  promise 
of    great   achievement. 

This  solidity  has  indeed  in  the  past 
assumed  the  form  of  stolidity  in  conser- 
vatism; of  an  almost  impregnable  satis- 
faction with  everything  native,  leading  to 
that  confidence  of  superiority  which  is  the 
worst  foe  of  progress.  But  latterly  light 
has  penetrated,  the  process  of    self-knowl- 


In  International  Conditions       .    137 

edge  by  comparison  with  other  standards 
is  begun,  and  is  bearing  fruit.  The  fact 
is  significant,  as  well  as  interesting,  that  a 
railroad  one  hundred  and  twenty-two  miles 
long,  from  Peking  northwest  to  Kalgan, 
has  just  been  constructed  by  Chinese 
management  alone,  and  without  foreign 
financial  assistance.  All  the  engineers  are 
Chinese,  the  chief  being  a  graduate  of 
Yale.  An  extension  of  one  hundred  and 
fifty  miles  is  planned,  to  be  executed  in 
similar  independence  of  outside  aid;  but 
the  rejection  of  foreign  capital  will  entail 
inadequate  means  for  rapid  building,  and 
protract  completion.  The  two  circum- 
stances illustrate  China's  past,  present,  and 
probable  future.  They  evidence  determina- 
tion to  break  the  bonds  of  past  dependence, 
yet  at  the  same  time  show  dependence 
inevitable  for  a  long  time  to  come,  until 
resources  accumulate;  until  development 
overtake  aspiration.     It  is  with  this  inter- 


138  The  Interest  of  America 

vening  period  that  "The  Open  Door"  is 
concerned.  Close  observers  tell  us  that 
national  feeling  also,  as  distinguished  from 
racial,  the  conception,  however  elementary, 
of  the  community  as  a  state,  is  making 
distinct  advance.  This  is  the  necessary 
first  step  towards  realizing  the  national 
unity  which  will  enable  China  to  take  her 
place  among  the  nations,  relieving  her 
from  the  attitude  of  pure  and  usually  in- 
effective defense  to  which  she  has  been 
hitherto  limited. 

Whatever  may  prove  to  be  the  character 
and  duration  of  the  process,  the  Eastern 
countries  will  have  to  undergo  the  same 
formative  period  as  those  of  Europe,  and 
of  North  America.  From  a  bundle  of  'com- 
munities, too  loosely  associated  even  to  be 
called  a  fagot,  they  have  yet  to  make  their 
way  to  nationality.  The  expanse  and 
population  of  India  and  China  render  it 
unlikely  that  this  stage  can  be  passed  as 


In  International  Conditions  139 

rapidly  as  in  Japan;  nor  will  their  inherited 
political  aptitudes  enable  them  to  parallel 
the  power  and  ease  with  which  the  thirteen 
States  of  the  American  Union  encountered 
and  successfully  passed  the  crisis  of  their 
constitutional  history,  between  1783  and 
1789.  On  the  other  hand,  the  facilities  for 
intercommunication  which  they  will  adopt 
from  Western  civilization  —  which  Western 
rule  has  already  bestowed  in  large  measure 
upon  India  —  will  enable  movements  to- 
wards consolidation  of  national  power, 
when  once  fairly  under  way,  to  progress 
with  a  quickness  and  sureness  not  possible 
to  mediaeval  Europe  during  its  correspond- 
ing period. 

Meantime,  while  the  Eastern  community 
of  nations  is  constituting  itself,  political 
relations  with  Europe  and  America  will 
continue  and  develop;  just  as,  throughout 
the  mediaeval  period,  such  relations  existed 
between  the  European  communities  of  those 


140  The  Interest  of  America 

days  and  that  which  we  now  know  as  the 
nearer  East.  The  advance  of  the  Saracens 
to  southern  France,  the  Crusades,  the 
progress  of  the  Turkish  Empire  in  Europe, 
the  wave  of  which  touched  Vienna  in  one 
direction  and  Malta  in  another,  are  familiar 
instances  of  political  relations,  under  the 
religious  and  social  traditions  and  national 
aspirations  of  that  age.  A  Christendom 
of  imperfect  nationalities  permitted  a  vigor- 
ous united  Islam  to  threaten  its  heart;  the 
consolidation  of  nationalities  arrested  the 
danger.  Yet  at  the  very  moment  of  arrest, 
the  external  power  was  courted  by  some 
Christian  states,  and  became  a  make-weight 
in  the  long  struggle  between  the  House  of 
Bourbon  and  that  of  Austria.  Not  infre- 
quently, when  France  and  the  Empire  were 
at  war,  the  energies  of  the  latter  were  weak- 
ened, and  its  efforts  distracted,  by  the 
attacks  of  the  Turks  on  the  other  side;  in 
its    rear.     Later,    and    now,   the    condition 


In  International  Conditions  141 

of  the  Turkish  Empire  fastens  the  attention 
of  Europe,  and  is  an  increasing  source  of 
menace,  because  of  the  conflict  of  interests 
centering  in  the  Levant.  Over  a  half  cen- 
tury ago,  in  the  Crimean  War,  two  Chris- 
tian Powers  combined  against  a  third,  and 
in  alliance  with  Turkey,  on  account  of 
clashing  interests  in  the  Turkish  dominions; 
and  only  two  years  have  passed  since  a 
like  danger  of  war  from  divergent  interests 
has  been  encountered. 

These  particular  matters  have  touched 
the  United  States,  if  at  all,  too  remotely 
for  demonstration;  even,  perhaps,  for  de- 
tection. Yet,  inasmuch  as  they  affect  the 
equilibrium  of  Europe,  they  may  affect 
her  by  their  influence  in  other  parts  of  the 
world,  where  the  United  States  comes  into 
immediate  touch  with  the  Powers  which 
maintain  that  equilibrium.  It  cannot  be 
to  her  a  matter  of  indifference  should  events 
weaken  a  nation  upon  whose  general  accord 


142  The  Interest  of  America 

she  can  count,  and  strengthen  one  less 
likely  to  act  with  her.  Occurrences  in  the 
East  within  the  last  ten  years  have  gravely 
affected  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe 
itself.  It  is  said,  and  plausibly,  that  Ger- 
many recognizes  a  new  European  era  since 
the  defeat  of  Russia  by  Japan.  She  is  re- 
lieved on  one  side,  to  such  an  extent  as  to 
remove  serious  anxiety  on  any  side  from  the 
Franco-Russian  alliance;  a  situation  still 
further  confirmed  by  the  assured  fidelity  to 
her  of  Austria-Hungary.  It  can  readily  be 
seen  that  such  relief  on  land  can  take  the 
form  of  larger  expenditure  diverted  to 
the  navy.  This  reduces,  or  will  reduce,  the 
relative  power  of  the  British  navy;  or  else 
cause  Great  Britain  a  largely  increased  ex- 
penditure, which  in  itself  is  weakening  to  a 
nation. 

It  seems  possible,  even  probable,  that 
Great  Britain  made  a  mistake  of  policy,  in 
more  ways  than  one,  in  crippling  Russia 


In  International  Conditions  143 


by  her  alliance  with  Japan.  It  was  to  her 
interest  that  Russia  should  be  deeply  en- 
gaged in  the  Far  East,  because  that  diverted 
her  by  so  far  from  Constantinople,  Suez, 
the  Persian  Gulf,  and  India.  Russia  had  not 
power  to  carry  on  in  all  these  directions.  It 
was  also  to  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  that 
Russia  should  weigh  upon  the  shoulders  of 
the  present  German  Empire,  as  once  the 
Turks  did  upon  that  of  the  sixteenth  and 
seventeenth  centuries.  By  the  disastrous 
events  in  Manchuria,  and  their  conse- 
quences, that  weight  has  been  removed, 
probably  for  a  generation.  Thus  one  event 
in  the  Far  East,  the  issue  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  has  been  assured  by  the  act 
of  one  European  government;  and  that 
event  has  materially  affected  the  equipoise 
of  Europe  itself,  to  the  disadvantage  of  the 
intervener,  who  now  is  compelled  to  enor- 
mous efforts  to  retrieve  the  loss. 

We  are  here  of  course  in  the  region  of 


144  The  Interest  of  America 

estimation,  rather  than  that  of  demonstra- 
tion; but  that  Japan,  even  as  things  were, 
had  well  nigh  reached  the  limit  of  her  finan- 
cial strength  at  the  end  of  the  war,  is  so 
far  sure  as  to  make  it  reasonably  certain 
that  the  British  alliance,  in  its  first  form 
only,  was  a  determinative  factor;  the  pre- 
cise effect  that  the  British  navy  for  two 
centuries  has  exercised  in  world  politics. 
Had  the  result  been  other,  been  more  nearly 
a  drawn  battle  between  the  two  contestants, 
more  entirely  exhaustive  financially  to  both, 
but  less  injurious  to  Russian  prestige,  the 
influence  upon  that  diplomatic  contention, 
"The  Open  Door,"  would  have  been  dis- 
tinctly modified.  The  Open  Door  is  but 
another  way  of  expressing  Balance  of 
Power;  for,  while  conspicuously  just,  and 
making  for  peace,  —  as  the  balance  of 
power  has,  — it  means  simply  equal  oppor- 
tunity, just  as  balance  of  power  means 
equal  independence.     But,  like  the  balance 


In  International  Conditions  145 

of  power,  the  maintenance  of  the  open  door 
is  the  result  of  a  balancing  of  forces;  the 
forces  of  the  various  states  interested  in  the 
commerce  and  development  of  China,  to 
which  the  phrase  applies. 

What  the  origin  of  this  phrase  I  do  not 
know;  but  it  is  certain  that  the  United 
States  has  been  very  active  and  prominent, 
if  not  indeed  foremost,  in  the  exposition 
and  maintenance  of  the  principle.  The 
words  before  quoted,  of  the  German  writer 
Delbruck,  sum  up  the  attitude  of  all  states, 
including  the  United  States,  towards  this 
question;  determined  "to  enforce  that  Ger- 
man influence,  German  capital,  German 
commerce,  German  engineering,  and  Ger- 
man intelligence  can  compete  on  equal 
terms  with  other  nations."  It  is  of  course 
desired  by  all  that  this  reasonable  aim 
should  be  reached  peaceably;  and  it  is  all 
the  more  likely  so  to  be  reached,  if  it 
is   clearly   understood   from   the   beginning 


146  The  Interest  of  America 

that  the  rights  claimed  will  be  sustained 
by  force,  if  necessary.  There  being  no 
misunderstanding,  there  is  less  likely  to 
be  a  falling  out  because  of  measures  taken 
in  ignorance  of  another's  attitude. 

But  it  must  be  clearly  borne  in  mind  all 
the  time  that  the  nations,  speaking  gen- 
erally, are  intent  each  upon  its  own  ad- 
vantage, according  to  its  own  lights,  which 
are  not  likely  always,  or  even  usually,  to 
coincide  with  the  views  of  others.  Rail- 
roads, for  instance,  are  a  very  common 
form  of  investment  of  capital,  and  of  em- 
ployment of  labor,  with  which  goes  a  well 
ascertained  influence.  Consequently,  the 
building  of  railroads  is  an  opportunity 
which  comes  under  the  head  of  Open  Door, 
and  latterly  there  has  seemed  to  be  an  in- 
stance of  leaving  the  United  States  in  the 
cold;  to  deny  her  that  which  a  German 
Chancellor  has  called  "a  place  in  the  sun." 
The    attempt    was    met,    and    successfully 


In  International  Conditions  147 

met,  by  the  firm  self-assertion  of  the  United 
States  Government.  Very  many  railroads 
will  have  to  be  built  in  China,  within  the 
next  generation.  So  also  the  integrity  of 
the  Chinese  Empire  is  essential  to  the  open 
door.  When  territory  is  occupied  and  ad- 
ministered by  a  foreign  state,  under  the 
terms  of  a  lease,  as  has  been  done  often  in 
the  past,  not  only  is  there  danger  of  such 
occupation  passing  into  annexation,  as  hap- 
pened to  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  a  year 
ago,  and  seems  now  close  at  hand  in  Korea, 
but  even  such  modified  possession  tends  to 
bring  the  territory  under  the  national  cus- 
toms, closing  the  open  door  in  part  or 
wholly. 

Questions  of  this  nature,  and  they  are 
multifold  in  kind  and  origin,  fall  under 
the  head  of  the  Open  Door.  In  meeting 
them  the  United  States  necessarily  becomes 
involved  in  understandings  with  other  na- 
tions —  European  nations.      To  undertake 


148  The  Interest  of  America 


alone  the  maintenance  of  the  Open  Door 
would  be  to  establish  a  protectorate,  and 
essentially  to  abandon  that  equality  which 
is  the  spirit  of  the  policy.  As  an  example 
of  such  questions,  there  is  constantly  re- 
current uncertainty  and  discussion  as  to 
transactions  in  Manchuria,  where  Japanese 
or  Russian  occupation,  coincident  with  that 
of  China,  raises  doubts  as  to  whether  this 
or  that  measure,  taken  by  one  or  another, 
observes  the  just  rights  of  China  herself, 
or  of  other  nations  as  interested  in  equality 
of  opportunity.  It  is  vain,  too,  to  deny 
that,  while  there  may  be  accord  in  the 
principle  of  the  open  door,  its  very  ob- 
servance entails  competition;  and  com- 
petition, in  trade,  has  a  strong  tendency 
to  utilize  any  opportunity  to  obtain  ad- 
vantage. Protection,  to  which  almost  the 
whole  world  is  now  committed,  is  the 
utilization  of  the  opportunity,  which  pos- 
session or  occupation  gives,  to  obtain  com- 


In  International  Conditions  149 

mercial  advantages  by  other  means  than 
simple  competition  of  skill  and  energy. 
The  industrial,  financial,  and  commercial 
worlds  abound  in  expedients  of  similar 
character.  The  American  Trusts  have 
illustrated  the  tendency. 

Having  then  to  deal  in  this  matter  with 
other  nations,  almost  all  European,  and 
recognizing  that  the  accord  rests  ultimately 
upon  national  power,  force,  upon  which  all 
order,  social  and  political,  also  rests,  not 
indeed  for  its  sanctions,  but  for  its  main- 
tenance, it  cannot  be  indifferent  to  the 
United  States  when  the  relative  power  of 
the  European  countries  interested  varies. 
On  the  contrary,  every  such  fluctuation  in 
Europe  will  concern  her.  It  may  concern 
her  in  many  parts  of  the  world;  but  it 
cannot  fail  to  do  so  in  the  Pacific  and 
China.  It  is  not  a  matter  of  indifference 
to  the  United  States  that  now  Russia  is 
weak,    that    Germany   is   building   a   huge 


150  The  Interest  of  America 

navy,  that  the  British  navy  is  declining, 
relatively,  owing  to  the  debility  of  a  govern- 
ment which  in  the  way  of  expenditure  has 
assumed  obligations  in  seeming  excess  of  its 
power  to  meet  by  sound  financial  methods. 
In  the  past,  even,  the  relative  force  of 
other  states  has  mattered  to  America 
more  than  most  Americans  realize.  It 
might  have  been  a  very  serious  concern  to 
us  if,  in  1823,  the  navy  of  Great  Britain 
had  so  far  declined  below  those  of  the 
Continent  as  to  be  unable  to  forbid  the 
transport  of  the  allied  troops  to  South 
America,  to  reduce  the  Spanish  colonies  to 
submission.  In  1814,  it  was  the  difficulty 
of  the  European  situation  that  led  Great 
Britain  to  abandon  so  readily  her  demands 
for  territorial  concessions  after  the  War  of 
181 2.  We  owed  our  independence,  at  the 
period  it  was  achieved,  to  the  fact  that 
the  British  navy  then  had  declined,  rela- 
tively to  those  of  allied  France  and  Spain. 


In  International  Conditions  151 

This  at  least  was  the  opinion  of  Washing- 
ton, whose  observation  at  the  time  led  him 
to  the  conclusion  that  "we  have  reached 
the  end  of  our  tether."  Had  France  and 
Great  Britain  been  able  to  arrange  a  basis 
of  agreement,  1861-1863,  success  in  the 
War  of  Secession  would  have  been  very 
problematical. 

It  seems  indeed  not  impossible,  nor  even 
very  improbable,  that  the  exigencies  of  the 
balance  of  power,  which  to-day  as  formerly 
is  the  key  to  international  European  politics, 
may  have  the  result  of  neutralizing,  or  at 
least  of  reducing,  European  influence  in 
world  politics  as  regards  the  Farther  East, 
unless  the  present  struggle  for  naval 
supremacy  is  either  arrested  or  decided. 
Concentration,  such  as  that  of  the  British 
navy  now  in  its  home  waters,  is  effected  by 
drawing  back  distant  detachments  from  their 
advanced  positions.  In  principle  and  prac- 
tice   it    is    absolutely    correct;    but    it   in- 


152  The  Interest  of  America 

volves  necessarily  a  certain  temporary  loss 
of  control  over  the  positions  abandoned. 
So  long  as  Germany  and  Great  Britain 
stand  over  against  one  another,  as  they 
now  do,  concentration  in  the  North  Sea 
is  militarily  right,  and  imposed;  but, 
while  the  conditions  render  this  necessary, 
they  cannot  be  represented  in  force  else- 
where, until  the  one  or  the  other  has 
a  surplusage  of  ships,  permitting  big 
detachments. 

How  far  groupings  of  the  Powers,  by 
alliance  or  entente,  may  modify  this  con- 
dition, may  release  some  part  of  the  aggre- 
gate European  naval  force  to  represent  in 
other  fields  Europe's  real  power,  is  a  very 
difficult  question.  It  is  supposable,  for 
instance,  that  while  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  dispute  the  North  Sea,  France 
might  assure  to  the  Entente  the  control  of 
the  Mediterranean,  to  the  no  great  sorrow 
of  Italy.    It  has  been  said  that  the  existing 


In  International  Conditions  153 

agreements  between  France,  Great  Britain, 
and  Spain,  constitute  a  kind  of  Monroe 
Doctrine  for  the  Western  Mediterranean. 
Such  a  doctrine  may  grow,  as  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  has;  may  undertake,  for  exam- 
ple, to  decide  whether  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean coast  line  there  shall  be  any  change 
which  will  affect  conditions  of  naval  power. 
A  fleet  competent  to  dictate  in  the  Med- 
iterranean, while  the  greatest  navies  stand 
on  guard  in  the  North  Sea,  would  be  sub- 
stantially a  flying  squadron;  occupying  a 
great  central  position,  available  for  mo- 
mentary action  elsewhere  for  a  measurable 
time.  Such  combinations  of  navies  have 
many  historical  precedents.  They  labor 
under  the  weakness  always  incident  to 
coalitions,  to  the  combined  action  of  two  or 
more  nations;  but  they  are  not  impossible. 
The  entertainment  of  such  considera- 
tions is  necessarily  speculative  and  con- 
jectural;   but  in  the  competition  of  nations 


154  The  Interest  of  America 

they  constitute  food  for  reflection  to  states- 
men. Meantime,  it  is  evident  that,  while 
conditions  remain  as  they  are,  Japan  and 
the  United  States,  the  only  two  outlying 
great  naval  nations,  are,  each  in  her  special 
sphere  of  interests,  less  affected,  directly, 
than  if  there  were  as  of  old  an  unchal- 
lenged naval  supremacy  in  Europe.  When 
Japan  first  entered  into  alliance  with  Great 
Britain,  in  1902,  the  latter  had  such  su- 
premacy. She  could  then  have  spared  sub- 
stantial assistance  in  the  Far  East,  if  needed, 
and  yet  have  maintained  her  superiority 
elsewhere.  The  Two  Power  Standard  was 
then  attained.  Japan  had  already,  in 
1895,  experienced  European  intervention 
to  her  injury,  by  a  combination  which 
Great  Britain  might  have  resisted;  though 
with  doubtful  issue  in  the  then  lack  of  a 
Japanese  battleship  force.  At  the  later 
date  she  did  exercise  such  intervention, 
and  it  was  decisive  for  Japan's  next  war.    It 


In  International  Conditions  155 

may  well  be  questioned  whether  such  inter- 
ventions can  be  possible  again,  while  the 
present  competition  of  navies  continues. 

The  two  instances  illustrate  moreover 
the  potent  moral,  as  well  as  material, 
effect  of  a  decided  step,  when  taken.  It  is 
like  offensive  action  confronting  an  un- 
ready enemy.  In  1895,  France,  Germany, 
and  Russia  compelled  Japan  to  retrocede 
the  Liao-tung  peninsula  with  Port  Arthur. 
Great  Britain  was  averse  to  this  action, 
which  was  followed  by  the  leasing  of  the 
retroceded  positions  by  China  to  Russia; 
but  she  was  unready,  her  mind  not  made 
up,  the  thing  was  done,  and  Japan  had  no 
battleship  force.  In  1904,  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance  was  an  existent  known 
fact,  a  positive  measure;  and  Japan  had 
a  battle  fleet.  Great  Britain  was  still  the 
supreme  naval  power,  and  neither  Ger- 
many nor  France  moved  to  support  Russia. 
It  was  not  indeed  the  policy  of  Germany 


156  The  Interest  of  America 

so  to  do;  but  it  was  that  of  France,  were 
she  able.  In  the  case,  and  as  things  turned 
out,  Japan  fought  her  fight  in  her  own 
North  Sea,  and  Great  Britain  saw  to  the 
European  end  of  the  line.  The  circum- 
stance illustrates  division  of  labor  between 
national  fleets;  for,  although  the  British 
fleet  had  no  fighting  to  do,  its  action  was 
distinctly  military  —  that  of  a  "contain- 
ing" force.  It  was  equally  a  containing 
force  in  1898,  if  the  statement,  already 
quoted,  be  true,  viz.:  that  Great  Britain, 
to  the  proposal  of  intervention  between 
the  United  States  and  Spain,  replied  that 
she  not  only  would  not  assist,  but  would 
resist. 

These  are  illustrations  also  of  the  fact 
that  the  possession  and  exertion  of  or- 
ganized force  do  not  necessarily  mean  war. 
Such  force  may  exert,  and  often  does  exert, 
its  full  proportional  effect  without  strik- 
ing  a   blow;     and   the    more   indisputably 


In  International  Conditions  157 


effective  it  is,  the  surer  and  more  peaceful 
the  result.  It  may  be  righteously  used,  or 
it  may  not  be;  but  the  organization  and 
possession  of  it  do  not  necessarily  mean 
even  an  inclination  to  war,  nor  does  its 
absence  constitute  a  guarantee  of  peace. 
The  War  of  Secession  in  the  United  States 
is  an  instance  in  point.  No  belligerents 
in  modern  times  have  been  more  utterly 
unprepared  for  war,  in  any  ordinary  sense 
of  preparation,  than  were  the  two  parties 
to  that  conflict.  Yet  they  fought,  the  most 
prolonged  war  since  Waterloo;  prolonged 
just  because  the  absence  of  preparation  on 
either  side  constituted  for  the  moment  an 
equality,  which,  however  destined  ulti- 
mately to  disappear  before  the  greater  re- 
sources of  the  North,  permitted  the  South 

—  justly   from    a    military    point    of    view 

—  to  hope  that  she  could  achieve  separa- 
tion through  the  failure  of  perseverance,  of 
staying  power,  in  her  adversary. 


158  The  Interest  of  America 

Naval  support  of  Great  Britain  by  a 
continental  European  Power,  as  suggested 
a  few  lines  before,  labors  under  the  draw- 
back that,  if  exerted,  it  is  an  act  of  war, 
and  entails  a  land  war  as  well;  to  which 
against  Germany  no  single  continental 
nation  is  at  present  equal.  This  is  not  to 
say  that  the  French  army  is  not  a  matter 
of  very  serious  consideration,  especially 
when  taken  in  connection  with  the  frontier 
defenses  elaborated  by  France  since  1870. 
Together,  these  offensive  and  defensive 
measures  constitute  just  that  security  which 
organized  force  gives,  even  when  ultimately 
inferior.  It  not  only  imposes  respectful 
consideration  beforehand,  disinclining  the 
adversary  to  a  rupture  for  less  than  im- 
perative reasons;  it  also,  in  case  of  hostili- 
ties, obtains  delay,  allowing  time  for  skill, 
or  for  the  chapter  of  accidents,  to  reverse 
conditions. 

It  is   held   by   French   writers   that   the 


In  International  Conditions  159 

attitude  of  Germany  in  1905  compelled 
the  dismissal  by  the  French  Government 
of  its  foreign  minister;  and  that  the  humil- 
iation, with  all  the  modification  of  policy 
it  implied,  was  due  to  the  fact  that  French 
military  preparations  had  been  permitted 
to  fall  into  neglect,  owing  to  causes  not 
necessary  here  to  name.  On  the  con- 
trary, a  year  later,  demands  similarly 
overbearing,  in  French  estimation,  were 
withstood,  because  the  first  lesson  had 
led  to  preparations  too  obvious  to  be  dis- 
regarded, except  for  causes  more  serious 
than  existed.  France  then  held  her 
ground,  and  Germany,  so  it  is  said, 
lowered  her  tone.  It  is  impossible  to  affirm 
absolutely  concerning  nearly  contemporary 
transactions,  the  records  of  which  are  still 
covered  by  the  secrecy  of  archives;  but 
the  general  impression  in  Europe  is  that 
matters  were  as  stated,  and  certainly  there 
is  the  belief  that  such  peremptoriness  does 


160  The  Interest  of  America 

and  will  characterize  the  diplomacy  of 
Germany,  so  long  as  her  present  military 
preponderance  lasts.  By  this,  as  well  as 
by  other  political  necessities,  Austria  is 
chained  to  her;  and  the  alliance  on  land 
is  for  the  time  irresistible.  As  in  the 
alliance  of  Great  Britain  with  Japan,  it 
is  not  necessary  that  Austria  act;  it  is 
enough  to  know  that  she  must  act,  if  need 
require. 

This  consideration  of  exposure  on  the 
land  side  vitiates  the  power  of  the  Entente, 
except  so  far  as  counting  the  cost  of  a  war 
will  act  as  a  deterrent  to  Germany,  and  so 
modify  her  political  action,  as  in  the  case 
just  cited.  So  much  attainment  is  valu- 
able; but  it  falls  very  far  short  of  the 
power  to  take  up  an  aggressive  naval 
action  by  a  continental  state,  thereby 
bringing  on  land  war  as  well.  It  is  one 
thing  to  be  strong  enough  to  make  an  ad- 
versary   wary    of    attacking;     it    is    quite 


In  International  Conditions  161 

another  to  be  able  to  beat  him  if  a  contest 
arises.  The  consideration  disposes  of  the 
supposition  that  any  European  naval  state 
would  support  the  British  position  in  the 
Mediterranean,  unless  already  at  war,  or 
with  war  unavoidable.  Otherwise,  Great 
Britain  alone  must  find  the  ships;  and 
should  Austria  prove  financially  able  to 
put  afloat  there  the  heavy  squadron  she 
has  contemplated,  it  will  have  to  be  ac- 
cepted as  an  addition  to  the  British  burden. 
These  conclusions,  if  reasonable,  not 
only  emphasize  the  paramount  importance 
in  world  politics  of  the  British  navy,  but 
they  show  also  that  there  are  only  two 
naval  states  which  can  afford  to  help 
Great  Britain  with  naval  force,  because 
they  alone  have  no  land  frontiers  which 
march  with  those  of  Germany.  These 
states  are  Japan  and  the  United  States. 
In  looking  to  the  future,  it  becomes  for 
them  a  question  whether  it  will  be  to  their 


1 62  The  Interest  of  America 

interest,  whether  they  can  afford,  to  ex- 
change the  naval  supremacy  of  Great 
Britain  for  that  of  Germany;  for  this 
alternative  may  arise.  Those  two  states 
and  Germany  cannot,  as  matters  now 
stand,  touch  one  another,  except  on  the 
open  sea;  whereas  the  character  of  the 
British  Empire  is  such  that  it  has  every- 
where sea  frontiers,  is  everywhere  assail- 
able where  local  naval  superiority  does 
not  exist,  as  for  instance  in  Australia, 
and  other  Eastern  possessions.  The  United 
States  has  upon  Great  Britain  the  further 
check  of  Canada,  open  to  land  attack. 

A  German  navy,  supreme  by  the  fall  of 
Great  Britain,  with  a  supreme  German 
army  able  to  spare  readily  a  large  expedi- 
tionary force  for  over-sea  operations,  is  one 
of  the  possibilities  of  the  future.  Great 
Britain  for  long  periods,  in  the  Seven  Years 
War  and  Napoleonic  struggle,  17 56-1 8 15, 
has  been  able  to  do,  and  has  done,  just  this; 


In  International  Conditions  163 

not  because  she  has  had  a  supreme  army, 
but  because,  thanks  to  her  insular  situa- 
tion, her  naval  supremacy  covered  effec- 
tually both  the  home  positions  and  the 
expedition.  The  future  ability  of  Germany 
thus  to  act  is  emphasized  to  the  point  of 
probability  by  the  budgetary  difficulties  of 
Great  Britain,  by  the  general  disorganiza- 
tion of  Russia,  and  by  the  arrest  of  popula- 
tion in  France.  Though  vastly  the  richer 
nation,  the  people  of  Great  Britain,  for  the 
very  reason  of  greater  wealth  long  enjoyed, 
are  not  habituated  to  the  economical 
endurance  of  the  German;  nor  can  the 
habits  of  individual  liberty  in  England  or 
America  accept,  unless  under  duress,  the 
heavy  yoke  of  organization,  of  regulation 
of  individual  action,  which  constitutes  the 
power  of  Germany  among  modern  states. 

The  rivalry  between  Germany  and  Great 
Britain  to-day  is  the  danger  point,  not  only 
of  European  politics,  but  of  world  politics 


164  The  Interest  of  America 

as  well.  It  is  not  that  other  delicate  ques- 
tions do  not  exist  continuously,  and  still 
others  arise  from  time  to  time.  These  in- 
deed are  the  occasions,  the  kindling  wood, 
from  which  great  fires  often  start;  but  for 
a  fire  there  must  be  material.  Behind  this 
particular  rivalry  are  popular  interests  and 
jealousies,  dependent  upon  industry  and 
commerce,  in  which  the  welfare  and  live- 
lihood of  the  peoples  are  involved.  No 
such  emphasized  industrial  and  maritime 
competition  between  two  communities  has 
arisen  since  the  time  of  Cromwell  and  the 
later  Stewart  kings,  when  England  wrested 
from  Holland  her  long  possessed  commer- 
cial supremacy,  supported  by  a  navy  until 
then  unconquered.  Although  the  contem- 
porary facts  of  to-day  are  matter  of 
common  knowledge,  easily  accessible,  few 
outsiders  clearly  realize  the  degree  of  Ger- 
many's advance,  or  the  conditions  which 
invest   it   with   peculiar    significance;   past 


In  International  Conditions  165 

and  future,  as  well  as  present.  Nor  do 
many  so  regard  the  remoter  past  as  to 
comprehend,  and  enter  into,  the  intensity 
of  German  feeling  which  accompanies 
her  career  of  industrial  and  commercial 
achievement. 

It  is  possible  to  sympathize  with  this 
feeling  without  ignoring  that  the  menace 
of  the  progress  is  sensibly  felt  in  world 
politics.  To  this  has  been  due  the  gradual 
formation  of  the  Entente,  Great  Britain 
with  France  and  Russia,  two  nations  tradi- 
tionally antagonistic  to  her  until  very 
lately.  This,  with  similar  understandings, 
a  German  Chancellor  denounced  as  an  at- 
tempt to  encircle  Germany,  —  to  isolate 
her;  the  motive  for  them  being  probably 
found  in  the  necessities  of  the  balance  of 
power,  not  only  in  Europe,  but  over  the 
world,  constituting  a  reply  to  Germany's 
apparent  disposition  to  push  in  many  di- 
rections for  maritime  and  commercial  posi- 


1 66  The  Interest  of  America 

tions.  It  cannot  be  too  often  repeated 
that  such  ambitions  give  no  just  cause  of 
offense;  but  it  is  quite  a  different  thing 
to  say  that  they  call  for  no  watchfulness, 
nor  for  counteraction.  History  has  shown 
that  in  all  such  advance  there  is  an  inevi- 
table element  of  aggressiveness,  which  can 
be  kept  within  bounds  only  by  an  oppo- 
sition of  force.  Thus  is  insured  a  balance, 
an  equilibrium,  the  maintenance  of  which 
has  been,  and  continues  to  be,  the  anxious 
preoccupation  of  European  statesmen. 

Since  the  War  of  Secession,  the  United 
States  has  been  entering  more  and  more, 
insensibly  yet  inevitably,  into  the  European 
family,  so  that  events  there  should  pre- 
occupy her  citizens  also.  In  the  War  with 
Spain,  the  Monroe  pronouncement  itself 
received  European  support  as  well  as  aroused 
European  antagonism;  and  general  report 
identified  Germany  with  the  latter,  an 
impression  doubtless   strengthened  by   the 


In  International  Conditions  167 

unpleasantness  in  the  Philippines.  Unques- 
tionably, had  Germany  possessed  then  the 
navy  which  her  programme  now  calls  for, 
her  attitude  would  have  been  stiffer  and 
her  position  stronger.  Our  supporter  at 
that  time  would  have  confronted  a  very 
different  situation.  The  Spanish  contention 
is  settled,  a  thing  of  the  past;  but  to  the 
most  superficial  observer  it  must  be  obvious 
that  the  future  bristles  with  questions  in 
which  we,  in  common  with  the  entire  Euro- 
pean group  of  nations,  have  interests  specific 
as  well  as  general. 

Let  Germany's  present,  however,  be  con- 
sidered in  the  light  of  her  past;  for,  unless 
this  be  done  with  some  approach  to  ade- 
quacy, it  is  impossible  duly  to  allow  for  her 
as  a  contemporary  factor.  To  understand 
in  the  best  sense,  it  is  necessary  not  only  to 
recognize  the  interests  of  a  nation,  but  to 
enter  as  well  into  its  feelings;  tracing  them 
where  possible  to  the  historic  origin  which 


1 68  The  Interest  of  America 

once  occasioned,  and  may  still  account 
for  them.  Such  understanding  is  essential 
to  just  appreciation.  The  sentiment  of  a 
people  is  the  most  energetic  element  in 
national  action.  Even  when  material  in- 
terests are  the  original  exciting  cause,  it  is 
the  sentiment  to  which  they  give  rise,  the 
moral  tone  which  emotion  takes,  that  con- 
stitutes the  greater  force.  Whatever  indi- 
vidual rulers  may  do,  masses  of  men  are 
aroused  to  effective  action  —  other  than 
spasmodic  —  only  by  the  sense  of  wrong 
done,  or  of  right  to  be  vindicated.  For 
this  reason  governments  are  careful  to  ob- 
tain for  their  contentions  an  aspect  of  right 
which  will  keep  their  people  at  their  backs. 
The  past  of  Germany  has  developed  for 
her  just  such  a  sentiment,  with  which 
present  interests  cooperate  to  constitute 
a  motive  force  of  very  great  power;  bringing 
the  people  of  the  Empire  heartily  in  sup- 
port of  the  general  international  attitude 


In  International  Conditions  169 

of  their  rulers.  As  in  all  countries,  there 
are  within  her  borders  internal  contentions 
and  conflicting  interests,  which  divide  men 
into  parties,  the  effects  of  which  color  their 
view  of  particular  international  disputes 
as  these  arise;  but  underlying  all  there  is 
the  sense  of  what  political  unity  has  meant 
and  has  done  for  the  German  race.  A 
recent  French  writer,  in  the  Revue  des 
Deux  Mondes,  discussing  German  diplomacy 
in  a  critical  spirit,  nevertheless  says  well, 
"The  spirit  of  faction  exists  in  Germany 
as  elsewhere.  But,  to  hold  it  in  check,  the 
sense  of  nationality  is  stronger  there  than 
elsewhere,  and  the  patriotic  cohesion,  which 
at  the  call  of  the  government  unites  that 
people  of  sixty  millions,  remains  the  pro- 
found truth  which  France  more  than  any 
other  country  should  beware  of  forgetting." 
The  lesson  may  be  for  France  in  particular, 
but  it  likewise  is  for  the  world  in  general. 
There  is  also  wide  spread  in  the  German 


170  The  Interest  of  America 

people  the  recognition  that  the  maintenance 
of  this  gain  depends  largely  upon  the  sea. 
German  union  gave  the  needed  impetus  to 
German  industrial  enterprise,  which  dates 
since  1870;  and  industry  has  called  for 
markets,  for  commerce,  and  for  shipping. 
It  begot  also  Protection,  which  draws  its 
strongest  line  at  the  sea  frontier.  Protection 
was  adopted  in  1879,  partly  to  foster  home 
industries,  commonly  so  called;  partly  to 
sustain  agriculture,  with  its  gift  of  food, 
against  the  drain  of  rural  population  to  the 
factories.  To  this  development  of  the  in- 
dustrial system,  multiplying  employment, 
has  been  due  the  decrease  of  emigration, 
from  220,000  in  1881,  to  20,000  at  present; 
a  number  more  than  made  good  by  immi- 
gration, so  that  a  recent  German  writer 
claims  that  Germany  has  become  an  immi- 
grant nation. 

The  military  correlative  of  all  this  is  a 
navy.    The  numerical  strength  of  the  Ger- 


In  International  Conditions  171 

man  Navy  League,  which  drew  its  impulse 
from  a  similar  association  in  Great  Britain, 
now  exceeds  greatly  that  of  the  island  state 
which  beyond  all  others  depends  upon  con- 
trol of  the  sea;  not  for  prosperity  only,  but 
for  bare  existence.  This  remarkable  growth 
very  probably  is  due  in  large  measure  to 
the  singular  capacity  for  systematic  develop- 
ment of  energy,  for  sagacious  planning, 
adapting  means  to  ends,  which  in  Germany 
characterizes  all  movement,  —  military,  ed- 
ucational, industrial,  commercial;  but,  how- 
ever excellent  the  propaganda  of  the  League, 
it  would  not  have  accomplished  its  results 
had  there  not  been  in  the  popular  sentiment 
something  which  corresponded  to  the  ap- 
peal. Granting  the  sentiment,  unquestion- 
ably the  League  has  done  much  to  give 
it  form  and  vigor,  and  so  to  make  it  pro- 
ductive, in  face  of  the  great  expenditure  — 
that  is,  of  the  increase  of  debt  and  of  the 
great   additional   taxation  —  involved;   but 


172  The  Interest  of  America 

the  sentiment  was  a  condition  necessary 
to  success.  "It  is  not  our  rules  that  have 
made  our  success,"  said  recently  the  head 
of  the  League;  " rather  has  the  spirit  that 
lives  in  the  League.  The  spirit  upon  which 
we  are  founded  is  that  of  a  German  ideal- 
ism. In  our  flag  is  incorporated  the  idealism 
of  the  German  navy." 

German  naval  expenditure  has  risen  from 
less  than  ten  million  dollars  in  1875,  five 
years  after  the  war  with  France,  to  over 
a  hundred  annual  millions;  and  it  is  planned 
that  the  same  rate  shall  continue  for  ten 
years  to  come.  It  will  be  remembered,  too, 
that  such  a  sum  brings  a  larger  return  there 
than  in  the  United  States.  This  is  no  freak 
of  a  government,  however  little  parliamen- 
tary to  our  notions  that  of  Germany  is. 
It  is  the  expression  of  the  will  of  a  people. 
Also,  it  may  be  added,  it  is  an  additional 
illustration  of  the  fact  that  a  navy,  and 
shipping   generally,    appeal    to    a    national 


In  International  Conditions  173 

sense  of  unity  more  powerfully  than  does 
any  other  one  form  of  national  activity;  for 
the  reason  that,  being  external  to  the  na- 
tional bounds,  they  are  less  sectional  and 
more  universal  in  the  impression  produced. 
It  is  significant  that,  of  the  million  and  more 
members  of  the  German  League,  one  fourth 
are  found  in  the  single  inland  kingdom  of 
Saxony.  A  great  fleet,  whether  merchant 
or  military,  is  a  more  conspicuous  emblem 
of  national  power  than  are  the  other 
processes  or  results  of  national  industrial 
achievement. 

This  is  especially  applicable  to  Germany, 
where  the  navy  is  a  very  new  institution, 
and  where  the  realization  of  unity,  its  con- 
version from  a  worshipped  ideal  to  a  con- 
crete reality,  is  also  new.  As  regards  union, 
Germany  to-day  is  very  much  where  the 
United  States  was  between  1789  and  1812. 
Union,  embraced  in  a  moment  of  racial  ex- 
altation, as  it  was  by  the  American  colonies 


174  The  Interest  of  America 

during  the  War  of  Independence,  has  been 
expressed  and  consecrated  in  Germany  in 
a  formal  Constitution,  the  endurance  of 
which  throughout  the  lifetime  of  a  gener- 
ation has  gained  for  it  the  grip  which  con- 
tinuance always  gives.  But  there  remain, 
not  yet  outgrown,  those  "particularist" 
sentiments,  to  borrow  the  German  phrase 
corresponding  to  our  "  states'  rights,"  to- 
gether with  that  divergence  of  local  or 
sectional  interests,  which  reproduce  the 
conditions  of  the  United  States  during  the 
corresponding  period  of  national  existence; 
an  inheritance  from  the  jealousies  of  sep- 
arate colonies.  It  required  the  War  of  1812, 
and  the  consequent  concentration  of  thought 
upon  a  single  and  common  external  motive, 
to  develop  a  national  sentiment,  the  devo- 
tion to  an  ideal,  —  of  Union,  —  as  distin- 
guished from  the  motive  of  material 
interest,  which  had  occasioned  the  framing 
of  the  Constitution  and  facilitated  its  adop- 


In  International  Conditions  175 


tion.  How  powerful  that  sentiment  was, 
voiced  in  the  simple  words  "The  Union," 
can  be  testified  by  those  who  remember  the 
stormy  days  which  preceded  the  War  of 
Secession.  No  hatred  of  slavery,  nor  im- 
pulse of  interest,  competed  in  power  with 
the  idea  of  national  integrity  to  be  asserted 
and  preserved. 

So  in  the  German  confederacy,  a  customs 
union,  prompted  by  evident  advantage, 
had  preceded  political  union  and  led  to  it; 
but  the  consummation  of  that  achievement 
into  a  true  national  oneness  requires  a 
motive  force  transcending  that  of  material 
interests.  It  is  found  in  the  pride  of  inter- 
national position  achieved  by  a  united 
Germany,  contrasted  with  the  weakness  of 
centuries  of  disunion,  and  with  the  humili- 
ation of  foreign  intervention  and  oppression 
which  that  disunion  had  permitted.  It 
seeks  and  finds  expression  in  a  national 
self-assertion,  the  occasions  of  which  some- 


176  The  Interest  of  America 


times  to  an  onlooker  suggest  —  if  Germans 
will  pardon  the  remark  —  the  sensitiveness 
of  a  newcomer,  of  one  too  recently  in  the 
position  of  attainment  to  take  for  granted 
the  due  recognition  of  the  fact  by  others. 
Americans  must  be  aware  that  there  was 
a  time  when  a  like  trait  was  noted  in  us; 
and  it  proceeded  from  the  same  cause,  an 
uneasy  impression  that  others  were  dis- 
posed to  take  us  at  less  than  our  own  valu- 
ation, and  consequently  to  show  us  less  than 
due  consideration. 

In  both  cases,  also,  it  is  true  that  in  the 
policies  of  each  state  there  was  that  which 
appeared  to  others  self-assertion  carried 
to  the  pitch  of  aggressiveness.  "We  will 
not  permit  equality  with  other  Powers  to 
be  taken  from  us,"  said  the  late  Chan- 
cellor, Biilow,  some  years  ago.  "We  will 
not  allow  the  right  to  speak  like  them  in  the 
world  to  be  contested.  We  have  become 
a  great  Power,  and  with  God's  help  we  hope 


In  International  Conditions  177 


so  to  remain."  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  the 
symbol  of  American  external  policy,  in  its 
beginnings  was  as  little  liked  as  now  is  the 
purpose  of  external  action  of  which  the 
contemporary  great  German  naval  expan- 
sion is  the  visible  token.  That  which  by 
the  state  supporting  each  was  characterized 
as  defensive  only,  has  appeared  to  other 
nations  clearly  aggressive  in  tendency.  To 
forbid  European  possession  upon  these  con- 
tinents seems  to  an  American  simple  rea- 
sonable precaution,  for  self-protection;  but 
to  others  such  prohibition  may  very  well 
appear  to  pass  beyond  the  bounds  of  defense 
into  those  of  "  offense,"  in  the  political  and 
military  sense  of  the  word.  It  certainly  so 
seemed  in  the  early  history  of  the  Doctrine, 
but  nations  now  have  grown  accustomed  to 
its  assertions,  are  tolerant  of  them;  and, 
it  must  be  added  there  is  in  the  United 
States  a  latent  power  which  commands 
consideration. 


178  The  Interest  of  America 

That  latent  power,  however,  must  re- 
ceive organization  if  it  is  to  be  fully  ef- 
fective. The  concrete  expression  of  the 
resources  of  a  nation  is  its  wealth,  but  it  is 
trite  to  say  that  a  nation,  like  a  man,  may 
abuse  its  wealth;  may  waste  it  by  neglect, 
or  neutralize  it  by  misapplication.  The 
United  States  at  present  has  two  leading 
principles  of  external  policy  —  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  the  Open  Door  in  the  Far 
East.  As  towards  Europe,  our  Nearer 
East,  the  immemorial  policy  is  one  of  non- 
interference; negative,  not  positive;  yet 
the  correlative  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
But  non-interference  with  European  inter- 
relations does  not  imply  absence  of  concern 
in  them,  nor  should  it  involve  heedlessness 
of  the  fact  that  the  shifting  of  the  balance 
in  Europe  may  affect  our  interests  and  our 
power  throughout  the  world.  This  truth 
also  has  its  momentary  concrete  expression 
in  the  rivalry  between  Germany  and  Great 


In  International  Conditions  179 

Britain,  in  which  the  existing  economical 
and  naval  disparity  is  decreasing,  though 
it  is  still  considerable. 

The  United  States  may  have  many  differ- 
ent diplomatic  discussions  with  the  several 
European  nations;  but  with  the  European 
system,  as  now  represented  in  the  balance 
of  power  between  the  Triple  Alliance  and 
the  Triple  Entente,  our  concern  is  only  in 
the  effect  which  changes  in  that  unstable 
equilibrium  may  have  upon  our  two  external 
policies.  In  the  present  state  of  that  equi- 
librium, for  the  passing  moment,  but  not  so 
surely  for  an  indefinite  future,  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  is  less  obviously  liable  to  adverse 
influence  than  is  the  Open  Door;  because 
every  foot  of  American  soil  is  now  the  pos- 
session of  some  sovereign  state,  whose  rights 
as  such  are  ascertained  by  international 
law  and  cannot  readily  be  infringed.  The 
Chinese  Empire  is  of  course  equally  a  sov- 
ereign state;  but  the  feebleness  of  its  organ- 


180  The  Interest  of  America 

ization,  resulting  in  misgovernment  and 
lack  of  military  strength,  has  not  only  per- 
mitted but  provoked  the  frequent  inter- 
ference of  other  nations,  with  constant 
assaults  upon  its  rights  of  sovereignty,  de- 
spite the  greatness  of  its  undeveloped  wealth, 
in  population  and  resources.  The  result 
of  this  has  been  to  obscure  and  actually  to 
lessen  the  effective  value  of  those  rights. 
They  are  freely  disregarded  in  spirit,  if 
not  in  letter.  So  far  as  the  status  of  China 
is  concerned,  conditions  are  maintained 
not  by  her  own  power  sustaining  her  rights, 
but  by  the  opposition  of  interests,  in  relation 
to  her,  of  other  states;  those  of  Europe,  the 
United  States,  and  Japan.  The  position 
in  so  far  is  identical  with  that  of  the  Turkish 
Empire  up  to  the  revolution  of  a  year  ago, 
the  outcome  of  which  in  this  respect  re- 
mains to  be  seen;  the  immediate  results, 
we  know,  were  Bulgaria's  declaration  of 
independence,  and  the  annexations  by  Aus- 


In  International  Conditions  181 

tria-Hungary.  The  uncertainties  of  such 
situations  arise  from  local  instability  of 
government.  They  are  continuously  preg- 
nant of  surprises,  such  as  that  of  Bulgaria, 
Bosnia,  and  Herzegovina;  of  difficult  ques- 
tions like  that  of  Crete  now,  where  the 
natural  aspirations  of  the  population  are 
crushed  by  the  policy  of  the  protecting 
Powers,  induced  by  the  stubbornness  of 
Turkey,  which  has  drawn  her  line  of  ac- 
quiescence at  Bulgaria  and  the  Austrian 
annexations;  in  other  words,  at  the  point 
where  force  compels  her  to  accept.  Such 
transactions  breed  in  the  international 
relations  of  states  a  sense  of  insecu- 
rity which  is  liable  to  become  acute 
suddenly. 

Further,  the  Open  Door,  like  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  is  a  declaration  of  national  policy, 
not  an  assertion  of  international  law;  ex- 
cept so  far  as  it  may  be  consecrated  by 
agreements  between  particular  nations.    In 


1 82  The  Interest  of  America 

so  far,  and  for  the  period  of  agreement,  it 
binds  the  nations  concerned;  but  for  mainte- 
nance beyond  this  it  depends  upon  power. 
No  nation  not  consenting  is  bound  to  it  by 
established  principles,  but  is  at  liberty  to 
disregard  it;  except  as  constrained  by  force 
which  it  feels  compelled  to  respect.  The 
Open  Door  also,  like  other  policies,  notably 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  is  the  outcome  of 
conditions  which  have  at  last  reached  a 
turning  point,  a  crisis;  a  moment  of  birth 
following  a  period  of  conception.  Both  are 
proclamations  to  the  effect  that  processes 
long  unimpeded  have  reached  a  stage  when 
policy  demands  that  it  be  said:  Thus  far 
shalt  thou  go,  and  no  farther.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine  said  this  to  European  coloniz- 
ation in  America,  till  then  unchallenged. 
The  Open  Door  says  the  like  to  the 
further  extension,  by  political  or  military 
intervention,  of  external  control  over 
Eastern    markets,    broadly    understood    to 


In  International  Conditions  183 

cover  all  financial  and  commercial  op- 
portunity; control  by  annexation,  or 
by  influence  resting  upon  force;  in 
short,  by  substantial  possession,  however 
disguised. 

Possession  by  such  means,  followed  in- 
evitably by  subordinating  the  native  mar- 
kets to  the  policy  of  foreigners,  has  gone  on 
for  three  centuries;  and  is  seen  now  in  Brit- 
ish India,  in  the  extensive  Dutch  and  French 
holdings  in  the  Far  East,  in  Korea,  in  Man- 
churia, in  the  Philippines.  These  parallel 
former  European  control  in  the  American 
continents.  To  arrest  this  progress  at  the 
doors  of  the  four  hundred  million  consumers 
which  inhabit  the  Chinese  Empire  is  the 
proximate  aim  of  the  Open  Door.  To  this 
the  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  is  a 
corollary.  That  integrity  is  the  concern 
of  the  United  States,  or  of  any  country 
asserting  the  Open  Door,  not  as  a  matter 
of  benevolence,  but  because  it  is  essential  to 


184  The  Interest  of  America 

free  access  to  Chinese  markets;  limited 
only  by  the  general  policy  of  the  Chinese 
themselves,  dealing  equally  with  all  out- 
siders. Inasmuch  as  China  is  not  able  to 
maintain  her  rights  of  sovereignty  in  this 
matter,  unless  assisted,  the  principle  of  in- 
tegrity for  the  Empire  follows  upon  the  dec- 
laration of  equal  rights  in  her  markets.  Just 
how  far  the  maintenance  of  the  Open  Door 
may  carry  the  interested  nations  to  decisive 
action,  in  support  of  the  integrity  of  the 
Chinese  Empire,  remains  to  be  seen.  Overt 
action,  as  distinct  from  latent  power  to  act, 
will  be  necessary  only  in  case  some  among 
the  countries  concerned  obtain,  by  positions, 
by  predominant  force,  by  intrigue,  or  by 
the  negligence  of  rivals,  a  preponderance, 
destroying  that  balance  which  the  Open 
Door  requires.  Equilibrium  will  ensure 
quiet.  Thus  the  Open  Door,  which  in 
principle  has  received  the  adhesion  of  the 
Western   community   of   nations,  does  not 


In  International  Conditions  185 

stand  isolated,  as  an  unrelated  doctrine, 
but  is  a  positive  and  formulated  attitude 
affecting,  however  unconsciously  of  its  range, 
the  general  policy  of  contact  beween  the 
East  and  the  West. 


IV 
THE   OPEN   DOOR 


IV 

THE   OPEN   DOOR 

P  I  ^HIS  newcomer  by  name  into  the  poli- 
-*-  cies  of  nations,  the  Open  Door,  this 
artificially  sustained  balance  of  commercial 
opportunity,  or  free  competition,  proposes 
to  exclude,  within  the  regions  affected, 
the  advantage  which  most  peoples  to-day 
secure  for  their  own  industries  within  the 
limits  of  their  territorial  control.  It  is 
to-day  the  most  conspicuous  feature  in  the 
general  policy  of  the  Pacific  Ocean,  into 
which  it  enters  as  a  factor.  Its  aim  is 
essentially  commercial,  for  the  age  is  above 
all  commercial  in  spirit;  but,  in  the  inter- 
action of  those  forces  which  determine  the 
character  and  degree  of  progress,  material 
strength,  physical  power,  underlies  the  un- 
disturbed peaceful  developments  of  indus- 


190  The  Interest  of  America 

try  and  exchange.  Finance  supports  war; 
but  readiness  for  war  shields  from  exter- 
nal molestation  the  processes  upon  which 
finance  is  sustained.  It  was  this  assurance 
of  quiet  under  the  wings  of  her  navy  that 
enabled  the  financial  eminence  of  Great 
Britain  to  be  built  up.  A  like  immunity 
has  been  conferred  upon  the  United  States 
by  remoteness  from  the  scenes  of  European 
contentions,  and  still  more  by  the  exigen- 
cies of  the  Balance  of  Power  fettering  the 
action  of  European  states.  The  result  in 
the  two  instances  is  that  the  two  English 
speaking  states  are  now  the  richest  in  the 
world.  So  the  Open  Door,  to  be  benefi- 
cially effective,  demands  evident  security 
of  maintenance,  freedom  from  disturbance, 
under  the  balance  of  forces  applicable  in 
the  Pacific  in  general,  and  in  the  Western 
Pacific  in  particular. 

It  seems  then  of  interest  to  consider  the 
question  of  balance  of  power  in  the  Pacific, 


In  International  Conditions  iqi 

as  bearing  upon  the  question  of  the  main- 
tenance of  the  Open  Door;  the  more  so 
that  the  United  States  obviously,  by  her 
geographical  situation  as  a  Pacific  Power, 
and  by  her  advocacy  of  the  Open  Door, 
has  a  peculiar  interest  in  the  matter.  She 
has  also  peculiar  opportunity,  advantage, 
for  the  application  of  such  material  organ- 
ized power  as  she  may  see  fit  to  develop 
for  the  maintenance  of  her  contentions. 
In  the  matter  of  particular  advanced  posi- 
tions in  that  ocean  she  stands  on  a  level 
with  European  Powers;  but  their  positions, 
while  useful  in  a  military  and  commer- 
cial sense,  are  very  remote  from  the  base 
of  the  national  power,  with  a  long  line  of 
communications,  exposed  in  the  case  of 
each  to  molestation  by  possible  enemies  at 
many  places.  As  before  pointed  out,  there 
is  now  a  tendency  towards  such  an  equi- 
librium of  naval  force  in  Europe  as  will 
render    increasingly    difficult    for   any    one 


192  The  Interest  of  America 

Power  to  divert  a  large  detachment  of  its 
navy  so  far  from  the  home  shores.  In  this 
is  seen  again  the  effect  of  European  rela- 
tions upon  American  interests. 

It  is  not  to  the  interest  of  the  United 
States  to  propose  to  herself  the  object  of 
supremacy  in  the  Pacific;  a  regrettable 
phrase,  too  often  used,  provocative  of  an- 
tagonism by  its  very  sound.  An  assured 
supremacy  over  her  own  possessions,  and 
over  the  approaches  to  them,  is  in  her  case 
a  legitimate  aim,  menacing  none;  for  there 
is  no  country  so  situated,  relatively  to  her, 
as  to  have  access  to  its  own  ports  en- 
dangered by  her  superior  navy,  which  is 
the  unfortunate  relation  of  the  British 
navy  to  Germany.  The  dilemma  of  Great 
Britain  is  that  she  cannot  help  command- 
ing the  approaches  to  Germany,  by  the 
mere  possession  of  the  very  means  essen- 
tial to  her  own  existence  as  a  state  of  the 
first  order.     No  such  invidious  character- 


In  International  Conditions  103 

istic  attaches  to  the  position  of  the  United 
States;  but  from t her  geographical  situa- 
tion, in  virtue  of  nearness,  whatever  mili- 
tary numbers  she  may  possess  have  in- 
creased effectiveness  towards  either  the 
Panama  Canal,  when  finished,  or  towards 
the  Far  East.  This  is  true  even  now, 
before  the  completion  of  the  canal;  be- 
cause, granting  proper  permanent  prepara- 
tions on  the  Pacific  coast,  the  fleet  can 
be  assembled  there,  not  as  soon  as  desir- 
able, but  soon  enough  to  retrieve  injuries 
that  may  have  been  received  on  account 
of  its  absence.  This  assumes  that  the 
battle-ships  will  be  kept  together,  concen- 
trated in  force,  whether  in  the  Atlantic  or 
in  the  Pacific;  the  only  proper  disposition 
for  them.  Whatever  its  numbers,  the  fleet 
gains  in  proportionate  force,  when  nearness 
to  the  scene  not  only  facilitates  action 
but  reduces  the  necessity  of  detachments 
and  of   long   lines  of  communication. 


194  The  Interest  of  America 

The  recent  development  of  the  German 
navy,  present  and  programmed,  if  the 
word  may  be  allowed,  has  most  singularly 
modified,  in  a  favorable  sense  for  the  im- 
mediate present,  the  effective  power  of 
the  United  States  in  the  Pacific.  In  an 
article  on  the  Disposition  of  Navies,  written 
eight  years  ago,  shortly  after  the  promul- 
gation of  the  first  treaty  of  conditional 
alliance  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan, 
and  two  years  before  the  war  between 
Japan  and  Russia,  I  had  occasion  to  com- 
ment upon  the  then  existing  difficulties, 
and  the  necessary  provision  to  meet  them, 
on  the  part  of  the  confronting  allies,  Japan 
and  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia. 
The  importance  of  the  Mediterranean  to 
the  communications,  and  their  exposure 
within  it,  were  naturally  prominent  fea- 
tures in  such  a  discussion.  Russia  then 
already  had  assembled  in  the  Far  East  the 
fine  squadron  of  which  such  pitiful  use  was 


In  International  Conditions  195 

afterwards  made.  But  while  the  possible 
attitude,  or  action,  of  Germany,  in  case 
of  an  Eastern  war  involving  others  than  the 
immediate  participants,  was  considered,  it 
was  not  felt  that  her  fleet  then  would 
powerfully  affect  the  balance,  as  other- 
wise constituted.  Great  Britain  then  held 
achieved  the  Two  Power  Standard;  and 
there  seemed  no  cause  for  doubt  that  she 
could  both  control  the  communications 
and  seriously  help  her  ally,  should  it  be- 
come necessary  to  do  more  than  hold  the 
French  navy  in  check  in  the  waters  of 
Europe. 

This  was  eight  years  ago.  Now  the  Ger- 
man navy  is  developing  a  power  which  will 
soon  make  it  second  to  that  of  Great  Brit- 
ain, with  a  large  margin  of  superiority 
over  every  other  one,  including  that  of 
the  United  States.  The  result  of  this  is 
to  fasten  the  British  navy  to  British  waters. 
In     occupying     this    situation,     as     Great 


196  The  Interest  of  America 

Britain  now  has  done,  an  advanced  front 
of  operations  is  maintained  in  concentrated 
force,  relying  upon  such  disposition  to  pro- 
tect all  the  region  behind;  that  is,  practi- 
cally, all  her  colonies,  and  every  essential 
sea  communication  of  the  British  Islands 
with  the  outside  world.  As  a  military 
measure  this  is  perfectly  correct;  and  so 
long  as  it  holds,  so  long  as  no  disaster  or 
neglect  weakens  the  British  fleet,  it  will  be 
effective  both  for  defense,  and  for  the 
offensive  work  of  cutting  Germany's  sea 
communications.  But  it  is  a  disposition 
that  must  be  sustained  in  peace  as  well  as 
in  war.  No  chance  of  a  surprise,  by  divid- 
ing the  battleships  between  home  waters 
and  others  can  be  permitted;  the  fact  of 
Austria  in  1866,  and  of  France  in  1870, 
stand  as  warnings  against  surprise  by 
superior  force  and  superior  preparation. 

Obviously,   while  this   European  tension 
lasts,  neither   Germany  nor  Great  Britain 


In  International  Conditions  197 

can  divert  much  force  to  the  Pacific.  In 
March,  1910,  according  to  the  reply  made 
by  the  head  of  the  Admiralty  to  a  question 
in  Parliament,  there  are  on  the  China 
Station  no  British  battleships,  only  four 
first-class  cruisers;  and  also  no  such  cruisers 
nor  battleships  in  the  British  East  Indies. 
The  navies  of  the  two  states,  and  other 
circumstances  of  national  strength,  remain 
indeed  factors  for  consideration  elsewhere. 
They  forbid,  for  instance,  the  adoption 
by  another  country  of  measures  which 
might  cause  the  two  to  unite  even  momen- 
tarily against  it;  but  the  Open  Door,  if 
adhered  to  as  a  policy,  offers  to  commercial 
states  no  temptation  to  resistance.  At- 
tempts to  obtain  undue  national  privileges, 
especially  if  by  force,  or  by  an  unfair  use 
of  present  occupation,  may  make  the  Open 
Door  a  cause  of  war  by  inducing  measures 
to  resist  its  violation;  but  the  maintenance 
of  equal  trade  opportunity  will  not  provoke 


198  The  Interest  of  America 

opposition.  The  same  general  conditions 
that  find  expression  in  the  protagonism  of 
Germany  and  Great  Britain  will  control 
also  the  action  of  the  smaller  European 
navies;  for  each  one  of  them  is  a  factor 
in  the  balance  of  power,  which  is  essential 
to  the  independent  movement  of  all  the 
states. 

The  result  is  to  leave  the  two  chief 
Pacific  nations,  the  United  States  and 
Japan,  whose  are  the  only  two  great  navies 
that  have  coastlines  on  that  ocean,  to 
represent  there  the  balance  of  power. 
This  is  the  best  security  for  international 
peace;  because  it  represents,  not  a  bargain, 
but  a  fact,  readily  ascertainable.  Those 
two  navies  are  more  easily  able  than  any 
other  to  maintain  there  a  concentration 
of  force;  and  it  may  even  be  questioned 
whether  sound  military  policy  may  not 
make  the  Pacific  rather  than  the  At- 
lantic  the   station   for   the    United    States 


In  International  Conditions  199 


battle  fleet.  For  the  balance  of  naval 
power  in  Europe,  which  compels  the  re- 
tention of  the  British  and  German  fleets 
in  the  North  Sea,  protects  the  Atlantic 
coast  of  the  United  States,  —  and  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  —  to  a  degree  to  which 
nothing  in  Pacific  conditions  corresponds. 
Under  existing  circumstances,  neither  Ger- 
many nor  Great  Britain  can  afford,  even 
did  they  desire,  to  infringe  the  external 
policy  of  the  United  States  represented  in 
the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

With  Japan  in  the  Pacific,  and  in  her 
attitude  towards  the  Open  Door,  the  case 
is  very  different  from  that  of  European  or 
American  Powers.  Her  nearness  to  China, 
Manchuria,  Korea,  gives  the  natural  com- 
mercial advantages  that  short  and  rapid 
transportation  always  confers.  Labor  with 
her  is  still  cheap,  another  advantage  in 
open  competition;  but  the  very  fact  of 
these   near   natural   markets,   and   her   in- 


200  The  Interest  of  America 

terest  in  them,  cannot  but  breed  that 
sense  of  proprietorship  which,  in  dealing 
with  ill-organized  states,  easily  glides  into 
the  attempt  at  political  control  that  ulti- 
mately means  control  by  force.  Hence  the 
frequent  reports,  true  or  untrue,  that  such 
advantage  is  sought  and  accomplished. 
Whether  true  or  not,  these  illustrate  what 
nations  continually  seek,  when  opportunity 
offers  or  can  be  made.  This  is  in  strict 
line  with  that  which  we  call  Protection; 
but  with  the  difference  that  Protection  is 
exercised  within  the  sphere  commonly 
recognized  as  legitimate,  either  by  Inter- 
national Law  or  by  the  policy  of  compet- 
ing states.  The  mingled  weakness  and 
perverseness  of  Chinese  negotiators  invite 
such  attempt,  and  endanger  the  Open 
Door;  give  rise  to  continual  suspicion  that 
undue  influence  resting  upon  force  is  affect- 
ing equality  of  treatment,  or  is  establish- 
ing  a   basis   for  inequality  in  the   future. 


In  International  Conditions  201 

There  can  be  no  question  that  the  gen- 
eral recent  attitude  of  Russia  and  Japan, 
however  laudably  meant,  does  arouse  such 
suspicions.1 

Then  again,  the  American  possession, 
the  Hawaiian  Islands,  are  predominantly- 
Japanese  in  labor  population;  a  condition 
which,  as  the  outcome  of  little  more  than 
a  generation,  warrants  the  jealousy  of 
Japanese  immigration  on  the  part  of  the 
Pacific  coast.  Finally,  the  population  of 
that  coast  is  relatively  scanty,  and  its  com- 
munications with  the  East,  though  rapid 
for  express  trains,  are  slow  for  the  immense 
traffic  of  men  and  stores  which  war  im- 
plies and  requires.  That  is,  the  power  of 
the  country  east  of  the  Rocky  Mountains 

1  See  a  very  significant  editorial,  "  The  Question  of 
Manchuria,"  in  the  London  Times  of  August  6,  19 10. 
The  Times  has  been  throughout  a  consistent  and  strong 
advocate  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance. 

See  also  "  The  Mystery  of  the  Status  Quo  "  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century  for  September. 


202  The  Interest  of  America 

has  far  to  go,  and  with  poor  conveyance, 
in  order  to  reinforce  the  Western  Coast;  the 
exact  opposite  of  our  advantage  of  rapid 
maritime  access  to  the  Panama  Canal. 
In  the  absence  of  the  fleet,  invasion  may 
be  easy.  Harm  may  be  retrieved  in  meas- 
ure by  the  arrival  of  the  fleet  later;  but 
under  present  world  conditions  the  Pacific 
coast  seems  incomparably  the  more  ex- 
posed of  the  three  great  divisions  of  the 
American  shore  line  —  the  Atlantic,  the 
Gulf,  and  the  Pacific. 

Such  a  conclusion  traverses  the  practice 
of  the  nation  since  it  became  a  nation;  but 
the  navies  of  Germany  and  of  Japan  are 
newcomers,  not  a  generation  of  mankind 
old.  The  international  effect  of  each,  as 
viewed  by  the  writer,  has  been  indicated; 
that  of  Japan  briefly,  that  of  Germany 
much  more  at  large  because  the  European 
system  is  excessively  complicated,  one  of 
checks  and  balances,  the  growth  and  de- 


In  International  Conditions  203 

velopment  of  centuries.  It  is  not  indeed 
very  difficult  to  understand  in  main  out- 
lines, but  it  involves  and  is  conditioned 
by  a  multiplicity  of  details,  requiring  much 
minute  information  and  much  historical 
knowledge  of  antecedents,  without  which 
appreciation  and  a  reasonably  accurate  es- 
timate of  probabilities  are  impossible. 

Such  knowledge  and  appreciation  are 
the  growth  of  a  lifetime;  the  business  of 
an  expert,  a  specialist;  confined  probably 
to  a  very  few  men  in  Europe,  and  for 
which  perhaps  no  American  has  exhaustive 
need.  But  while  the  helm  of  state  must 
be  committed  to  experts,  as  that  of  an 
army  to  generals,  national  movement,  like 
that  of  an  army,  is  compact  and  power- 
ful in  proportion  as  those  who  follow 
comprehend  and  share,  in  their  subordi- 
nate measure,  the  plans  and  spirit  of  the 
leader,  and  thus  are  prepared  to  give 
support    which,    to   be     really   dependable, 


204  The  Interest  of  America 

must  be  intelligent.  Comprehension  of 
the  great  issues  to  which,  in  our  day 
beyond  any  previous,  the  whole  world  is 
a  party,  needs  to  be  spread  among  our 
people,  because  as  never  before  these 
matters  concern  us  as  members  of  a  great 
family.  Thus  national  policy  will  become 
the  policy,  not  of  the  government  only, 
but  of  the  people;  giving  a  momentum  of 
unanimity  without  which  no  national 
movement  can  be  effective,  least  of  all  in 
external  policy  beyond  its  own  borders. 

During  the  year  1910  the  occurrence 
which  has  modified  most  noticeably  the 
inter-relations  of  states  has  been  the  Russo- 
Japanese  Convention  of  July  4.  The  full 
scope  of  this  is  not  yet  clearly  understood, 
but  evidently  there  is  contemplated  not 
only  an  accord  between  the  two  Powers 
as  regards  their  mutual  relations  at  their 
very  delicate  point  of  contact  in  the  Far 


In  International  Conditions  205 


East,  but  further  also  mutual  support 
against  the  intrusion  of  a  policy  foreign 
to  both.  In  such  possible  opposition  are 
included,  not  merely  European  or  Ameri- 
can states,  but  likewise  the  wishes  of 
China,  whose  proper  national  territory  is 
the  subject  of  the  Convention. 

The  date  of  this  Convention  follows 
quickly  —  as  diplomatic  movements  count 
quickness  —  upon  the  proposal  of  the 
United  States  to  insure  the  neutraliza- 
tion of  the  railroads  in  Chinese  territory, 
now  under  the  control  of  Japan  and  Russia, 
as  well  as  of  others  contemplated  in  Man- 
churia. Therefore,  although  public  assur- 
ance has  been  made  that  the  substance  of 
the  Convention  was  determined  before  the 
American  proposition  was  communicated, 
the  framing  of  the  agreement  may  seem 
to  indicate  a  direct  purpose  of  cooperation 
to  resist  any  possible  interference  having 
similar   ends  in   view.     Such   intervention, 


206  The  Interest  of  America 

however,  is  not  at  all  likely  to  take  place, 
except  in  the  shape  of  diplomatic  repre- 
sentation, unless  hindrance  to  the  free 
working  of  the  Open  Door  should  seem 
likely  to  result.  Such  hindrance  would 
affect  similarly  all  maritime  nations,  whose 
combined  navies  still  hold  in  their  hands 
the  ultimate  effectual  control  of  such  a 
situation,  as  actually  as  they  did  ten 
years  ago.  Otherwise,  the  prescriptions 
of  the  Open  Door  being  observed,  con- 
ditions in  Europe  are  too  delicate  to 
permit  interference;  and  Germany  at  least 
will  not  fall  into  the  mistake  made  by 
Great  Britain  of  undertaking  any  measure 
liable  to  relieve,  or  to  withdraw,  Russia 
from  entanglements  in  the  Far  Ea9t,  for 
this  would  by  so  far  add  to  her  power  to 
bring  pressure  to  bear  upon  Germany  in 
Europe. 

This    aspect    of  the    recent    Convention, 
indeed,  has  been  jealously  noted  at  once. 


In  International  Conditions  207 

It  may  contribute  eventually  to  retard  the 
progress  of  the  German  navy,  which 
hitherto  has  been  directly  facilitated  by 
the  weakening  of  Russia  through  her  dis- 
astrous war  with  Japan,  and  by  the  in- 
ternal troubles  ensuant.  The  success  of 
Japan  owed  much  to  the  treaty  of  alliance 
with  Great  Britain,  which  effectually  de- 
terred France  from  such  cooperation  with 
her  ally  Russia  as  she  had  extended  in 
1895.  Great  Britain  thus  contributed, 
scarcely  indirectly,  to  that  removal  of 
Russian  incidence  upon  Germany  which 
has  facilitated  financially  the  upbuilding 
of  the  German  navy,  but  which  may  be 
counteracted  in  part  by  the  recent  agree- 
ments between  Japan  and  Russia. 

The  argument  against  the  Anglo- Japanese 
alliance,  as  a  measure  of  policy  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain,  suggested  before  the  war 
between  Japan  and  Russia,  was  that  the 
more    heavily    Russia    became    engaged    in 


208  The  Interest  of  America 

the  Far  East,  in  her  endeavor  to  reach  an 
ice-free  sea,  the  less  could  she  bear  upon 
British  interests  in  the  Levant  and  in  the 
Middle  East;  notably  in  Persia  and  Af- 
ghanistan. There  is  a  limit,  usually  finan- 
cial, to  national  aggressiveness.  In  the 
Far  East  Russia  was  then  confronted  by 
Japan;  and  not  by  Japan  alone,  but  by 
every  nation  interested  in  that  freedom  of 
trade  with  China  which  has  given  origin 
to  the  expression,  the  Open  Door.  There 
could  be  no  question  that  should  Russia 
there  attempt  exclusion,  or  undue  control, 
she  would  be  face  to  face  with  all  naval 
Powers,  whose  common  interest  in  calling 
her  to  order  would  insure  cooperation  so 
far;  and  farther  would  not  be  certainly 
desirable.  Meanwhile,  Russia's  preoccu- 
pations there  would  limit  necessarily  her 
action  elsewhere;  in  the  Balkans,  in  Persia, 
and  on  the  German  frontier.  It  is  believed 
that     German    statesmanship    encouraged 


In  International  Conditions  209 

Russia  to  undertake  national  enterprise  in 
the  distant  East,  after  the  time  when  the 
policy  of  Bismarck  sought  alliance  with 
Austria-Hungary  preferably  to  that  with 
the  Czar.  The  joint  intervention  of  1895, 
to  which  Germany  was  a  party,  by  depriv- 
ing Japan  of  Port  Arthur  helped  markedly 
to  determine  towards  the  Farther  East 
Russia's  main  effort  of  expansion,  until  she 
was  checked  by  Japan.  As  has  been  shown 
by  recent  occurrences,  the  profound  humili- 
ation and  weakening  of  Russia  contributes 
to  enhance  this  limitation  upon  her  in- 
fluence in  Europe;  while  at  the  same  time 
the  commercial  and  naval  nations,  Great 
Britain  included,  find  themselves  confronted 
in  Manchuria  with  two  particular  national 
interests  established  in  possession,  instead 
of  one. 

The  late  conventions  between  Japan  and 
Russia  as  to  their  position  in  Manchuria, 
and  that  between  Great  Britain  and  Rus- 


210  The  Interest  of  America 

sia  as  to  their  mutual  relations  and  accord- 
ant action  in  Persia,  are  direct  outcomes 
of  the  late  war  in  the  Far  East,  and  are 
incidents  in  the  general  combination  which 
half  unconsciously  has  been  forming  among 
the  European  states,  as  the  result  of  the 
German  predominance.  Of  this  the  most 
threatening  exponent  has  been  the  growth 
of  the  German  navy.  The  various  conven- 
tions have  their  one  unifying  motive  in  the 
relief  of  mutual  pressure  between  the  states 
contracting  them,  in  order  to  increase  their 
ability  to  balance  the  two  mid-Europe  mili- 
tary monarchies. 

The  general  movement  of  which  these 
are  specific  incidents  encounters  neces- 
sarily the  difficulty  which  attends  all  arti- 
ficial combinations.  Conflict  of  aims  is 
the  gnawing  defect  of  most  alliances  not 
founded  upon  immediate  dominant  inter- 
ests, as  that  between  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  has  been  estimated  to  be.     So  far 


In  International  Conditions  211 

and  so  long  as  paper  conventions  can  com- 
pose clashing  interests,  to  the  mutual  re- 
lief of  the  parties  concerned,  so  good;  but 
the  motive  of  the  two  conventions  speci- 
fied is  not  local,  but  remote.  They  have 
been  contracted,  not  chiefly  to  reconcile 
immediate  difficulties  on  the  spot,  which 
have  not  ceased  to  exist,  and  are  merely 
postponed,  but  in  order  to  affect  distant 
contingencies.  The  contrary  interests  of 
Japan  and  Russia  in  the  Far  East  are  no 
less  than  they  were,  nor  have  they  ceased 
to  haunt  the  background  of  the  national 
consciousness.  Like  a  quarreling  couple, 
they  have  for  the  moment  joined  hands 
against  outsiders,  but  their  own  causes  of 
variance  remain,  and  will  receive  a  so- 
lution of  force;  not  necessarily  of  war. 
The  timely  exhibition  of  force  may  pre- 
vent open  war;  but  it  is  scarcely  for 
merely  commercial  reasons  that  the  Rus- 
sian    Duma,     in     the    face     of     notorious 


212  The  Interest  of  America 

money  embarrassments,  has  been  induced 
to  authorize  the  double  tracking  and  gen- 
eral improvement  of  the  Siberian  railroad, 
the  imperfect  construction  of  which  so 
vitally  affected  the  exertion  of  Russian 
strength,  despite  the  eminent  adminis- 
trative supervision  displayed  during  the 
war.  Nor  is  the  annexation  of  Korea, 
formally  effected  since  these  pages  were 
written,  calculated  wholly  to  soothe  Rus- 
sian susceptibilities.  It  is  perfectly  un- 
derstandable, all  the  same,  that  Russia  for 
the  moment  may  prefer  to  join  hands  with 
Japan  in  resisting  tendencies  which  would 
complicate  the  situation  by  bringing  upon 
the  scene  other  Powers;  and  the  case  is 
much  the  same  in  Persia  as  regards  Great 
Britain  and  Russia,  as  has  been  shown 
from  time  to  time  by  slight  straws  im- 
pelled by  puffs  of  wind. 


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